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EVCM, EverCommerce
EverCommerce is a leading provider of integrated, vertically-tailored SaaS solutions for service-based small- and medium-sized businesses.
EverCommerce is simplifying and empowering the lives of business owners whose services support us every day.
We provide tailored, integrated Software-as-a-Service ("SaaS") solutions that support the highly diverse workflows and customer interactions that professionals in home services, health services, and wellness services need to automate manual processes, generate new business, and create more loyal customers.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 8/4–8/10 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 77% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.9%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $242M | $338M | $490M | $621M | $535M | $562M | $589M | $594M | RevenueRevenue |
| 60% | 41% | 42% | 41% | 44% | 43% | 43% | 43% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 11% | 9% | 10% | 12% | 13% | 14% | 13% | 14% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($54M) | ($22M) | ($27M) | ($31M) | ($3M) | $26M | $59M | $58M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −22.4% | −6.5% | −5.5% | −4.9% | −0.5% | 4.7% | 10.1% | 9.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($110M) | ($64M) | ($92M) | ($64M) | ($49M) | ($9M) | $21M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($94M) | ($60M) | ($82M) | ($60M) | ($46M) | ($41M) | $18M | $32M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($613K) | $58M | $37M | $65M | $105M | $113M | $111M | $105M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $53M | $77M | $101M | $111M | $104M | $89M | $68M | $66M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $10M | $30M | ($4M) | ($13M) | $20M | $39M | ($3M) | ($20M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $8M | $5M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $1M | $2M | $3M | CapexCapex |
| 3.2% | 1.3% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($8M) | $53M | $34M | $62M | $102M | $112M | $109M | $103M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −3.4% | 15.7% | 7.0% | 10.0% | 19.0% | 19.9% | 18.5% | 17.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($8M) | $53M | $34M | $62M | $102M | $112M | $109M | $103M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −3.4% | 15.7% | 7.0% | 10.0% | 19.0% | 19.9% | 18.5% | 17.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $310M | $403M | $365M | $0 | $15M | $0 | $36M | $36M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $24M | $0 | $0 | $43M | $67M | $58M | $85M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($324M) | ($418M) | ($380M) | ($18M) | ($38M) | ($12M) | ($31M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $310M | $402M | $341M | ($47M) | ($67M) | ($60M) | ($88M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($301K) | ($87K) | $224K | ($1M) | $400K | ($2M) | $620K | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($15M) | $41M | ($779K) | ($2M) | $355K | $40M | ($6M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| — | -8% | -1% | -2% | -0% | — | 5% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -8% | -7% | -6% | -5% | 2% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −8% | −7% | −6% | −5% | 2% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $57M | $96M | $94M | $93M | $93M | $136M | $130M | $129M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $25M | $41M | $48M | $45M | $31M | $37M | $38M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $11M | $10M | $8M | $9M | $7M | $5M | $12M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $14M | $30M | $40M | $37M | $24M | $32M | $26M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $144M | $172M | $181M | $180M | $218M | $213M | $216M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $87M | $103M | $105M | $117M | $111M | $101M | $104M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.5× | 2.0× | 2.1× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $15M | $14M | $12M | $10M | $6M | $6M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $427M | $668M | $921M | $914M | $876M | $863M | $894M | $893M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $698M | $546M | $536M | $532M | $528M | $523M | $522M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $602M | $452M | $444M | $440M | $392M | $394M | $393M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | -1.1× | -0.1× | 0.6× | 1.7× | 1.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | $808M | $678M | $685M | $692M | $670M | $655M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| ($275M) | ($389M) | $986M | $907M | $826M | $751M | $717M | $714M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 12.4% | 3.2% | 4.5% | 4.3% | 4.8% | 4.7% | 4.8% | 4.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 27.1M | 41.7M | 118M | 195M | 189M | 185M | 184M | 180M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.93 | $8.09 | $4.16 | $3.19 | $2.83 | $3.04 | $3.20 | $3.29 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-3.46 | $-1.44 | $-0.70 | $-0.31 | $-0.24 | $-0.22 | $0.10 | $0.18 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.31 | $1.27 | $0.29 | $0.32 | $0.54 | $0.60 | $0.59 | $0.57 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.31 | $1.27 | $0.29 | $0.32 | $0.54 | $0.60 | $0.59 | $0.57 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.28 | $0.11 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-10.14 | $-9.33 | $8.37 | $4.66 | $4.37 | $4.06 | $3.90 | $3.96 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.54 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.83 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −15.7%/yr | −16.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −14.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −40.9%/yr | −35.5%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $18M of profit into $109M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $18M | ($41M) | ($46M) | ($60M) | ($82M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$68M | +$89M | +$104M | +$111M | +$101M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$28M | +$26M | +$26M | +$27M | +$22M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$3M | +$39M | +$20M | −$13M | −$4M |
