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TCI, Transcontinental Realty Investors Inc.
Transcontinental Realty Investors Inc. is a fully integrated externally managed real estate company.
We have no employees and rely upon the employees of Pillar to render services to us in accordance with the terms of the Advisory Agreement and the Cash Management Agreement.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 11/3–11/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 30% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −13%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 30% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $118M | $125M | $149M | $48M | $57M | $41M | $37M | $50M | $47M | $49M | $50M | RevenueRevenue |
| $37K | ($16M) | $181M | ($27M) | $7M | $9M | $468M | $6M | $6M | $14M | $8M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $24M | $26M | $31M | $16M | $19M | $15M | $13M | $15M | $13M | $13M | $14M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $2M | ($25M) | ($181M) | ($36M) | $6M | ($11M) | ($45M) | ($31M) | $1M | ($3M) | $2M | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| ($67M) | ($98M) | $148M | ($10M) | $381K | $100M | $307M | $27M | ($42M) | ($36M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $61M | $156M | $52M | $22M | ($2M) | ($104M) | ($112M) | ($139M) | $2M | $28M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($3M) | $33M | $18M | ($23M) | $4M | ($14M) | $150M | ($143M) | ($39M) | ($11M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $1.2B | $464M | $478M | $460M | $359M | $560M | $569M | $636M | $207M | $207M | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $862M | $866M | $879M | $788M | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| 71% | 68% | 33% | 29% | 27% | 22% | 15% | 17% | 17% | 19% | 19% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $842M | $894M | $286M | $253M | $236M | $177M | $184M | $179M | $182M | $211M | $214M | Total debtDebt |
| $824M | $852M | $249M | $202M | $199M | $110M | ($49M) | $52M | $82M | $122M | $130M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $961M | $1.1B | $482M | $512M | $518M | $417M | $378M | $196M | $218M | $266M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $19M | $19M | $21M | $21M | $20M | $20M | $21M | $21M | $21M | $19M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $206M | $189M | $360M | $333M | $342M | $351M | $819M | $826M | $832M | $847M | $846M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 8.7M | 8.7M | 8.7M | 8.7M | 8.6M | 8.6M | 8.6M | 8.6M | 8.6M | 8.6M | 8.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $23.62 | $21.70 | $41.26 | $38.15 | $39.56 | $40.65 | $94.85 | $95.61 | $96.34 | $98.01 | $97.93 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −9.2%/yr | −3.0%/yr |
| EPS | +93.3%/yr | +15.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −63.6%/yr (2-yr) | −63.6%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | +17.1%/yr | +19.9%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $14M + ST investments $75M − debt $253M
What this means
Netting $89M of cash and short-term investments against $253M of debt leaves $164M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -3%–7%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($4M) ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.21×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($3M) ÷ net income $14M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $49M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −85%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.97/share (latest year $1.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $96.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 20% → −15% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 20% early to −15% lately, median −13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −39.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate sector
Too few catalog companies share this one's industry, so the bench widens to its sector, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REAXThe Real Brokerage Inc. | $2.0B | 9% | -4.5% | -223% | 3% |
| GDSGDS Holdings Limited ADS | $1.7B | 23% | 6.7% | -1%4y | -19% |
| FORForestar Group Inc Common Stock | $1.7B | 21% | 14.3% | 7% | -11% |
| HHHHoward Hughes Holdings Inc. | $1.5B | — | 23.8% | 4%2y | 19% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38%3y | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| ASPSAltisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. | $171M | 26% | 2.4% | 5% | -3% |
| TCITranscontinental Realty Investors Inc. | $49M | — | -12.6% | -0% | -65%3y |
| RITRReitar Logtech Holdings Limited | as filed: HK$378M | 26% | 11.2% | 24% | -3% |
| Group median | — | — | 8.9% | 5% | -3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFTranscontinental Realty Investors Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered−0%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← TCBX its page in the Manual TCMD →
Industry order: ← SUI the REITs — Residential chapter UDR →