← All companies ← TWIN Manual TWST → ← TUYA Software TYL →
TWLO, Twilio Inc.
Twilio Programmable Voice is an API that allows developers to build solutions to make, manage, and receive phone calls globally through a browser, application, phone, or other methods.
By combining our leading communications capabilities with rich contextual data and artificial intelligence ("AI"), we provide the infrastructure for businesses of all sizes to revolutionize how they engage with their customers by delivering seamless, trusted, and personalized customer experiences at scale.
The value proposition of our offerings has become stronger and our products have become more strategic to our customers as businesses are increasingly prioritizing building more personalized and differentiated customer engagement experiences through digital channels.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~32 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Messaging (57%) and Other (15%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 56% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −19% through the cycle on a 52% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 14% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Messaging at 57%.
- Messaging57%$2.9B
- Other15%$747M
- Voice12%$616M
- Email10%$523M
- Segment6%$303M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $277M | $399M | $650M | $1.1B | $1.8B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $5.1B | $5.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| $157M | $216M | $349M | $609M | $916M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.6B | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 57% | 54% | 54% | 54% | 52% | 49% | 47% | 49% | 51% | 49% | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 42% | 40% | 45% | 52% | 50% | 53% | 46% | 36% | 29% | 25% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 28% | 30% | 26% | 34% | 30% | 28% | 28% | 23% | 23% | 20% | 19% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($41M) | ($66M) | ($115M) | ($370M) | ($493M) | ($916M) | ($1.2B) | ($877M) | ($54M) | $158M | $242M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −14.9% | −16.6% | −17.7% | −32.6% | −28.0% | −32.2% | −31.5% | −21.1% | −1.2% | 3.1% | 4.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($41M) | ($63M) | ($121M) | ($362M) | ($504M) | ($961M) | ($1.2B) | ($997M) | ($89M) | $55M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($41M) | ($64M) | ($122M) | ($307M) | ($491M) | ($950M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.0B) | ($109M) | $34M | $104M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $10M | ($3M) | $8M | $14M | $33M | ($58M) | ($254M) | $415M | $716M | $1.0B | $965M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $8M | $19M | $26M | $110M | $150M | $258M | $279M | $284M | $206M | $195M | $180M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $19M | ($8M) | $11M | ($54M) | $13M | $1M | ($76M) | $470M | $3M | $174M | $84M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $14M | $9M | $5M | $45M | $26M | $46M | — | — | — | — | $41M | CapexCapex |
| 5.1% | 2.3% | 0.8% | 4.0% | 1.5% | 1.6% | — | — | — | — | 0.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | ($13M) | $3M | ($31M) | $7M | ($104M) | — | — | — | — | $924M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.6% | −3.1% | 0.4% | −2.8% | 0.4% | −3.7% | — | — | — | — | 17.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($4M) | ($13M) | $3M | ($31M) | $7M | ($104M) | — | — | — | — | $924M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.5% | −3.1% | 0.4% | −2.8% | 0.4% | −3.7% | — | — | — | — | 17.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $9M | $23M | $31M | $0 | $334M | $492M | $37M | $6M | $0 | $61M | $62M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $2K | $100K | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $669M | $2.3B | $869M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($35M) | ($227M) | ($139M) | ($1.3B) | ($846M) | ($2.5B) | ($616M) | $229M | $1.4B | $81M | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $229M | $36M | $516M | $1.0B | $1.5B | $3.1B | $45M | ($644M) | ($2.3B) | ($833M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| — | $74K | $163K | $0 | $40K | ($191K) | $60K | $108K | $0 | $0 | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| $204M | ($193M) | $385M | ($252M) | $680M | $548M | ($826M) | ($147K) | ($224M) | $251M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| -137% | -21% | -24% | -7% | -5% | -7% | -9% | -7% | -0% | 1% | 2% | ROICROIC |
| -13% | -18% | -28% | -7% | -6% | -9% | -12% | -10% | -1% | 0% | 1% | Return on equityROE |
| −13% | −18% | −28% | −7% | −6% | −9% | −12% | −10% | −1% | 0% | 1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $306M | $115M | $487M | $254M | $934M | $1.5B | $652M | $656M | $421M | $682M | $542M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $26M | $43M | $98M | $154M | $251M | $388M | $548M | $563M | $589M | $637M | $711M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $4M | $11M | $18M | $39M | $60M | $93M | $125M | $120M | $100M | $85M | $92M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $22M | $32M | $79M | $115M | $191M | $295M | $423M | $443M | $488M | $552M | $619M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $353M | $353M | $873M | $2.1B | $3.4B | $5.9B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $74M | $79M | $138M | $247M | $448M | $704M | $808M | $738M | $820M | $887M | $740M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.8× | 4.5× | 6.3× | 8.3× | 7.5× | 8.4× | 6.2× | 6.6× | 4.2× | 4.0× | 4.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $38M | $51M | $64M | $141M | $183M | $255M | $264M | $210M | $191M | $177M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $4M | $18M | $38M | $2.3B | $4.6B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.3B | $5.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $413M | $450M | $1.0B | $5.2B | $9.5B | $13.0B | $12.6B | $11.6B | $9.9B | $9.8B | $9.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | $434M | $458M | $302M | $986M | $987M | $989M | $991M | $992M | $993M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | ($53M) | $204M | ($632M) | ($494M) | $336M | $333M | $569M | $310M | $451M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $83M | $90M | $590M | $871M | $1.