Owner Scorecard
An independent research publication · records as of July 18, 2026

← All companies ← AEP Manual AESI → ← AEP Electric Utilities AQN →

AES, AES Corp.

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

AES Corp. is an outline of our strategy and our businesses by SBU, including key financial drivers.

Together with our many stakeholders, we are improving lives by delivering the greener, smarter energy solutions the world needs.

Our diverse workforce is committed to continuous innovation and operational excellence, while partnering with our customers on their strategic energy transitions and continuing to meet their energy needs today.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AES · AES Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.2B
−0.4% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $12.5B 5-yr avg $12.2B
Gross margin 19% 5-yr avg 21%
Operating margin 20.3% 5-yr avg 13.6%
Owner-earnings margin 29% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin −12% 5-yr avg −21%

Next report Est. 8/3–8/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~32 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 48% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 0.4% and 28% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 23% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

59% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States41%$5.1B
  • Chile12%$1.5B
  • Dominican Republic11%$1.4B
  • El Salvador9%$1.1B
  • Mexico6%$760M
  • Bulgaria6%$687M
  • Other18%$2.2B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$10.3B$10.5B$10.7B$10.2B$9.7B$11.1B$12.6B$12.7B$12.3B$12.2B$12.5BRevenueRevenue
$2.4B$2.5B—$2.3B$2.7B$2.7B$2.5B$2.5B—$2.2B$2.4BGross profitGross prof.
23%23%—23%28%24%20%20%—18%19%Gross marginGross mgn
2%2%2%2%2%1%2%2%2%2%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$36M$999M$3.0B$1.7B$1.3B$369M$836M$1.8B$3.2B$2.1B$2.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
0.4%9.5%27.6%16.7%13.5%3.3%6.6%14.4%26.3%17.5%20.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($354M)($521M)($509M)($277M)($192M)$644M$96M$104M$894M$75M—Pretax incomePretax
($1.1B)($1.2B)$1.2B$303M$46M($409M)($546M)$249M$1.7B$910M$1.4BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$2.9B$2.5B$2.3B$2.5B$2.8B$1.9B$2.7B$3.0B$2.8B$4.3B$5.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.2B$1.2B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.5B$1.6BDepreciationDeprec.
$2.9B$2.5B$137M$1.1B$1.6B$1.3B$4.3B$3.9B$2.3B$4.9B$5.2BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2.3B$2.2B$2.1B$2.4B$1.9B$2.1B$4.6B$7.7B$7.4B$5.9B$6.4BCapexCapex
22.8%20.7%19.8%23.6%19.7%19.0%36.1%61.0%60.2%48.5%51.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.7B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$846M$1.4B$1.7B$1.5B$3.1B$3.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
16.7%12.7%12.5%13.9%17.5%7.6%11.3%13.7%12.2%24.9%29.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$552M$327M$222M$61M$855M($214M)($1.8B)($4.7B)($4.6B)($1.6B)($1.5B)Free cash flowFCF
5.4%3.1%2.1%0.6%8.9%−1.9%−14.6%−37.0%−37.8%−13.3%−11.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$52M$609M$66M$192M$136M$658M$243M$542M$246M$108M$104MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$290M$317M$344M$362M$381M$401M$422M$444M$483M$501M$501MDividends paidDiv. paid
$79M$0$0————————BuybacksBuybacks
($2.1B)($2.6B)($505M)($2.7B)($2.3B)($3.1B)($5.8B)($8.2B)($7.7B)($6.2B)—Investing cash flowInv. cash
($747M)$43M($1.6B)($86M)($78M)$797M$3.8B$5.4B$5.0B$2.0B—Financing cash flowFin. cash
$37M$8M($54M)($18M)($24M)($46M)($56M)($270M)($63M)($27M)—Exchange-rate effectFX
-40%-47%38%10%2%-15%-22%10%46%22%31%Return on equityROE
−51%−60%27%−2%−13%−29%−40%−8%33%10%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.8B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$2.1B$1.8B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.8B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$622M$562M$577M$487M$461M$604M$1.1B$712M$593M$612M$648MInventoryInvent.
$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.7B$2.2B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0BAccounts payablePayables
$805M$654M$843M$655M$605M$869M$1.1B($67M)$585M$315M$337MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$6.4B$6.4B$5.0B$5.2B$5.4B$5.4B$7.6B$6.6B$6.8B$6.5B$6.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$5.3B$6.0B$4.4B$5.1B$5.4B$4.7B$6.5B$9.7B$8.6B$8.5B$8.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.1×1.1×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.2×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$20.4B$20.3B$21.4B$22.6B$22.8B$19.9B$23.0B$30.0B$33.2B$37.8B—Net PP&ENet PP&E
$743M$661M$703M$643M$700M$1.0B$961M$963M$1.1B$1.0B—Regulatory assetsReg. assets
$843M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$877M$750M$585M$483M—Regulatory liabilitiesReg. liab.
$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$362M$348M$345M$342M$342MGoodwillGoodwill
$36.1B$33.1B$32.5B$33.6B$34.6B$33.0B$38.4B$44.8B$47.4B$51.8B$52.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$911M$1.1B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BInterest expenseInt. exp.
0.0×0.9×2.8×1.6×1.3×0.4×0.7×1.4×2.2×1.5×1.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$782M$837M$879M$888M$872M$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$938M$2.8B—Redeemable interestsRedeemable
$2.9B$2.4B$2.4B$2.2B$2.1B$1.8B$2.1B$3.5B$4.1B$5.0B—Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$2.8B$2.5B$3.2B$3.0B$2.6B$2.8B$2.4B$2.5B$3.6B$4.1B$4.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
660M660M665M667M668M666M668M712M713M714M715MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.58$15.95$16.14$15.28$14.46$16.73$18.89$17.79$17.22$17.13$17.46Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.71$-1.76$1.81$0.45$0.07$-0.61$-0.82$0.35$2.35$1.27$1.89EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.61$2.02$2.02$2.13$2.53$1.27$2.13$2.44$2.09$4.27$5.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.84$0.50$0.33$0.09$1.28$-0.32$-2.75$-6.59$-6.51$-2.27$-2.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44$0.48$0.52$0.54$0.57$0.60$0.63$0.62$0.68$0.70$0.70Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.55$3.30$3.19$3.61$2.84$3.18$6.81$10.85$10.37$8.30$9.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.23$3.73$4.82$4.49$3.94$4.20$3.65$3.49$5.11$5.69$6.18Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.1%/yr+3.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.6%/yr+11.1%/yr
EPS—+79.3%/yr
Dividends / share+5.3%/yr+4.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.9%/yr+23.9%/yr
Book value / share+3.3%/yr+7.6%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put $4.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.6B).

