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WHR, Whirlpool
Whirlpool manufactures products in four countries and markets products in nearly every country around the world.
As of December 31, 2025, the operations previously reported within the MDA Asia segment are no longer reported as a segment as a result of the deconsolidation of Whirlpool India.
Prior period segment information has been recast to retrospectively reflect this change.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~28 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Refrigeration (31%) and Laundry (28%), with 4 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 17% and operating margin about 5.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −5.4% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Refrigeration at 31%.
- Refrigeration31%$4.8B
- Laundry28%$4.4B
- Cooking24%$3.7B
- Dishwashing8%$1.2B
- Other6%$946M
- Spare parts and warranties4%$550M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $20.7B | $21.3B | $21.0B | $20.4B | $19.5B | $22.0B | $19.7B | $19.5B | $16.6B | $15.5B | $15.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.4B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $2.6B | $2.4B | $2.2B | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 18% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 20% | 20% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 14% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 10% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $1.4B | $1.1B | $279M | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.3B | ($1.1B) | $1.0B | $143M | $838M | $672M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.6% | 5.3% | 1.3% | 7.6% | 8.3% | 10.7% | −5.4% | 5.2% | 0.9% | 5.4% | 4.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $1.1B | $887M | ($21M) | $1.5B | $1.4B | $2.3B | ($1.2B) | $593M | ($188M) | $516M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $888M | $350M | ($183M) | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.8B | ($1.5B) | $481M | ($323M) | $318M | $165M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 17% | — | — | 23% | 26% | 22% | — | 13% | — | 28% | 41% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.2B | $1.4B | $915M | $835M | $470M | $364M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $655M | $654M | $645M | $587M | $568M | $494M | $475M | $361M | $333M | $338M | $354M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($340M) | $260M | $767M | ($525M) | ($143M) | ($101M) | $2.4B | $39M | $734M | ($323M) | ($258M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $660M | $684M | $590M | $532M | $410M | $525M | $570M | $549M | $451M | $389M | $385M | CapexCapex |
| 3.2% | 3.2% | 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.1% | 2.4% | 2.9% | 2.8% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 2.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $543M | $580M | $639M | $698M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $820M | $366M | $384M | $81M | ($21M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.6% | 2.7% | 3.0% | 3.4% | 5.6% | 7.5% | 4.2% | 1.9% | 2.3% | 0.5% | −0.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $543M | $580M | $639M | $698M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $820M | $366M | $384M | $81M | ($21M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.6% | 2.7% | 3.0% | 3.4% | 5.6% | 7.5% | 4.2% | 1.9% | 2.3% | 0.5% | −0.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $12M | $35M | $25M | $0 | $0 | $46M | $3.0B | $14M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $294M | $312M | $306M | $305M | $311M | $338M | $390M | $384M | $384M | $300M | $261M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $525M | $750M | $1.2B | $148M | $121M | $1.0B | $903M | $0 | $50M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($612M) | ($721M) | ($399M) | $636M | ($237M) | ($660M) | ($3.6B) | ($553M) | ($602M) | ($504M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($278M) | ($553M) | ($518M) | ($1.4B) | ($253M) | ($1.3B) | $1.2B | ($792M) | ($476M) | ($621M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($36M) | $63M | ($67M) | ($28M) | ($28M) | ($67M) | ($20M) | $45M | ($149M) | $49M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $277M | $53M | $245M | $414M | $982M | $110M | — | ($388M) | — | — | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 14% | 7% | — | 20% | 19% | 26% | -10% | 11% | — | 7% | 4% | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 8% | -8% | 37% | 28% | 37% | -65% | 20% | -12% | 12% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| 12% | 1% | −21% | 27% | 20% | 30% | −82% | 4% | −26% | 1% | −3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $2.0B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $669M | $626M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.6B | $3.0B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $4.4B | $4.8B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $5.4B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $3.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $918M | $856M | $256M | $89M | $576M | $404M | $268M | $178M | ($178M) | ($121M) | $147M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $7.3B | $7.9B | $7.9B | $7.4B | $9.1B | $9.7B | $6.4B | $6.2B | $5.2B | $4.9B | $5.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7.7B | $8.5B | $9.7B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $8.5B | $5.9B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $6.5B | $5.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $3.8B | $4.0B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.2B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $3.0B | $3.1B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $19.2B | $20.0B | $18.3B | $19.0B | $20.4B | $20.3B | $17.1B | $17.3B | $16.3B | $16.0B | $16.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4.4B | $4.8B | $5.0B | $4.7B | $5.4B | $5.2B | $7.6B | $7.2B | $6.6B | $6.2B | $6.1B | Total debtDebt |
