Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← SPFI Manual SPGI → ← REGCP REITs — Retail UE →

SPG, Simon Property Group

Simon Property Group, Inc. is an Indiana corporation that operates as a self-administered and self-managed real estate investment trust, or REIT, under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or the Internal Revenue Code.

We must comply with the covenants contained in our financing agreements that limit our ratio of debt to total assets or market value, as defined.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SPG · Simon Property Group
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.4B
+6.7% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.9B 5-yr avg $5.7B
Cash margin 59% 5-yr avg 68%
Debt / assets 72% 5-yr avg 74%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~41 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating cash per share has been roughly flat (2% a year). The dividend takes 60% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 72% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$5.4B$5.5B$5.6B$5.8B$4.6B$5.1B$5.3B$5.7B$6.0B$6.4B$6.9BRevenueRevenue
$1.8B$1.9B$2.4B$2.1B$1.1B$2.2B$2.1B$2.3B$2.4B$4.6B$4.6BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7BDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$3.4B$3.6B$3.8B$3.8B$2.3B$3.6B$3.8B$3.9B$3.8B$4.1B$4.1BCash from operationsOp. cash
$2.0B$2.2B$2.4B$2.5BDividends paidDiv. paid
Balance sheet
60%62%65%60%Dividend / operating cashPayout
Cash flow & returns
($969M)($761M)($237M)($1.1B)($4.0B)($553M)($627M)($1.4B)$1.4B($1.6B)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($2.5B)($1.9B)($4.5B)($2.6B)$2.0B($3.6B)($3.1B)($2.0B)($5.0B)($3.1B)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($141M)$922M($968M)$155M$342M($478M)$88M$547M$231M($577M)Change in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$35.2B$36.4B$37.1B$37.8B$38.1B$37.9B$38.3B$39.3B$40.2B$50.9B$51.1BReal estate (gross)RE gross
$31.1B$32.3B$30.7B$31.2B$34.8B$33.8B$33.0B$34.3B$32.4B$40.6B$39.7BTotal assetsAssets
74%76%76%77%77%75%76%76%75%70%72%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$23.0B$24.6B$23.3B$24.2B$26.7B$25.3B$25.0B$26.0B$24.3B$28.4B$28.7BTotal debtDebt
$22.4B$23.2B$22.8B$23.5B$25.7B$24.8B$24.3B$23.9B$22.9B$27.6B$27.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$858M$809M$816M$789M$784M$796M$761M$855M$906M$975M$1.1BInterest expenseInt. exp.
3.2×3.5×3.6×3.7×2.5×3.0×3.4×3.3×3.4×3.3×3.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$26.0B$27.8B$26.7B$28.1B$31.1B$29.4B$29.2B$30.6B$28.8B$33.9BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$138M$190M$230M$219M$186M$548M$212M$196M$185M$233MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$649M$553M$500M$385M$433M$492M$473M$469M$473M$1.3BNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$4.3B$3.7B$3.3B$2.5B$3.0B$3.4B$3.1B$3.0B$2.9B$5.2B$4.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
313M312M310M308M309M329M328M327M326M326M324MShares out (diluted)Shares
$6.52$7.16$7.91$7.63Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$13.79$11.83$10.65$8.20$9.84$10.23$9.57$9.25$9.02$15.96$13.67Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.3%/yr+5.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+2.0%/yr+10.5%/yr
EPS+10.3%/yr+31.6%/yr
Dividends / share+10.2%/yr (2-yr)+10.2%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+1.3%/yr+12.8%/yr
Book value / share+1.6%/yr+10.1%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • A range, because the filings do not split maintenance from expansion
    Between cash from operations less all capital spending $4.1B − $934M = $3.2B, and cash from operations $4.1B
    What this means

    Owner earnings is what a business produces in cash after the spending needed to keep it competitive. For a property trust that spending cannot be read: the filings mix the money that replaces a roof with the money that buys a building, and management decides which is which. Rather than model the split and publish a single figure, the two ends are shown. The upper end is operating cash, which no owner could exceed. The lower end deducts every dollar of capital spending, which is too harsh, since a trust that is growing is charged for buildings it is adding. A trust whose distribution sits near the lower end is paying it out of the properties; one whose distribution exceeds the upper end is paying it from somewhere else.

