Owner Scorecard


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HPP, Hudson Pacific Properties

The purchase of properties with a value-add component, typically sourced through off-market transactions, also facilitates our long-term 7 growth.

We are a vertically integrated real estate investment trust ("REIT") offering end-to-end real estate solutions for dynamic tenants in the synergistic, converging and secular growth industries of tech and media.

Our primary investment markets include Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, New York and Vancouver, British Columbia.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HPP · Hudson Pacific Properties
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$831M
−1.3% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $814M 5-yr avg $910M
Cash margin 17% 5-yr avg 26%
Dividend / operating cash 0% 5-yr avg 24%

Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating cash per share has been roughly flat (3% a year). The dividend takes 0% of FFO, and is covered. Debt is 37% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$640M$728M$728M$818M$805M$897M$1.0B$952M$842M$831M$814MRevenueRevenue
$27M$68M$98M$43M$383K$6M($56M)($192M)($364M)($572M)($551M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$269M$284M$251M$282M$300M$344M$373M$398M$354M$375M$363MDepreciationDeprec.
$227M$293M$215M$288M$302M$315M$370M$232M$165M$121M$135MCash from operationsOp. cash
$118M$159M$157M$158M$155M$155M$145M$55M$15M$351K$351KDividends paidDiv. paid
Balance sheet
52%54%73%55%51%49%39%24%9%0%0%Dividend / operating cashPayout
Cash flow & returns
($525M)($333M)($392M)($316M)($1.0B)($754M)($378M)$468M($251M)$43MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$335M$33M$145M$18M$796M$487M$97M($867M)$66M($101M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$37M($7M)($33M)($10M)$91M$47M$89M($167M)Change in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$5.9B$6.2B$7.1B$7.3B$8.2B$8.4B$8.7B$8.2B$8.2B$7.8B$7.8BReal estate (gross)RE gross
$6.7B$6.6B$7.1B$7.5B$8.4B$9.0B$9.3B$8.3B$8.1B$7.3B$7.2BTotal assetsAssets
40%37%37%37%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$2.7B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7BTotal debtDebt
$2.6B$2.3B$2.6B$2.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$76M$90M$83M$105M$114M$122M$150M$214M$177M$172M$167MInterest expenseInt. exp.
1.2×1.5×2.2×1.4×1.0×1.0×0.6×0.1×-1.0×-2.3×0.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.1B$3.6B$3.5B$3.5B$3.7B$3.3B$3.1B$2.9B$3.0B$2.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
15.8M22.0M22.2M22.4M21.9M21.7M20.5M20.1M20.2M44.7M64.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$7.47$7.21$7.06$7.05$7.08$7.12$7.08$2.73$0.76$0.01$0.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$196.82$165.48$159.32$158.27$172.38$160.96$152.86$141.57$66.52$45.25Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/7 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×2.22 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−8.3%/yr−12.8%/yr
Dividends / share−53.3%/yr−74.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.9%/yr (2-yr)−1.9%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share−11.4%/yr−15.9%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Before capital spending
    Cash from operations $121M · capital spending not separately filed
    What this means

    Owner earnings is what a business produces in cash after the spending needed to keep it competitive. For a property trust that spending cannot be read: the filings mix the money that replaces a roof with the money that buys a building, and management decides which is which. Rather than model the split and publish a single figure, the two ends are shown. The upper end is operating cash, which no owner could exceed. The lower end deducts every dollar of capital spending, which is too harsh, since a trust that is growing is charged for buildings it is adding. A trust whose distribution sits near the lower end is paying it out of the properties; one whose distribution exceeds the upper end is paying it from somewhere else.

  • Thin against what the buildings cost
    Cash from operations $121M ÷ real estate at cost $7.8B
    What this means

    The cash the properties throw off, measured against what they cost to acquire and build rather than against a market value nobody filed. Read it across the record: a portfolio whose yield on cost is rising is either raising rents faster than it is adding buildings, or buying well. Gross cost is used deliberately, so accumulated depreciation cannot shrink the denominator and flatter the return.

  • Lightly covered
    Dividends $351K ÷ cash from operations $121M
    What this means

    A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether the cash covers it. This is a harder test than the industry's usual one: funds from operations adds depreciation back without deducting the capital that genuinely keeps buildings competitive, so a distribution can look covered on that measure and still be funded by borrowing or by selling buildings. Above 100% of operating cash, it is being funded by something other than the properties.

  • Withheld — not in the filings' structured data
    What this means

    Funds from operations is defined by the industry's trade association rather than by accounting rules, and no REIT tags it in the structured data behind this site. Rebuilding it from the standard tags misses the figure these companies report by as much as half, because the gains on property sales it must exclude sit behind each filer's own custom tags. Rather than publish an invented number under the industry's name, the record shows the cash the properties actually produced.

Is it sound?

  • Conservative
    Total debt $2.7B ÷ assets $7.3B
    Industry peers: median 39%
    What this means

    Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.

  • Adequate
    (operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $212M (including $39M charged into development)
    Industry peers: median 3.6×
    What this means

    How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. The bill counted here is every dollar of interest the trust incurred, including the part it charged into the cost of buildings under construction rather than against this year's earnings — that money is paid to lenders all the same, and leaving it out flatters exactly the trusts doing the most building. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.

  • Consolidated accounts only
    What this means

    These figures are the trust's consolidated accounts. Where a REIT owns buildings through joint ventures it does not control, its share of those properties — and of the debt against them — sits outside every line here, and the filings do not tag it in a form this pipeline can read. Read the equity-method and off-balance-sheet notes in the 10-K before concluding anything about total leverage.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$36M
'27$35M
'28$34M
'29$33M
'30$31M
later$463M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$36Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$632Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$344Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$344M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.0B, of which the leases are 11%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$316M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$409Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $912M of capital spent building

$255M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 62% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Victor J. Coleman$10.5M$9.5M$6M
2022Victor J. Coleman$6.8M−$5.7M($56M)
2023Victor J. Coleman$8.4M$9.1M($192M)
2024Victor J. Coleman$24.8M$3.6M($364M)
2025Victor J. Coleman$2.8M−$2.1M($572M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$30M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.7% of revenue, equal to 22.3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Office REITs

The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDCash marginmedian over the recordCash / assetsmedian over the recordDividend / cashmedian over the recordDebt / assetsmedian over the record
DEIDouglas Emmett$1.0B48%4.7%38%53%
SLGSL Green Realty$1.0B30%2.7%88%27%
CUZCousins Properties$994M46%4.8%48%31%
HPPHudson Pacific Properties$831M35%3.4%50%37%3y
HIWHighwoods Properties$806M49%6.9%54%
ESRTEmpire State Realty Trust Inc.$768M32%5.5%16%20%
CDPCopt Defense Properties$764M39%6.2%47%52%
PDMPiedmont Realty Trust Inc.$565M38%5.3%44%47%
Group median39%5.1%47%37%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hudson Pacific Properties (HPP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HPP, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← HPK its page in the Manual HPQ →

Industry order: ← HIW the REITs — Office chapter JBGS →