Owner Scorecard


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VERX, Vertex Inc.

Software asset-light

Vertex is a leading provider of enterprise compliance technology for global commerce.

Our software, data, and services help businesses operate with confidence by automating and governing transaction-based compliance obligations that arise wherever they buy, sell, and move goods and services around the world.

Unlike direct taxes, which are paid directly by the entity being taxed, indirect taxes are collected from a purchaser and remitted to taxing authorities by the seller or service provider as part of each transaction.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VERX · Vertex Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$748M
+12.2% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $787M 5-yr avg $581M
Gross margin 64% 5-yr avg 62%
Operating margin −1.7% 5-yr avg −1.1%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg −2%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Cloud subscriptions (47%), Software licenses (38%) and Services (15%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −0.9% through the cycle on a 63% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 5.9% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Cloud subscriptions at 47%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Cloud subscriptions47%$353M
  • Software licenses38%$287M
  • Services15%$109M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$272M$322M$375M$426M$492M$572M$667M$748M$787MRevenueRevenue
$177M$211M$209M$264M$298M$349M$426M$482M$504MGross profitGross prof.
65%66%56%62%61%61%64%64%64%Gross marginGross mgn
43%43%66%48%50%50%49%50%51%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%10%15%10%9%10%10%11%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($3M)$32M($105M)($3M)($8M)($18M)($2M)$2M($13M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.0%9.9%−28.0%−0.7%−1.6%−3.1%−0.3%0.3%−1.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
($4M)$31M($108M)($4M)($10M)($22M)$2M$8MPretax incomePretax
($6M)$31M($75M)($1M)($12M)($13M)($53M)$7M$4MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$80M$92M$60M$90M$64M$74M$165M$166M$174MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$25M$25M$32M$45M$61M$72M$83M$97M$107MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
$57M$27M($45M)$21M($5M)($18M)$87M$4M$6MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$21M$20M$21M$32M$46M$49M$72MCapexCapex
7.7%6.3%5.6%7.5%9.3%8.6%10.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$59M$72M$39M$59M$18M$25M$93MOwner earningsOwner earn.
21.8%22.4%10.3%13.8%3.7%4.4%14.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$59M$72M$39M$59M$18M$25M$93MFree cash flowFCF
21.8%22.4%10.3%13.8%3.7%4.4%14.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M$251M$474K$474KAcquisitionsAcquis.
$28M$29M$146M$146MDividends paidDiv. paid
$1M$841K$10MBuybacksBuybacks
($33M)($38M)($44M)($295M)($72M)($66M)($158M)($124M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($31M)($31M)$214M($9M)$17M($26M)$231M($33M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($402K)$12K($22K)($479K)($352K)$724K($1M)$3MExchange-rate effectFX
$16M$24M$229M($214M)$9M($18M)$237M$12MChange in cashΔ cash
-1%-3%-6%-1%1%-3%ROICROIC
-33%-1%-5%-5%-29%3%1%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$56M$76M$303M$73M$92M$68M$296M$314M$230MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$62M$70M$77M$77M$103M$142M$164M$183M$153MReceivablesReceiv.
$11M$9M$13M$14M$24M$36M$38M$37MAccounts payablePayables
$62M$60M$68M$64M$89M$118M$128M$146M$116MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$166M$403M$196M$243M$267M$536M$561M$492MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$335M$292M$369M$403M$441M$537M$575M$564MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×1.4×0.5×0.6×0.6×1.0×1.0×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$55M$57M$97M$101M$101M$178M$210MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$0$16M$270M$252M$258M$358M$392M$400MGoodwillGoodwill
$265M$559M$670M$719M$760M$1.2B$1.3B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$51M$1M$49M$47M$335M$337M$339MTotal debtDebt
($24M)($302M)($43M)($22M)$39M$23M$108MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$377M$329M$440M$489M$507M$987M$1.0BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
($126M)($130M)$229M$230M$230M$253M$179M$259M$241MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.9%2.9%39.5%6.1%4.0%5.9%7.1%7.7%7.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $53M loss into $93M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income($53M)($13M)($12M)($1M)($75M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$83M+$72M+$61M+$45M+$32M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$47M+$34M+$20M+$26M+$148M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$87M−$18M−$5M+$21M−$45M
Cash from operations$165M$74M$64M$90M$60M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$72M−$49M−$46M−$32M−$21M
Owner earnings$93M$25M$18M$59M$39M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%4%4%14%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $47M), owner earnings is nearer $46M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $26M · 11.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $314M − debt $340M
    What this means

    Netting $314M of cash and short-term investments against $340M of debt leaves $26M owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (145.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 89 + DIO 0 − DPO 51 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -6%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $2M ÷ invested capital $285M
    Industry peers: median -30%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -5%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $166M ÷ net income $7M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Modest selling cost
    Selling and marketing $196M ÷ revenue $748M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 7.7%
    Stock pay, share count unread
    Stock compensation $58M (fiscal 2025), 7.7% of revenue · repurchases $10M
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $748M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $340M vs ($14M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.12/share (latest year $0.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −6% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to −1% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −28.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$492M
  • Cash & short-term investments$230M
  • Receivables$153M
  • Other current assets$108M
Current liabilities$564M
  • Accounts payable$37M
  • Other current liabilities$527M
Current ratio0.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.87×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.41×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($72M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($159M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($477M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$350M$11M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$387Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2024

Over the record, the business generated $626M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$261M · 42%
  • Dividends$203M · 32%
  • Buybacks$2M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$160M · 26%
  • Returned to owners$205M

    56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $203M as dividends and $2M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $175M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend recordPays

    Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$392M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$263Mover 3 years since fiscal 2020 buying other businesses, against $261M of capital spent building over the 8-year record

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Beside that spending sits $13M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2020 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$6.9M−$14.9M$59M
2022$7.0M$6.7M$18M
2023$7.5M$20.2M$25M
2024$8.4M$36.0M$93M
2025$10.3M−$16.5M
2025$25.6M$26.6M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio183:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$58M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 7.7% of revenue, equal to 2478.0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics and what the growth costs. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the recordSales & marketinglatest FYStock paylatest FY
ASANAsana$791M89%-68.9%-177%3y-27%51.5%27.2%
SPSCSPS Commerce$752M67%14.1%13%21%22.5%7.1%
VERXVertex Inc.$748M63%-0.9%-1%14%26.3%7.7%
BRZEBraze$738M67%-30.7%-30%-5%44.3%19.5%
CWANClearwater Analytics$731M72%1.7%0%15%20.4%17.5%
DSGXDescartes Systems$729M74%18.3%6%33%
APPNAppian Corporation$727M71%-18.7%-50%-6%33.2%5.7%
NTSKNetskope Inc.$709M65%-76.9%-107%1y-27%55.5%72.8%
Group median69%-9.8%-16%4%33.2%17.5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vertex Inc. has delivered.

Vertex Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’24−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings — on 162M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $108M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Vertex Inc. (VERX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VERX, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← VELO its page in the Manual VFC →

Industry order: ← VEEV the Software chapter VIA →