| Cash from operations | $111M | $113M | $105M | $65M | $37M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$1M | −$3M | −$3M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $109M | $112M | $102M | $62M | $34M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 20% | 19% | 10% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer $81M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2023 that has not been remediated as of December 31, 2025, as described in Part II, Item 9A.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $59M ÷ interest expense $35M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $394M · 6.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $130M − debt $523M
What this means
Netting $130M of cash and short-term investments against $523M of debt leaves $394M owed, about 6.6× a year's operating profit (8.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -8%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $51M ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median -10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -3%–20%; latest $109M = operating cash $111M − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $81M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $111M ÷ net income $18M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $85M ÷ Owner Earnings $109M — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $109M Owner Earnings, $85M (78%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $85M buybacks. Net of $28M stock comp, the real buyback was about $57M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 78%; across the record (2019–2025) it is 60%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.03×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $68M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $120M ÷ revenue $589M
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 4.8%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $28M (fiscal 2025), 4.8% of revenue · repurchases $85M · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $589M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.11×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $523M vs $112M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.13/share (latest year $0.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −11% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 5% lately, median −5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +30%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 30% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · −22.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$129M
- Receivables$38M
- Other current assets$48M
- Debt due within a year$6M
- Accounts payable$12M
- Other current liabilities$86M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $488M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$25M · 5%
- Buybacks$277M · 57%
- Retained (debt / cash)$187M · 38%
- Returned to owners$277M
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $277M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$9.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 26M shares were bought for $253M, about $9.83 each.
- Net change in share count565.7%
The diluted count rose from 27M to 180M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$6M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership10.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 4.8% of revenue, equal to 48.0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics and what the growth costs. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record | Sales & marketinglatest FY | Stock paylatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QLYSQualys | $669M | 78% | 24.5% | 25% | 40% | 21.4% | 11.5% |
| FSLYFastly Inc. | $624M | 54% | -30.9% | -13% | -21% | 32.3% | 18.8% |
| VRNSVaronis | $624M | 85% | -23.5% | -22% | 5% | 48.3% | 20.9% |
| NCNOnCino | $595M | 59% | -20.4% | -6% | 2% | 23.0% | 12.4% |
| EVCMEverCommerce | $589M | — | -4.9% | -1% | 16% | 20.3% | 4.8% |
| BBBlackBerry Limited | $549M | 72% | 0.1% | 0% | 3% | 20.8% | 4.2% |
| FROGJFrog | $532M | 79% | -21.4% | -10% | 14% | 42.1% | 29.5% |
| INTAIntapp | $504M | 67% | -9.8% | -23% | 6% | 32.5% | 17.5% |
| Group median | — | — | -15.1% | -8% | 5% | 27.6% | 14.9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EverCommerce has delivered.
EverCommerce’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, EverCommerce earns about $92M on its 15.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $103M on 177M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $393M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3M) runs well above depreciation ($66M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $103M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← EVC its page in the Manual EVER →
Industry order: ← ESTC the Software chapter FIG →