Owner Scorecard


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RNR, RenaissanceRe

An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RNR · RenaissanceRe
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.8B
+9.3% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $11.1B 5-yr avg $9.2B
Combined ratio 73% 5-yr avg 92%
Loss ratio 41% 5-yr avg 60%
Return on equity 22% 5-yr avg 9%

Next report Est. 10/20–10/30 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~29 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
It underwrites at a profit, about a 73% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 27% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 9% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.9× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$1.7B$2.1B$2.2B$4.2B$5.2B$5.5B$6.9B$9.1B$11.8B$12.8B$11.1BRevenueRevenue
$1.5B$1.9B$2.1B$3.4B$4.1B$5.9B$7.2B$7.5B$10.0B$9.9BPremiums written (net)Prem. written
$1.4B$1.7B$2.0B$3.3B$4.0B$5.2B$6.3B$7.5B$10.1B$9.9B$9.2BPremiums earnedPremiums
$182M$222M$270M$424M$354M$319M$560M$1.3B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7BInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$630M($328M)$263M$967M$996M($114M)($1.2B)$3.1B$3.0B$4.0BPretax incomePretax
$503M($222M)$227M$749M$762M($40M)($1.1B)$2.6B$1.9B$2.7B$2.6BNet incomeNet inc.
0%-2%2%0%1%10%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$485M$1.0B$1.2B$2.1B$2.0B$1.2B$1.6B$1.9B$4.2B$3.7B$3.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
57%63%74%75%69%48%53%57%41%Loss ratioLoss
21%20%22%23%23%23%25%25%26%26%26%Expense ratioExpense
≈ 78%≈ 142%≈ 92%≈ 97%≈ 106%≈ 104%≈ 99%≈ 81%≈ 86%≈ 89%≈ 73%Combined ratioCombined
($164M)($41M)($271M)($27M)($184M)($249M)($248M)($451M)($851M)($1.1B)Prior-yr reserve developmentReserve dev.
10%-5%5%13%10%-1%-20%27%18%23%22%Return on equityROE
9%−6%3%12%9%−2%−21%26%17%22%22%Retained to equityRetained/eq
$52M$51M$53M$59M$68M$68M$65M$75M$81M$75M$71MDividends paidDiv. paid
$309M$189M$0$0$63M$1.0B$167M$0$667M$1.6BBuybacksBuybacks
($165M)($122M)($2.5B)($3.0B)($2.3B)($816M)($3.0B)($3.8B)($3.1B)($2.2B)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($401M)$29M$1.1B$1.1B$665M($302M)$725M$2.6B($1.3B)($1.4B)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($5M)$8M($5M)$2M$4M$6M$22M$6M($17M)($12M)Exchange-rate effectFX
($86M)$940M($254M)$271M$358M$122M($665M)$683M($201M)$55MChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$9.3B$9.5B$11.9B$17.4B$20.6B$21.4B$22.2B$29.2B$32.6B$36.1B$36.2BInvestments (total)Investments
$2.8B$5.1B$6.1B$9.4B$10.4B$13.3B$15.9B$20.5B$21.3B$22.3B$22.3BFloat (reserves)Float
$12.4B$15.2B$18.7B$26.3B$30.8B$34.0B$36.6B$49.0B$50.7B$53.8B$55.2BTotal assetsAssets
$6.3B$9.5B$11.6B$17.3B$19.9B$23.8B$26.7B$33.5B$33.2B$34.6BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1.2B$1.3B$2.1B$3.1B$3.4B$3.6B$4.5B$6.1B$7.0B$7.6BRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$4.9B$4.4B$5.0B$6.0B$7.6B$6.6B$5.3B$9.5B$10.6B$11.6B$11.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
41.6M39.9M39.8M43.2M47.2M47.2M43.0M47.6M51.3M46.5M42.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.10$-5.58$5.72$17.34$16.16$-0.85$-24.66$53.80$36.43$57.71$62.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.24$1.29$1.33$1.38$1.45$1.44$1.50$1.58$1.57$1.61$1.68Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$117.10$110.19$126.90$138.31$160.25$140.43$123.73$198.60$205.96$249.74$280.86Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+23.4%/yr+20.3%/yr
EPS+19.0%/yr+29.0%/yr
Dividends / share+2.9%/yr+2.1%/yr
Book value / share+8.8%/yr+9.3%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 89%
    Underwriting profit
    Total benefits, losses and expenses $8.8B ÷ premiums earned $9.9B
    Industry peers: median 100%
    What this means

    The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.

  • Strong
    Net income $2.7B ÷ equity $11.6B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • Float $14.6B
    1.3× equity
    Net reserves + unearned premiums − prepaid reinsurance − receivables − DAC = $14.6B
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • 11.6% on the float
    Net investment income $1.7B, 11.6% on the float
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

The cost and the reserves

  • Cost of float −7.3%
    Paid to hold the money
    Underwriting profit $1.1B ÷ float $14.6B
    What this means

    Buffett's own yardstick: the underwriting result as the price of holding the float. At or below zero, policyholders are paying the company to invest their money — the gold standard. A modest positive cost can still beat borrowing; a chronic high cost means the float is expensive leverage.

  • Past promises held
    Prior-year development, FY2025: favorable (reserves released) · record: 10 favorable, 0 unfavorable of 10
    What this means

    Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Kevin J. O’Donnell$8.9M$8.2M($40M)
2022Kevin J. O’Donnell$10.2M$10.2M($1.1B)
2023Kevin J. O’Donnell$23.7M$30.2M$2.6B
2024Kevin J. O’Donnell$11.7M$27.9M$1.9B
2025Kevin J. O’Donnell$13.0M$25.3M$2.7B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$78M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.6% of revenue, equal to 2.4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDCombined ratiomedian over the recordLoss ratiomedian over the recordYield on floatmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the record
ACGLArch Capital$19.9B88%55%5.1%14%
LLoews Corp.$18.5B149%76%9.7%6%
EGEverest Group$17.7B100%70%5.5%9%
MKLMarkel Group Inc.$15.5B59%3.1%12%
CNACNA Financial Corporation$15.0B127%76%9.1%8%
WRBW.R. Berkley$14.7B62%5.1%14%
RNRRenaissanceRe$12.8B94%60%8.6%10%
CINFCincinnati Financial Corporation$12.6B98%66%10.5%14%
Group median99%64%7.1%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what RenaissanceRe’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered11%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity10%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $11.5B on 42M shares, a 10% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RenaissanceRe (RNR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RNR, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← RNGR its page in the Manual RNST →

Industry order: ← RLI the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter ROOT →