Owner Scorecard


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WD, Walker & Dunlop

We are a leading commercial real estate services, finance, and technology company in the United States.

Through investments in people, brand, and technology, we have built a diversified suite of commercial real estate services to meet the needs of our customers.

Our services include (i) multifamily lending, property sales, appraisal, valuation, and research, (ii) commercial real estate debt brokerage and advisory services, (iii) investment management, and (iv) affordable housing lending, property sales, tax credit syndication, development, and investment.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
WD · Walker & Dunlop
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+9.0% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $334M 5-yr avg $1.2B
Operating margin 17.0% 5-yr avg 20.4%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin −462% 5-yr avg 29%
Free cash flow margin −462% 5-yr avg 29%

Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 29% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from 11% to 360% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 57% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$52M$82M$96M$817M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$334MRevenueRevenue
$185M$233M$213M$230M$330M$385M$319M$193M$186M$140M$57MOperating incomeOp. inc.
359.6%282.8%222.9%28.2%30.5%30.6%25.4%18.3%16.4%11.3%17.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$186M$234M$213M$230M$330M$352M$265M$138M$132M$79MPretax incomePretax
$114M$211M$161M$173M$246M$266M$214M$107M$108M$56M$69MNet incomeNet inc.
38%9%24%25%26%25%21%25%23%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$759M$1.1B$64M$428M($1.4B)$870M$1.6B($518K)$129M($664M)($1.5B)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$111M$131M$142M$152M$169M$210M$235M$227M$238M$239M$244MDepreciationDeprec.
$516M$704M($263M)$78M($1.9B)$358M$1.1B($362M)($244M)($986M)($1.9B)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$5M$5M$5M$3M$9M$22M$16M$13M$16M$14MCapexCapex
4.8%6.3%4.9%0.6%0.3%0.7%1.7%1.5%1.1%1.3%4.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$757M$1.1B$59M$423M($1.4B)$861M$1.6B($17M)$116M($680M)($1.5B)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/mn/m62.0%51.7%−130.5%68.4%124.0%−1.6%10.3%−55.1%−462.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$757M$1.1B$59M$423M($1.4B)$861M$1.6B($17M)$116M($680M)($1.5B)Free cash flowFCF
n/mn/m62.0%51.7%−130.5%68.4%124.0%−1.6%10.3%−55.1%−462.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$31M$37M$45M$64M$80M$85M$89M$92M$92MDividends paidDiv. paid
$13M$35M$69M$31M$46M$19M$42M$21M$12M$10MBuybacksBuybacks
($67M)$97M($552M)($80M)$115M($378M)($134M)$127M($38M)($77M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($694M)($1.1B)$322M($332M)$1.5B($458M)($1.6B)$7M($155M)$758MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($919K)$75M($166M)$16M$221M$35M($135M)$133M($64M)$16MChange in cashΔ cash
17%27%15%14%21%15%12%7%6%4%1%ROICROIC
19%26%18%17%21%17%13%6%6%3%4%Return on equityROE
14%13%17%13%8%1%1%−2%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$119M$191M$90M$121M$321M$306M$226M$329M$279M$299M$193MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$29M$42M$50M$52M$66M$212M$202M$234M$336M$419M$424MReceivablesReceiv.
$29M$42M$50M$52M$66M$212M$202M$234M$336M$419M$424MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$73M$34M$43M$48M$54MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$96M$124M$174M$180M$249M$699M$960M$902M$869M$869M$869MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.1B$2.2B$2.8B$2.7B$4.7B$5.2B$4.0B$4.1B$4.4B$5.1B$6.2BTotal assetsAssets
$164M$164M$296M$294M$292M$740M$704M$773M$768M$829M$1.4BTotal debtDebt
$45M($27M)$206M$173M($30M)$435M$478M$445M$489M$530M$1.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
11.7×6.5×3.8×3.9×2.3×0.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.4B$1.4B$1.9B$1.6B$3.5B$3.6B$2.3B$2.3B$2.6BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$5M$6M$5M$7M$28M$27M$22M$12MNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$610M$809M$902M$1.0B$1.2B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
35.8%25.7%25.0%2.9%2.6%2.9%2.7%2.6%2.4%2.2%8.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
30.5M31.4M31.4M30.8M31.1M31.5M32.7M32.9M33.2M33.4M33.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.69$2.62$3.05$26.52$34.86$39.93$38.51$32.07$34.15$36.99$9.98Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.73$6.73$5.14$5.63$7.92$8.43$6.54$3.27$3.26$1.69$2.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$24.79$33.85$1.89$13.72$-45.50$27.31$47.75$-0.51$3.51$-20.38$-46.13Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$24.79$33.85$1.89$13.72$-45.50$27.31$47.75$-0.51$3.51$-20.38$-46.13Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.00$1.21$1.46$2.04$2.45$2.58$2.67$2.75$2.77Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.08$0.17$0.15$0.15$0.10$0.29$0.67$0.49$0.39$0.47$0.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.98$25.79$28.74$33.61$38.48$49.16$51.68$52.43$52.71$52.00$51.49Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+40.9%/yr+1.2%/yr
EPS−8.4%/yr−26.6%/yr
Dividends / share+15.5%/yr (7-yr)+13.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+21.6%/yr+37.6%/yr
Book value / share+11.2%/yr+6.2%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $56M of profit but ($680M) of owner earnings: $736M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$56M$108M$107M$214M$266M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$239M+$238M+$227M+$235M+$210M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$27M+$27M+$28M+$34M+$37M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$986M−$244M−$362M+$1.1B+$358M
Cash from operations($664M)$129M($518K)$1.6B$870M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$16M−$13M−$16M−$22M−$9M
Owner earnings($680M)$116M($17M)$1.6B$861M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-55%10%-2%124%68%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer ($707M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $57M ÷ interest expense $62M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.1B · 19.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $299M − debt $1.4B
    What this means

