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AEP, American Electric Power Company Inc.

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

Electric markets served by AEP's public utility subsidiaries.

The service areas of AEP's public utility subsidiaries cover portions of the states of Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.

The public utility subsidiaries of AEP have traditionally provided electric service, consisting of generation, transmission and distribution, on an integrated basis to their retail customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

AEP · American Electric Power Company Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$21.9B

+10.9% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $22.8B 5-yr avg $19.4B

Operating margin 23.0% 5-yr avg 20.6%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 13%

Free cash flow margin −10% 5-yr avg −8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 19% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 39% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 30, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 7.0% year over year; operating income down 10.9%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2026
											Income statement
$16.4B	$15.4B	$16.2B	$15.6B	$14.9B	$16.8B	$19.6B	$19.0B	$19.7B	$21.9B	$22.8B	RevenueRevenue
$1.2B	$3.5B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$3.4B	$3.5B	$3.6B	$4.3B	$5.3B	$5.2B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
7.1%	22.9%	16.6%	16.7%	20.0%	20.3%	17.7%	18.7%	21.8%	24.3%	23.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$547M	$2.9B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.9B	$3.8B	—	Pretax incomePretax
$611M	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$3.0B	$3.6B	$3.1B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	33%	6%	-1%	2%	4%	0%	2%	-1%	3%	2%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$4.5B	$4.3B	$5.2B	$4.3B	$3.8B	$3.8B	$5.3B	$5.0B	$6.8B	$6.9B	$7.7B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.3B	DepreciationDeprec.
$2.2B	$649M	$1.3B	$145M	($855M)	($1.4B)	($92M)	($123M)	$688M	$39M	$1.2B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4.8B	$5.7B	$6.3B	$6.1B	$6.2B	$5.7B	$6.7B	$7.4B	$7.6B	$8.5B	$10.0B	CapexCapex
29.2%	36.9%	39.0%	38.9%	41.9%	33.7%	34.0%	38.9%	38.7%	38.6%	44.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.8B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$2.1B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$3.7B	$3.6B	$4.4B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
17.3%	16.6%	20.1%	13.3%	9.0%	6.7%	11.3%	11.0%	18.5%	16.5%	19.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($259M)	($1.4B)	($1.1B)	($1.8B)	($2.4B)	($1.8B)	($1.4B)	($2.4B)	($827M)	($1.5B)	($2.3B)	Free cash flowFCF
−1.6%	−9.2%	−6.7%	−11.4%	−16.2%	−10.8%	−7.0%	−12.5%	−4.2%	−6.9%	−10.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
($5.0B)	($3.7B)	($6.4B)	($7.1B)	($6.2B)	($6.4B)	($7.8B)	($6.3B)	($7.6B)	($11.9B)	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$504M	($605M)	$1.2B	$2.9B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$1.1B	$659M	$5.0B	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$34M	$9M	$32M	($12M)	$6M	$13M	$105M	($178M)	($133M)	$22M	—	Change in cashΔ cash
3%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	5%	6%	7%	6%	ROICROIC
4%	10%	10%	10%	11%	11%	10%	9%	11%	11%	10%	Return on equityROE
−3%	4%	4%	3%	4%	4%	3%	2%	4%	5%	3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$349M	$376M	$393M	$450M	$594M	$624M	$697M	$544M	$418M	$417M	$603M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.7B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.0B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.7B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.7B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$3.4B	$4.0B	Accounts payablePayables
$228M	($174M)	$52M	($381M)	$133M	($113M)	($3M)	$415M	($6M)	($562M)	($934M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6.0B	$4.3B	$4.1B	$4.1B	$4.4B	$7.8B	$6.8B	$6.1B	$5.8B	$6.1B	$7.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$9.5B	$8.3B	$8.6B	$10.3B	$9.9B	$12.4B	$13.3B	$11.6B	$13.0B	$13.3B	$14.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×	0.5×	0.5×	0.4×	0.4×	0.6×	0.5×	0.5×	0.4×	0.5×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$45.6B	$50.3B	$55.1B	$60.1B	$63.9B	$66.0B	$73.3B	$564M	$715M	$736M	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$5.8B	$3.9B	$3.5B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$4.8B	$6.1B	$5.6B	$5.6B	$5.2B	—	Regulatory assetsReg. assets
$3.8B	$8.4B	$8.6B	$8.5B	$8.4B	$8.7B	$8.1B	$8.2B	$8.4B	$8.4B	—	Regulatory liabilitiesReg. liab.
$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	GoodwillGoodwill
$63.5B	$64.7B	$68.8B	$75.9B	$80.8B	$87.7B	$93.4B	$96.7B	$103.1B	$114.5B	$121.6B	Total assetsAssets
$20.3B	$21.2B	$23.3B	$26.7B	$31.1B	$33.5B	$36.8B	$40.1B	$42.6B	$47.3B	$50.8B	Total debtDebt
$19.9B	$20.8B	$23.0B	$26.3B	$30.5B	$32.8B	$36.1B	$39.6B	$42.2B	$46.9B	$50.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$877M	$895M	$984M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.2B	Interest expenseInt. exp.
1.3×	3.9×	2.7×	2.4×	2.6×	2.8×	2.5×	2.0×	2.3×	2.6×	2.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$46.0B	—	—	—	—	—	—	$71.4B	$76.1B	—	—	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$23M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$39M	$42M	—	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$17.4B	$18.3B	$19.0B	$19.6B	$20.6B	$22.4B	$23.9B	$25.2B	$26.9B	$31.1B	$32.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
492M	493M	494M	495M	497M	502M	513M	520M	531M	537M	551M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$33.32	$31.31	$32.80	$31.42	$30.00	$33.46	$38.25	$36.49	$37.12	$40.70	$41.39	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.24	$3.88	$3.90	$3.88	$4.42	$4.96	$4.49	$4.24	$5.58	$6.66	$5.70	EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.76	$5.20	$6.60	$4.17	$2.71	$2.24	$4.31	$4.01	$6.88	$6.73	$7.93	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.53	$-2.88	$-2.20	$-3.60	$-4.85	$-3.63	$-2.69	$-4.55	$-1.56	$-2.81	$-4.26	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.28	$2.42	$2.54	$2.73	$2.87	$3.03	$3.20	$3.37	$3.57	$3.74	$3.68	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$9.72	$11.55	$12.78	$12.22	$12.56	$11.28	$12.99	$14.18	$14.36	$15.73	$18.23	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$35.38	$37.12	$38.54	$39.64	$41.33	$44.71	$46.53	$48.53	$50.71	$57.93	$58.26	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.2%/yr	+6.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+1.7%/yr	+20.0%/yr
EPS	+20.5%/yr	+8.5%/yr
Dividends / share	+5.6%/yr	+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.5%/yr	+4.6%/yr
Book value / share	+5.6%/yr	+7.0%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $3.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put $5.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.5B).