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $329M | $360M | $438M | $4.3B | $8.5B | $11.0B | $10.6B | $9.7B | $8.0B | $7.8B | $7.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 8.7% | 12.4% | 14.3% | 23.3% | 20.5% | 22.2% | 20.9% | 16.3% | 13.8% | 11.8% | 11.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 53.1M | 91.2M | 97.1M | 130M | 147M | 174M | 183M | 183M | 166M | 160M | 158M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.22 | $4.37 | $6.69 | $8.72 | $12.01 | $16.32 | $20.91 | $22.66 | $26.87 | $31.71 | $33.61 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.78 | $-0.70 | $-1.26 | $-2.36 | $-3.35 | $-5.45 | $-6.86 | $-5.54 | $-0.66 | $0.21 | $0.66 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.03 | $-0.14 | $0.03 | $-0.24 | $0.05 | $-0.60 | — | — | — | — | $5.86 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.08 | $-0.14 | $0.03 | $-0.24 | $0.05 | $-0.60 | — | — | — | — | $5.86 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.27 | $0.10 | $0.05 | $0.35 | $0.18 | $0.26 | — | — | — | — | $0.26 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.20 | $3.94 | $4.51 | $32.90 | $57.62 | $63.33 | $57.70 | $53.09 | $47.93 | $48.95 | $49.34 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.72 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +22.2%/yr | +21.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −0.2%/yr (5-yr) | −0.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +25.8%/yr | −3.2%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2021 the business turned a $950M loss into ($104M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($950M) | ($491M) | ($307M) | ($122M) | ($64M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$258M | +$150M | +$110M | +$26M | +$19M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$632M | +$361M | +$264M | +$93M | +$50M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1M | +$13M | −$54M | +$11M | −$8M |
| Cash from operations | ($58M) | $33M | $14M | $8M | ($3M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$46M | −$26M | −$45M | −$5M | −$9M |
| Owner earnings | ($104M) | $7M | ($31M) | $3M | ($13M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -4% | 0% | -3% | 0% | -3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $632M), owner earnings is nearer ($737M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $310M · 2.0× operating profitModest net debtCash $682M − debt $992M
What this means
Netting $682M of cash and short-term investments against $992M of debt leaves $310M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (6.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 46 + DIO 0 − DPO 12 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -137%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $97M ÷ invested capital $8.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 27%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 29.65×Cash-backedCash from ops $1.0B ÷ net income $34M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $873M ÷ revenue $5.1B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 11.8%The count is genuinely shrinkingStock compensation $600M (fiscal 2025), 11.8% of revenue · repurchases $869M · diluted shares -12.7% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $992M vs $2.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.40/share (latest year $0.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −16% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −16% early to −6% lately, median −21% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2019 · −32.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$542M
- Receivables$711M
- Other current assets$2.2B
- Accounts payable$92M
- Other current liabilities$649M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2021
Over the record, the business generated $3M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$146M · 4370%
- Buybacks$102K · 3%
- Returned to owners$102K
$0 as dividends and $102K as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$143M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $143M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $102K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count197.0%
The diluted count rose from 53M to 158M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $14.6M | −$7.8M | ($950M) |
| 2022 | $49.4M | −$20.0M | ($1.3B) |
| 2023 | $77k | $2.5M | ($1.0B) |
| 2024 | $9.4M | $3.2M | ($109M) |
| 2024 | $27.2M | $65.6M | ($109M) |
| 2025 | $24.3M | $52.3M | $34M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio129:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$600M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 11.8% of revenue, equal to 380.5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics and what the growth costs. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record | Sales & marketinglatest FY | Stock paylatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSNCSS&C Technologies | $6.3B | 47% | 21.8% | 7% | 25% | 10.0% | 4.1% |
| CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc. | $5.3B | — | 25.1% | 25% | 29% | 15.2% | 8.6% |
| TEAMAtlassian | $5.2B | 83% | -2.5% | — | 27% | 21.8% | 26.1% |
| TWLOTwilio Inc. | $5.1B | 52% | -19.4% | -7% | -1% | 17.2% | 11.8% |
| GENGen Digital | $5.0B | 82% | 32.2% | 11% | 31% | 24.6% | 4.7% |
| CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc. | $4.8B | 74% | -9.8% | -24%1y | 30% | 38.1% | 22.8% |
| SNOWSnowflake Inc. | $4.7B | 64% | -49.7% | -20% | 16% | 44.0% | 34.1% |
| PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc. | $4.5B | 78% | -17.6% | 7% | 16% | 23.6% | 15.3% |
| Group median | — | 74% | -6.2% | 7% | 26% | 22.7% | 13.6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Twilio Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $924M on 152M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $451M. The if-converted diluted count is 158M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← TWIN its page in the Manual TWST →
Industry order: ← TUYA the Software chapter TYL →