    Netting $299M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $1.1B owed, about 19.2× a year's operating profit (24.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–27%; 1% latest = NOPAT $41M ÷ invested capital $2.8B
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -131%–1469%; latest ($680M) = operating cash ($664M) − maintenance capex $16M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -55% of revenue this year, a 57% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves ($707M).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ($664M) ÷ net income $56M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.07×
    Harvesting
    Capex $16M ÷ depreciation $239M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 2.2%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $27M (fiscal 2025), 2.2% of revenue · repurchases $10M · diluted shares +2.1% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −44%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.64/share (latest year $1.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 288% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 288% early to 15% lately, median 28% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2025 · 11.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$96M · 3%
  • Dividends$524M · 19%
  • Buybacks$298M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 68%
  • Returned to owners$822M

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $524M as dividends and $298M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $74M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $298M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count9.4%

    The diluted count rose from 31M to 33M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.75/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−98%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($836M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $820M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.98 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $96M of capital spent building

$95M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021William M. Walker$7.6M$20.0M$861M
2022William M. Walker$4.8M−$7.7M$1.6B
2023William M. Walker$4.8M$4.7M($17M)
2024William M. Walker$7.6M$8.6M$116M
2025William M. Walker$15.5M$4.3M($680M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio92:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$27M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 2.2% of revenue, equal to 47.2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
CHYMChime Financial Inc.$2.2B88%-18.4%-88%1y2%
LXLexinFintech Holdings Ltd.$1.9B68%10.8%45%15%
PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd.$1.3B42%-1.2%4%3%
WDWalker & Dunlop$1.2B29.4%14%57%
XYFX Financial$1.1B60%29.2%25%18%
JFINJiayin Group Inc.$920M24.3%47%4y4%
CLSKCleanSpark Inc.$766M55%-39.3%-12%-79%
PWPPerella Weinberg Partners$751M-7.6%15%
Group median4.8%14%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Walker & Dunlop has delivered.

Walker & Dunlop’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Walker & Dunlop earns about $383M on its 31.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −55.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($1.5B) on 34M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Walker & Dunlop (WD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WD, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← WCN its page in the Manual WDAY →

Industry order: ← VRTS the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter WLTH →