Reported net income$3.6B

Owner earnings$3.6B · 17% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$3.6B	$3.0B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$3.3B	+$3.1B	+$2.9B	+$3.1B	+$2.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$39M	+$688M	−$123M	−$92M	−$1.4B
Cash from operations	$6.9B	$6.8B	$5.0B	$5.3B	$3.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$3.3B	−$3.1B	−$2.9B	−$3.1B	−$2.7B
Owner earnings	$3.6B	$3.7B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$1.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$5.1B	−$4.5B	−$4.5B	−$3.6B	−$2.9B
Free cash flow	($1.5B)	($827M)	($2.4B)	($1.4B)	($1.8B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	17%	19%	11%	11%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $3.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $5.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

A regulated utility reads differently here. What it spends above depreciation goes into rate base, where the commission lets it earn the allowed return and recover the capital, with interest, over decades — growth that is financed, not taken out of owners' pockets this year. So the truth sits between the bridge's two ends: owner earnings excuses the build-out entirely, free cash flow charges it entirely, and the scorecard's utility-plant figure shows how fast the base earning that return is compounding.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

The allowed return, earned and credited

Earned return on equity 10.3%

Earning the allowed return

Median over 10 readable years · latest FY2025: 11.5% (net income $3.6B ÷ equity $31.1B)

What this means
A commission caps what a regulated utility may earn on shareholders' capital, so the question is not whether the return is high but whether the company actually earns what it is allowed — persistent under-earning means costs the regulator will not put in rates, and a return above the band usually means unregulated businesses in the mix. Read through the record, because a single year carries rate-case timing noise.
AFUDC in earnings 6.8%

Construction credit in earnings

Equity allowance for funds used during construction $245M ÷ net income $3.6B

What this means
While a plant is under construction the commission lets the utility credit itself the allowed return on the capital tied up — a real, allowed profit that arrives as a bookkeeping entry now and as cash only after the plant enters rates. A large share means heavy reinvestment at the allowed return, the thing Berkshire's utility letters prize; it also means that much of this year's earnings has not yet been collected from anyone.