  • Strong against cost
    Cash from operations $4.1B ÷ real estate at cost $50.9B
    What this means

    The cash the properties throw off, measured against what they cost to acquire and build rather than against a market value nobody filed. Read it across the record: a portfolio whose yield on cost is rising is either raising rents faster than it is adding buildings, or buying well. Gross cost is used deliberately, so accumulated depreciation cannot shrink the denominator and flatter the return.

  • Not enough data
    Occupancy at fiscal year end, in the filing’s words
    Occupancy, as filed — the scope is the sentence’s own words99.9%
    “The ten Japanese Premium Outlets operate in various cities throughout Japan and comprise over 3.9 million square feet of GLA and were 99.9% leased as of December 31, 2025.”
    Occupancy, as filed — the scope is the sentence’s own words96.4%
    “Ending occupancy for our U.S. Malls and Premium Outlets decreased 0.1% to 96.4% as of December 31, 2025, from 96.5% as of December 31, 2024.”
    ✓ each figure is its sentence’s own characters, dated to the fiscal year end inside the sentence
    What this means

    No dividends are tagged in the structured data within the record's window — either none were paid, or the filer reports them under a variant tag the pipeline does not yet read. The financing section of the 10-K settles which.

  • Withheld — not in the filings' structured data
    What this means

    Funds from operations is defined by the industry's trade association rather than by accounting rules, and no REIT tags it in the structured data behind this site. Rebuilding it from the standard tags misses the figure these companies report by as much as half, because the gains on property sales it must exclude sit behind each filer's own custom tags. Rather than publish an invented number under the industry's name, the record shows the cash the properties actually produced.

Is it sound?

  • Heavy
    Total debt $28.4B ÷ assets $40.6B
    Industry peers: median 45%
    What this means

    Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.

  • Strong
    (operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $1.0B (including $31M charged into development)
    Industry peers: median 4.3×
    What this means

    How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. The bill counted here is every dollar of interest the trust incurred, including the part it charged into the cost of buildings under construction rather than against this year's earnings — that money is paid to lenders all the same, and leaving it out flatters exactly the trusts doing the most building. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.

  • Consolidated accounts only
    What this means

    These figures are the trust's consolidated accounts. Where a REIT owns buildings through joint ventures it does not control, its share of those properties — and of the debt against them — sits outside every line here, and the filings do not tag it in a form this pipeline can read. Read the equity-method and off-balance-sheet notes in the 10-K before concluding anything about total leverage.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021David Simon$10.5M$24.4M$3.1B
2022David Simon$35.7M$30.0M$3.1B
2023David Simon$15.6M$22.4M$3.1B
2024David Simon$61.4M$81.6M$3.1B
2025David Simon$11.7M$31.7M$3.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership8.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio148:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Peers, Retail REITs

The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDCash marginmedian over the recordCash / assetsmedian over the recordDividend / cashmedian over the recordDebt / assetsmedian over the record
SPGSimon Property Group$6.4B66%11.3%62%3y76%
KIMKimco Realty Corporation (HC)$2.1B51%5.2%66%39%
REGRegency Centers Corporation$1.6B54%5.9%62%35%
BRXBrixmor$1.4B46%6.6%53%60%
FRTFederal Realty Investment Trust$1.3B49%6.8%53%
MACMacerich$1.0B35%3.9%87%51%
KRGKite Realty Group Trust$844M44%5.0%56%45%
PECOPhillips Edison$727M45%5.2%46%45%
Group median48%5.6%62%48%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Simon Property Group (SPG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPG, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← SPFI its page in the Manual SPGI →

Industry order: ← REGCP the REITs — Retail chapter UE →