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WRB, W.R. Berkley
An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Claims run 62% of premiums, with underwriting costs on top. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about −5% a year across the record. The float runs about 2.4× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Revenue up 1.2% year over year; operating income up 9.5%
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $7.7B | $7.7B | $7.7B | $7.9B | $8.1B | $9.5B | $11.2B | $12.1B | $13.6B | $14.7B | $14.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| $6.4B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $8.9B | $10.0B | $11.0B | $12.0B | $12.7B | — | Premiums written (net)Prem. written |
| $6.3B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.6B | $6.9B | $8.1B | $9.6B | $10.4B | $11.5B | $12.4B | $12.6B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $564M | $576M | $674M | $646M | $584M | $672M | $779M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| $896M | $773M | $812M | $853M | $705M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.3B | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $602M | $549M | $641M | $682M | $531M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 33% | 28% | 20% | 20% | 24% | 20% | 19% | 21% | 23% | 22% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $848M | $711M | $620M | $1.1B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $798M | $595M | $570M | $1.1B | — | — | — | — | — | — | $3.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 61% | 63% | 62% | 62% | 64% | 61% | 61% | 61% | 62% | 62% | 62% | Loss ratioLoss |
| 15% | 16% | 19% | 16% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 18% | 18% | 17% | 17% | Expense ratioExpense |
| ($30M) | ($5M) | $7M | $34M | $627K | $863K | $55M | $30M | $14M | $34M | — | Prior-yr reserve developmentReserve dev. |
| 12% | 10% | 12% | 11% | 8% | 15% | 20% | 19% | 21% | 18% | 20% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 10% | 17% | 12% | 15% | 11% | 15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| $184M | $188M | $255M | $308M | $84M | $356M | $235M | $501M | $532M | $700M | $480M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $132M | $48M | $25M | $18M | $346M | $122M | $94M | $537M | $304M | $270M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($794M) | ($333M) | ($714M) | ($425M) | $120M | ($3.0B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.2B) | ($2.0B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($7M) | ($235M) | ($7M) | ($513M) | ($398M) | $6M | ($772M) | ($1.1B) | ($852M) | ($1.0B) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($15M) | $13M | ($31M) | $379K | $10M | ($4M) | ($25M) | $9M | ($30M) | $38M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $32M | $155M | ($133M) | $206M | $1.3B | ($804M) | ($119M) | ($86M) | $612M | $565M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $16.6B | $17.5B | $17.7B | $18.5B | $18.5B | $22.2B | $22.9B | $25.3B | $27.9B | $30.7B | $31.7B | Investments (total)Investments |
| $11.2B | $11.7B | $12.0B | $12.6B | $13.8B | $15.4B | $17.0B | $18.7B | $20.4B | $22.2B | $23.2B | Float (reserves)Float |
| $23.4B | $24.3B | $24.9B | $26.7B | $28.6B | $32.1B | $33.9B | $37.2B | $40.6B | $43.9B | $45.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $18.3B | $18.8B | $19.4B | $20.5B | $22.3B | $25.4B | $27.1B | $29.7B | $32.2B | $34.2B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $34M | $40M | $42M | $43M | $15M | $15M | $20M | $14M | $12M | $11M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $5.0B | $5.4B | $5.4B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $7.5B | $8.4B | $9.7B | $9.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 434M | 435M | 433M | 435M | 425M | 420M | 419M | 410M | 403M | 400M | 393M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.39 | $1.26 | $1.48 | $1.57 | $1.25 | $2.44 | $3.29 | $3.37 | $4.36 | $4.45 | $4.90 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.84 | $1.37 | $1.32 | $2.49 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $9.01 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.42 | $0.43 | $0.59 | $0.71 | $0.20 | $0.85 | $0.56 | $1.22 | $1.32 | $1.75 | $1.22 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $11.63 | $12.43 | $12.56 | $13.95 | $14.86 | $15.85 | $16.10 | $18.19 | $20.82 | $24.26 | $25.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before 2020 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.5%/yr | +14.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.6%/yr (3-yr) | +10.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | +13.8%/yr | +28.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +17.1%/yr | +54.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.8%/yr (3-yr) | +5.8%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +8.5%/yr | +10.3%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Loss ratio 62%Claims share of premiumsClaims incurred $7.8B ÷ premiums earned $12.4B
What this means
Claims as a share of premiums (the expense side was not cleanly tagged, so we show the loss ratio alone rather than a full combined ratio). Lower is better; the rest of underwriting cost sits on top of this.
- Return on equity 18%StrongNet income $1.8B ÷ equity $9.7BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $22.2B2.3× equityLoss and claim reserves $22.2B, 2.3× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $1.4B6.4% on the floatNet investment income $1.4B, 6.4% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
The cost and the reserves
- Not enough data
What this means
Needs the full float arithmetic and a cleanly tagged underwriting total; a partial figure would mislead.
- Reserve development +$34MPast reserves fell shortPrior-year development, FY2025: unfavorable (past years strengthened) · record: 2 favorable, 8 unfavorable of 10
In the filing’s words Management’s narrative describes the year’s prior-year development as favorable, while the development line filed in the structured data is signed unfavorable. The two disagree, so neither is quoted as the fact here — read the filing linked above.
What this means
Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Rob Berkley | $14.1M | $18.0M | $1.0B |
| 2022 | Mr. Rob Berkley | $16.7M | $22.6M | $1.4B |
| 2023 | Mr. Rob Berkley | $16.8M | $16.0M | $1.4B |
| 2024 | Mr. Rob Berkley | $17.4M | $22.1M | $1.8B |
| 2025 | Mr. Rob Berkley | $16.8M | $21.1M | $1.8B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership25.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$55M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.4% of revenue, equal to 2.3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Does management own its misses?2 plain admissions in this year's filing
“The favorable development for both short tail lines of business and auto physical damage related to the 2024 accident year, and resulted from favorable settlements of both catastrophe and non-catastrophe property claims below our expectations.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Combined ratiomedian over the record | Loss ratiomedian over the record | Yield on floatmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACGLArch Capital | $19.9B | 88% | 55% | 5.1% | 14% |
| LLoews Corp. | $18.5B | 149% | 76% | 9.7% | 6% |
| EGEverest Group | $17.7B | 100% | 70% | 5.5% | 9% |
| MKLMarkel Group Inc. | $15.5B | — | 59% | 3.1% | 12% |
| CNACNA Financial Corporation | $15.0B | 127% | 76% | 9.1% | 8% |
| WRBW.R. Berkley | $14.7B | — | 62% | 5.1% | 14% |
| RNRRenaissanceRe | $12.8B | 94% | 60% | 8.6% | 10% |
| CINFCincinnati Financial Corporation | $12.6B | 98% | 66% | 10.5% | 14% |
| Group median | — | — | 64% | 7.1% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what W.R. Berkley’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered0%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $9.6B on 371M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← WPC its page in the Manual WRBY →
Industry order: ← UVE the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter WTM →