The invested base and the regulatory ledger

Net utility plant $91.6B

Growing ≈ 9.7%/yr

Utility plant net of depreciation, as filed · FY2023→FY2025: $76.1B → $91.6B, ≈ 9.7%/yr

What this means
The closest filed figure to the rate base — the invested capital the commission sets the allowed return on. Its growth rate is the utility's reinvestment runway: under regulation, earnings power compounds roughly as fast as the base the return is earned on, funded by capital the regulator lets the company recover with interest. Rate base itself is not tagged in any structured filing, so this is the proxy, labeled as what it is.
Regulatory assets & liabilities $5.2B / $8.4B

Owes ratepayers

Regulatory assets $5.2B · regulatory liabilities $8.4B · net $3.2B liability position, as filed

What this means
The ledger of the regulatory relationship: assets are costs the commission has agreed the utility may collect from ratepayers in future rates, liabilities are amounts it must give back. Both are promises whose worth depends entirely on the commissions that made them — which is why they are shown as filed and never netted into earnings adjustments here.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $21.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt

What this means
Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $47.3B vs $31.1B equity

What this means
Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +97%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.36/share (latest year $6.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $57.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 16% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 16% early to 22% lately, median 19% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 7.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +1.0%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Rate cases, in the filing’s words

FY2025 10-Kthe filing, SEC EDGAR →

A regulated utility does not set its own price. It asks a commission for one, case by case, and the commission grants some part of it. Below are the proceedings this filing puts on the record, quoted verbatim, largest dollars first. Nothing here is computed; every figure is the filer’s own sentence.

Oklahoma Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 299 millionreturn on equity10.5 %
“In January 2026, PSO filed a request with the OCC for a $ 299 million annual base rate increase based upon a 10.5 % ROE with a capital structure of 50.1 % debt and 49.9 % common equity, net of existing rider revenue and certain incremental renewable facility benefits expected to be provided to customers through riders.”
2024 West Virginia Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 251 millionreturn on equity10.8 %
“In November 2024, APCo and WPCo (the Companies) filed a request with the WVPSC for a net $ 251 million annual increase in base rates based upon a proposed 10.8 % ROE and a proposed capital structure of 52 % debt and 48 % common equity.”
2024 Oklahoma Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 218 millionreturn on equity10.8 %
“In January 2024, PSO filed a request with the OCC for a $ 218 million annual base rate increase based upon a 10.8 % ROE with a capital structure of 48.9 % debt and 51.1 % common equity.”
2025 Texas Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 164 millionreturn on equity10.75 %
“In October 2025, SWEPCo filed a request with the PUCT for a $ 164 million annual increase in Texas base rates based upon a 10.75 % ROE and a proposed capital structure of 48 % debt and 52 % common equity.”
2024 Oklahoma Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 120 millionreturn on equity9.5 %
“In October 2024, PSO, the OCC and certain intervenors filed a joint stipulation and settlement agreement with the OCC that included a net annual revenue increase of $ 120 million based upon a 9.5 % ROE with a capital structure of 48.9 % debt and 51.1 % common equity.”
Kentucky Base Rate Caserequested by the filer
$ 96 millionreturn on equity10 %
“In August 2025, KPCo filed a request with the KPSC for a $ 96 million net annual increase in base rates based upon a proposed 10 % ROE and a proposed capital structure of 53.9 % debt and 46.1 % common equity, to be implemented no earlier than March 2026.”

Sentences from the Regulatory Matters and Pending Proceedings disclosures and the MD&A of the latest 10-K, largest dollars first, at most six. “Granted” marks a sentence in which the commission itself is the subject of the approving verb; everything else renders as a request, never as a decided outcome. A return on equity is shown only where the filer states one between 8 and 13 percent — the same figure in these filings also carries equity ratios and fair-value returns, and a number that must be interpreted before it can be believed is not shown at all. Nothing here says whether a case is still pending: filings state timings that are already past by the time they are read.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$7.1B

Cash & short-term investments$603M
Receivables$3.0B
Other current assets$3.5B

Current liabilities$14.2B

Debt due within a year$2.8B
Accounts payable$4.0B
Other current liabilities$7.4B

Current ratio0.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.50×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($7.0B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$2.8B due · $603M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$32.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($81.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$51.5B$662M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$515Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$3.2B

'27$2.5B

'28$3.5B

'29$2.9B

'30$1.8B

later$33.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3.2Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$5.6Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$3.5Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$47.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Jun 30, 2026$603M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.6B

Together, against $3.2B due next year1.3×

Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.2B against the $3.2B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Regulatory matters, in the filing’s words

FY2025 10-Kthe filing, SEC EDGAR →

For a rate-regulated utility the commission’s pen writes the economics. Two things it wrote here, quoted verbatim from the 10-K, gravest dollars first: costs the commission disallowed, and catastrophe or retirement costs moved off the meter through securitization bonds. Nothing below is computed; every figure is the filer’s own sentence.