| $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.3B | $5.5B | $5.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 8.5× | 7.0× | 1.5× | 8.3× | 8.5× | 13.4× | -5.6× | 2.9× | 0.4× | 2.5× | 2.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $955M | $930M | $914M | $923M | $910M | $167M | $170M | $175M | $250M | ($11M) | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $4.8B | $4.2B | $2.3B | $3.2B | $3.9B | $4.8B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 0.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | $579M | — | — | — | $278M | — | — | $106M | $106M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 77.2M | 74.4M | 67.2M | 64.2M | 63.3M | 62.9M | 55.9M | 55.2M | 55.1M | 56.2M | 59.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $268.37 | $285.66 | $313.05 | $318.05 | $307.36 | $349.52 | $352.84 | $352.45 | $301.40 | $276.23 | $254.63 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $11.50 | $4.70 | $-2.72 | $18.19 | $16.98 | $28.35 | $-27.17 | $8.71 | $-5.86 | $5.66 | $2.77 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $7.03 | $7.80 | $9.51 | $10.87 | $17.22 | $26.25 | $14.67 | $6.63 | $6.97 | $1.44 | $-0.35 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $7.03 | $7.80 | $9.51 | $10.87 | $17.22 | $26.25 | $14.67 | $6.63 | $6.97 | $1.44 | $-0.35 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.81 | $4.19 | $4.55 | $4.75 | $4.91 | $5.37 | $6.98 | $6.96 | $6.97 | $5.34 | $4.38 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $8.55 | $9.19 | $8.78 | $8.29 | $6.48 | $8.35 | $10.20 | $9.95 | $8.19 | $6.92 | $6.46 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $61.83 | $56.42 | $34.09 | $49.77 | $61.37 | $77.04 | $41.79 | $42.79 | $48.69 | $48.51 | $63.47 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.3%/yr | −2.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −16.1%/yr | −39.1%/yr |
| EPS | −7.6%/yr | −19.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +3.8%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −2.3%/yr | +1.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −2.7%/yr | −4.6%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $318M of profit but $81M of owner earnings: $237M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $318M | ($323M) | $481M | ($1.5B) | $1.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$338M | +$333M | +$361M | +$475M | +$494M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$137M | +$91M | +$34M | — | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$323M | +$734M | +$39M | +$2.4B | −$101M |
| Cash from operations | $470M | $835M | $915M | $1.4B | $2.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$389M | −$451M | −$549M | −$570M | −$525M |
| Owner earnings | $81M | $384M | $366M | $820M | $1.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 2% | 2% | 4% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $137M), owner earnings is nearer ($56M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $838M ÷ interest expense $341M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.5B · 6.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $669M − debt $6.2B
What this means
Netting $669M of cash and short-term investments against $6.2B of debt leaves $5.5B owed, about 6.6× a year's operating profit (7.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 30 + DIO 64 − DPO 103 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -10%–26%; 7% latest = NOPAT $579M ÷ invested capital $8.2BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–8%; latest $81M = operating cash $470M − maintenance capex $389MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $137M of SBC) leaves ($56M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $470M ÷ net income $318M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $300M ÷ Owner Earnings $81M — this fiscal year
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $81M of Owner Earnings, $300M (370%) went back to shareholders, $300M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 370%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 117%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.15×MaintainingCapex $389M ÷ depreciation $338M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.9%The count is flatStock compensation $137M (fiscal 2025), 0.9% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +0.5% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $15.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.76×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $6.2B vs ($1.6B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −55%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.45/share (latest year $4.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $42.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 4% lately, median 5%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · −5.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −3.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$626M
- Receivables$1.2B
- Inventory$2.2B
- Other current assets$944M
- Debt due within a year$577M
- Accounts payable$3.3B
- Other current liabilities$1.8B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $707M against the $586M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.2 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $7.0B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $12.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$5.4B · 44%
- Dividends$3.3B · 27%
- Buybacks$4.7B · 38%
- Returned to owners$8.0B
117% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.3B as dividends and $4.7B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $4.4B to $6.1B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $459M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $4.7B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−22.8%
The diluted count fell from 77M to 60M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$5.34/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$963M written down across 3 years (2018, 2022, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 31% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Bitzer | $18.8M | $42.5M | $1.7B |
| 2022 | Mr. Bitzer | $11.9M | −$19.3M | $820M |
| 2023 | Mr. Bitzer | $13.5M | $4.3M | $366M |
| 2024 | Mr. Bitzer | $13.9M | $12.8M | $384M |
| 2025 | Mr. Bitzer | $12.8M | $3.1M | $81M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$137M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.9% of revenue, equal to 16.3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Household Durables
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SONYSony Group Corporation | $81.7B | 39% | 10.3% | 12% | 8% |
| 6752Panasonic Holdings | $50.8B | 30%4y | 4.1% | 8% | 0% |
| WHRWhirlpool | $15.5B | 17% | 5.4% | 12% | 3% |
| 6753Sharp | $11.9B | 18%4y | 2.8% | 8% | -0% |
| MHKMohawk Industries Inc. | $10.8B | 26% | 7.5% | 7% | 7% |
| SGISomnigroup International Inc. | $7.5B | 42% | 12.6% | 16% | 8% |
| SNSharkNinja Inc. | $6.4B | 48% | 11.7% | 21% | 6% |
| HELEHelen of Troy | $1.8B | 43% | 11.8% | 11% | 12% |
| Group median | — | 34% | 8.9% | 12% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Whirlpool has delivered.
Whirlpool’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Whirlpool earns about $448M on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($21M) on 65M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $5.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← WHD its page in the Manual WINA →
Industry order: ← VIOT the Household Durables chapter XMAX →