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UBER, Uber Technologies Inc.
Uber runs a set of phone apps that match people who want something moved with the independent drivers and couriers who will move it: a rider to a destination, a meal from a restaurant, freight from a shipper to a carrier. It owns the network and the software, not the cars and not the labor; the drivers are not its employees. It earns its keep by taking a cut of each fare or order that crosses the platform.
We develop and operate proprietary technology applications supporting a variety of offerings on our platform ("platform(s)" or "Platform(s)").
We use this same network, technology, operational excellence and product expertise to connect shippers ("Shipper(s)") with carriers ("Carrier(s)") in the freight industry by providing Carriers with the ability to book a shipment, transportation management and other logistics services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- The question is whether matching the two sides is a franchise or a toll anyone with an app can build. The test is the network: if more drivers pull in more riders, and more riders pull in more drivers, the lead feeds on itself and the cut holds — but the filing concedes the mobility, delivery, and logistics industries are highly competitive, full of well-established, low-cost alternatives. Watch, too, whether the labor stays lawful as structured: the whole arrangement rests on drivers treated as contractors rather than employees, and complaints in several jurisdictions, including the United States and Brazil, challenge that point — a ruling against it could turn a contractor's fare into a payroll. The figures for margins, returns, and the net debt are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −12%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $7.9B | $10.4B | $13.0B | $11.1B | $17.5B | $31.9B | $37.3B | $44.0B | $52.0B | $53.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 60% | 50% | 61% | 56% | 41% | 25% | 19% | 18% | 16% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 15% | 14% | 37% | 20% | 12% | 9% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 7% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($4.1B) | ($3.0B) | ($8.6B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.8B) | ($1.8B) | $1.1B | $2.8B | $5.6B | $6.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −51.4% | −29.1% | −66.1% | −43.7% | −22.0% | −5.7% | 3.0% | 6.4% | 10.7% | 11.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($4.6B) | $1.3B | ($8.4B) | ($6.9B) | ($1.0B) | ($9.4B) | $2.3B | $4.1B | $5.8B | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($4.0B) | $997M | ($8.5B) | ($6.8B) | ($496M) | ($9.1B) | $1.9B | $9.9B | $10.1B | $8.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ($1.4B) | ($1.5B) | ($4.3B) | ($2.7B) | ($445M) | $642M | $3.6B | $7.1B | $10.1B | $10.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $510M | $426M | $472M | $575M | $902M | $947M | $823M | $711M | $719M | $732M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $2.0B | ($3.1B) | ($883M) | $2.6B | ($2.0B) | $7.0B | ($1.1B) | ($5.2B) | ($2.5B) | ($1.0B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $821M | $558M | $588M | $616M | $298M | $252M | $223M | $242M | $336M | $327M | CapexCapex |
| 10.4% | 5.3% | 4.5% | 5.5% | 1.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.4B) | ($743M) | $390M | $3.4B | $6.9B | $9.8B | $9.8B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −24.3% | −18.9% | −37.8% | −30.2% | −4.3% | 1.2% | 9.0% | 15.7% | 18.8% | 18.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($2.2B) | ($2.1B) | ($4.9B) | ($3.4B) | ($743M) | $390M | $3.4B | $6.9B | $9.8B | $9.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −28.2% | −20.1% | −37.8% | −30.2% | −4.3% | 1.2% | 9.0% | 15.7% | 18.8% | 18.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $64M | $7M | $1.5B | $2.3B | $59M | $0 | $0 | $815M | $821M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $1.3B | $6.5B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($487M) | ($695M) | ($790M) | ($2.9B) | ($1.2B) | ($1.6B) | ($3.2B) | ($3.2B) | ($3.6B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $1.0B | $4.6B | $8.9B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $15M | ($95M) | ($2.1B) | ($5.7B) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $22M | ($119M) | ($4M) | ($92M) | ($69M) | ($148M) | $63M | ($267M) | $215M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($868M) | $2.3B | $3.8B | ($4.3B) | $65M | ($1.1B) | $327M | $1.6B | $1.0B | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| — | — | -75% | -27% | -16% | -12% | 6% | 11% | 18% | 21% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -60% | -55% | -3% | -125% | 17% | 46% | 37% | 35% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −60% | −55% | −3% | −125% | 17% | 46% | 37% | 35% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $4.4B | $6.4B | $11.3B | $6.8B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $16.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $919M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $3.8B | $3.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $150M | $272M | $235M | $860M | $728M | $790M | $858M | $1.0B | $1.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $769M | $942M | $838M | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $2.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $8.7B | $13.9B | $9.9B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $11.3B | $12.2B | $14.0B | $12.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $4.3B | $5.6B | $6.9B | $9.0B | $8.9B | $9.5B | $11.5B | $12.3B | $12.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.0× | 2.5× | 1.4× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $39M | $153M | $167M | $6.1B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $8.2B | $8.1B | $8.9B | $8.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $24.0B | $31.8B | $33.3B | $38.8B | $32.1B | $38.7B | $51.2B | $61.8B | $59.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $6.9B | $5.7B | $7.6B | $9.3B | $9.3B | $9.5B | $9.5B | $10.5B | $10.5B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $490M | ($5.6B) | $760M | $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B | ($6.0B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -8.5× | -4.7× | -15.4× | -10.6× | -7.9× | -3.2× | 1.8× | 5.4× | 12.6× | 14.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | $17.2B | $16.6B | $19.5B | $23.4B | $23.6B | $26.0B | $28.8B | $33.7B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| — | $14.2B | $311M | $787M | $204M | $430M | $654M | $93M | $165M | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| ($8.6B) | ($7.4B) | $14.2B | $12.3B | $14.5B | $7.3B | $11.2B | $21.6B | $27.0B | $24.