Disallowances the filing records

$ 232 million$ 136 million$ 321 millioncommission action
“In January 2024, the WVPSC issued an order resolving APCo's and WPCo's ( the Companies) 2021-2023 ENEC cases. In the order, the WVPSC: (a) disallowed $ 232 million in ENEC under-recovered costs as of February 28, 2023 ($ 136 million related to APCo) and (b) approved the recovery of $ 321 million of ENEC under-recovered costs as of February 28, 2023 ($ 174 million related to APCo) plus a 4 % debt carrying charge rate over a ten-year recovery period starting September 1, 2024.”
$ 232 millioncommission action
“In March 2025, the WVPSC entered an order in the Companies' 2021-2023 ENEC remand cases further describing its calculations of the ordered $ 232 million disallowance.”
$ 3 millioncommission action
“In July 2025, the MPSC issued an order resulting in a combined $ 3 million PSCR cost disallowance related to OVEC and Rockport UPA costs.”

Costs financed through securitization bonds

$ 1.4 billionrequest or proceeding
“In July 2025, APCo filed a request with the Virginia SCC to finance, through the issuance of proposed 20 -year securitization bonds, approximately $ 1.4 billion of Virginia jurisdictional undepreciated property balances and a major storm operation and maintenance regulatory asset deferral balance.”
$478 million$500 million$311 millionbonds issued
“In June 2025, KPCo issued $478 million of securitization bonds to recover $500 million of regulatory assets, including $311 million of plant retirement costs, $79 million of deferred storm costs related to 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 major storms, $56 million of under-recovered purchased power rider costs, $51 million of deferred purchased power expenses and $3 million of issuance-related expenses, including KPSC advisor expenses.”
$ 471 millionrequest or proceeding
“In conjunction with its June 2023 filing, KPCo further requested to finance through the issuance of securitization bonds, approximately $ 471 million of regulatory assets.”

Sentences from the Regulatory Matters disclosures and MD&A of the latest 10-K, largest dollars first, at most three to a lane. “Commission action” and “bonds issued” mark sentences that carry the completed act in the filer’s own verb; everything else renders as a recording, request, or proceeding — never as a decided outcome. A filer with no qualifying sentence shows nothing here.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $50.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$64.9B · 130%
Dividends$15.2B · 30%

Returned to owners$15.2B
61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $15.2B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$30.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $30.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $20.3B to $50.8B.
Net change in share count12.0%
The diluted count rose from 492M to 551M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$3.74/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained3%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($7.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $235M, so each retained $1 added about 0.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

CEO pay ratio261:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	ROEmedian over the record	Plant growthannualized over the record	Dividend / cashmedian over the record
SOSouthern Company (The)	$29.6B	11%	4.5%	40%
NEENextEra Energy Inc.	$27.4B	12%	—	33%
AEPAmerican Electric Power Company Inc.	$21.9B	10%	9.7%	30%
EIXEdison International	$19.3B	6%	6.2%	25%
DTBDTE Energy Co	$15.8B	11%	5.8%	26%
FEFirstEnergy Corp.	$15.1B	9%	7.5%	33%
ESEversource Energy (D/B/A)	$13.5B	9%	8.9%	35%
ETREntergy Corporation	$12.9B	10%	7.3%	25%
Group median	—	10%	7.3%	31%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what American Electric Power Company Inc. has delivered.

American Electric Power Company Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, American Electric Power Company Inc. earns about $3.3B on its 14.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($3.3B) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($4.4B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($2.3B) on 544M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-30; net debt $50.2B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10.0B) runs well above depreciation ($3.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh AEP against another business →

The owners of AEP: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "American Electric Power Company Inc. (AEP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AEP, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← AEO its page in the Manual AES →

Industry order: ← 9503 the Electric Utilities chapter AES →