Reported net income$910M
Owner earnings$3.1B · 25% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$910M$1.7B$249M($546M)($409M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back————+$1.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$3.4B+$1.1B+$2.8B+$3.3B+$1.3B
Cash from operations$4.3B$2.8B$3.0B$2.7B$1.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1.3B−$1.3B−$1.3B−$1.3B−$1.1B
Owner earnings$3.1B$1.5B$1.7B$1.4B$846M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$4.7B−$6.1B−$6.4B−$3.3B−$1.1B
Free cash flow($1.6B)($4.6B)($4.7B)($1.8B)($214M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue25%12%14%11%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $4.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

A regulated utility reads differently here. What it spends above depreciation goes into rate base, where the commission lets it earn the allowed return and recover the capital, with interest, over decades — growth that is financed, not taken out of owners' pockets this year. So the truth sits between the bridge's two ends: owner earnings excuses the build-out entirely, free cash flow charges it entirely, and the scorecard's utility-plant figure shows how fast the base earning that return is compounding.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

The allowed return, earned and credited

  • Earned return on equity 5.9%
    Under-earning
    Median over 10 readable years · latest FY2025: 22.4% (net income $910M ÷ equity $4.1B)
    What this means

    A commission caps what a regulated utility may earn on shareholders' capital, so the question is not whether the return is high but whether the company actually earns what it is allowed — persistent under-earning means costs the regulator will not put in rates, and a return above the band usually means unregulated businesses in the mix. Read through the record, because a single year carries rate-case timing noise.

  • AFUDC in earnings —
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The equity allowance for funds used during construction is not tagged in this filer's structured data — the construction credit, if any, lives in the 10-K's rate-matters note.

The invested base and the regulatory ledger

  • Net utility plant —
    Not enough data
    What this means

    No undimensioned utility-plant figure is tagged in this filer's structured data.

  • Regulatory assets & liabilities $1.0B / $483M
    Owed recovery from ratepayers
    Regulatory assets $1.0B · regulatory liabilities $483M · net $517M asset position, as filed
    What this means

    The ledger of the regulatory relationship: assets are costs the commission has agreed the utility may collect from ratepayers in future rates, liabilities are amounts it must give back. Both are promises whose worth depends entirely on the commissions that made them — which is why they are shown as filed and never netted into earnings adjustments here.

  • What these figures mix —
    Consolidated, not the regulated book alone
    What this means

    This is a holding company whose consolidated figures mix the regulated utility with substantial unregulated businesses, and the filing does not separate the regulated share in structured form. The earned return and the balance-sheet lines above describe the whole enterprise; the segment note in the 10-K is where the regulated book stands alone.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity —
    Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
    What this means

    Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.

  • Conservative debt —
    Debt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · —
    What this means

    The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth —
    Earnings +33% over the record · —
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price —
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.33/share (latest year $1.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 12% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 19% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 0.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.9%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$6.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.7B
  • Receivables$1.7B
  • Inventory$648M
  • Other current assets$2.2B
Current liabilities$8.4B
  • Accounts payable$2.0B
  • Other current liabilities$6.4B
Current ratio0.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.65×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.3B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$430M$430M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$245Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$86M
'27$77M
'28$74M
'29$74M
'30$75M
later$2.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$86Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.6Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$0
Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B
Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $27.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$38.7B · 140%
  • Dividends$3.9B · 14%
  • Buybacks$79M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$4.0B

    25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.9B as dividends and $79M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$15.0B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $15.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$9.08

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $79M, about $9.08 each.

  • Net change in share count8.3%

    The diluted count rose from 660M to 715M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.70/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.4B5% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $38.7B of capital spent building

$789M written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 28% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$14.4M$13.5M$846M
2022$12.5M$27.9M$1.4B
2023$12.7M−$5.5M$1.7B
2024$13.4M$5.9M$1.5B
2025$9.2M$13.4M$3.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio120:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordPlant growthannualized over the recordDividend / cashmedian over the record
EIXEdison International$19.3B6%6.2%25%
DTBDTE Energy Co$15.8B11%5.8%26%
FEFirstEnergy Corp.$15.1B9%7.5%33%
ESEversource Energy (D/B/A)$13.5B9%8.9%35%
ETREntergy Corporation$12.9B10%7.3%25%
AESAES Corp.$12.2B6%—15%
CNPCenterPoint Energy Inc (Holding Co)$9.4B10%—24%
PPLPPL Corporation$9.0B9%1.5%42%
Group median—9%—25%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AES Corp. has delivered.

AES Corp.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, AES Corp. earns about $1.6B on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

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The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($1.5B) on 713M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $1.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.4B) runs well above depreciation (($1.6B)), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh AES against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AES Corp. (AES), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AES, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← AEP its page in the Manual AESI →

Industry order: ← AEP the Electric Utilities chapter AQN →