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.6% | 1.6% | 35.4% | 7.4% | 6.7% | 5.6% | 5.2% | 4.1% | 3.5% | 3.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | $100M | $73M | — | — | — | — | $73M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 426M | 479M | 1.25B | 1.75B | 1.90B | 1.97B | 2.09B | 2.15B | 2.12B | 2.07B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $18.60 | $21.78 | $10.41 | $6.35 | $9.21 | $16.14 | $17.82 | $20.45 | $24.54 | $25.92 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-9.46 | $2.08 | $-6.81 | $-3.86 | $-0.26 | $-4.63 | $0.90 | $4.58 | $4.74 | $4.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-4.52 | $-4.11 | $-3.93 | $-1.92 | $-0.39 | $0.20 | $1.61 | $3.21 | $4.61 | $4.73 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-5.25 | $-4.38 | $-3.93 | $-1.92 | $-0.39 | $0.20 | $1.61 | $3.21 | $4.61 | $4.73 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.93 | $1.16 | $0.47 | $0.35 | $0.16 | $0.13 | $0.11 | $0.11 | $0.16 | $0.16 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-20.07 | $-15.42 | $11.37 | $7.00 | $7.63 | $3.72 | $5.38 | $10.02 | $12.76 | $11.95 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.61 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.4 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.5%/yr | +31.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −26.8%/yr | −14.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +12.8%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $10.1B of profit but $9.8B of owner earnings: $290M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $10.1B | $9.9B | $1.9B | ($9.1B) | ($496M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$719M | +$711M | +$823M | +$947M | +$902M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$1.8B | +$1.8B | +$1.9B | +$1.8B | +$1.2B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$2.5B | −$5.2B | −$1.1B | +$7.0B | −$2.0B |
| Cash from operations | $10.1B | $7.1B | $3.6B | $642M | ($445M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$336M | −$242M | −$223M | −$252M | −$298M |
| Owner earnings | $9.8B | $6.9B | $3.4B | $390M | ($743M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 16% | 9% | 1% | -4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.8B), owner earnings is nearer $7.9B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 12.6×ComfortableOperating income $5.6B ÷ interest expense $440M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 0.5× operating profitModest net debtCash $7.1B + ST investments $528M − debt $10.5B
What this means
Netting $7.6B of cash and short-term investments against $10.5B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (1.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -75%–18%; 18% latest = NOPAT $5.6B ÷ invested capital $30.5BIndustry peers: median 22%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High, recently turned positivelatest $9.8B = operating cash $10.1B − maintenance capex $336M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -4%)Industry peers: median 41%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a -4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.8B of SBC) leaves $7.9B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $10.1B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $6.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.8B — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $9.8B Owner Earnings, $6.5B (67%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6.5B buybacks. Net of $1.8B stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.7B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 67%; across the record (2017–2025) it is 104%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $336M ÷ depreciation $719M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Sells itselfSelling and marketing $4.9B ÷ revenue $52.0B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.5%The count is risingStock compensation $1.8B (fiscal 2025), 3.5% of revenue · repurchases $6.5B · diluted shares +7.3% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $52.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $10.5B vs $1.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.57/share (latest year $4.94), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −49% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −49% early to 7% lately, median −22% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Worst year 2019 · −66.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$6.1B
- Receivables$3.9B
- Other current assets$2.8B
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$10.8B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $12.3B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $11.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$3.9B · 36%
- Buybacks$7.8B · 71%
- Returned to owners$7.8B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $7.8B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$716M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $716M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$79.50
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 98M shares were bought for $7.8B, about $79.50 each.
- Net change in share count385.8%
The diluted count rose from 426M to 2071M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Khosrowshahi | $19.9M | $4.2M | ($743M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Khosrowshahi | $24.3M | −$8.9M | $390M |
| 2023 | Mr. Khosrowshahi | $24.2M | $109.7M | $3.4B |
| 2024 | Mr. Khosrowshahi | $39.4M | $74.3M | $6.9B |
| 2025 | Mr. Khosrowshahi | $35.6M | $66.7M | $9.8B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio360:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$1.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.5% of revenue, equal to 32.8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BABAAlibaba Group Holding Limited | $151.3B | 41% | 13.3% | 26%1y | 41%4y |
| PDDPDD Holdings Inc. | $63.8B | 65% | -4.2% | 32% | 59% |
| UBERUber Technologies Inc. | $52.0B | — | -22.0% | -12% | -4% |
| VVisa Inc. | $40.0B | — | 64.4% | 28% | 53% |
| PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc. | $33.2B | — | 15.8% | 16% | 19% |
| MAMastercard Incorporated | $32.8B | — | 54.3% | 81% | 46% |
| MELIMercadoLibre Inc. | $28.9B | 48% | 8.1% | 14% | 21% |
| FIFiserv Inc | $21.2B | 87%3y | 26.3% | 8% | 21% |
| Group median | — | — | 14.6% | 21% | 31% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Uber Technologies Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $9.8B on 2036M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $4.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← UAN its page in the Manual UBSI →
Industry order: ← TNET the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter UNF →