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TTWO, Take-Two Interactive

Video Games asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a leading developer, publisher, and marketer of interactive entertainment for consumers around the globe.

Our products are currently designed for console gaming systems, mobile, including smartphones and tablets, and personal computer ("PC").

We deliver our products through physical retail, digital download, online platforms, and cloud streaming services.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
TTWO · Take-Two Interactive
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$6.7B
+18.2% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.7B 5-yr avg $5.3B
Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 50%
Operating margin −1.6% 5-yr avg −31.0%
ROIC −2% 5-yr avg −21%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg −0%

Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 50% and operating margin about 6.3% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −78% and 19% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Stock-based pay runs about 5.8% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

41% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • United States59%$3.9B
  • International41%$2.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.8B$1.8B$2.7B$3.1B$3.4B$3.5B$5.3B$5.3B$5.6B$6.7B$6.7BRevenueRevenue
$757M$895M$1.1B$1.5B$1.8B$2.0B$2.3B$2.2B$3.1B$3.8B$3.8BGross profitGross prof.
43%50%43%50%54%56%43%42%54%57%57%Gross marginGross mgn
28%28%25%25%25%29%45%42%46%40%40%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%11%9%10%9%12%17%18%18%16%16%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$91M$136M$207M$425M$629M$474M($1.2B)($3.6B)($4.4B)($104M)($104M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.1%7.6%7.7%13.8%18.7%13.5%−21.8%−67.1%−77.9%−1.6%−1.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$77M$137M$233M$458M$678M$465M($1.3B)($3.7B)($4.5B)($198M)Pretax incomePretax
$67M$174M$334M$404M$589M$418M($1.1B)($3.7B)($4.5B)($298M)($298M)Net incomeNet inc.
13%12%13%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$408M$494M$844M$686M$912M$258M$1M($16M)($45M)$624M$624MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$31M$44M$40M$48M$56M$61M$122M$171M$229M$199M$199MDepreciationDeprec.
$228M$160M$222M($25M)$157M($404M)$686M$3.2B$3.9B$419M$419MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$21M$62M$67M$53M$69M$159M$204M$142M$169M$163M$163MCapexCapex
1.2%3.4%2.5%1.7%2.0%4.5%3.8%2.6%3.0%2.4%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$387M$450M$803M$632M$843M$197M($121M)($158M)($215M)$462M$462MOwner earningsOwner earn.
21.7%25.1%30.1%20.5%25.0%5.6%−2.3%−2.9%−3.8%6.9%6.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$387M$432M$777M$632M$843M$99M($203M)($158M)($215M)$462M$462MFree cash flowFCF
21.7%24.1%29.1%20.5%25.0%2.8%−3.8%−2.9%−3.8%6.9%6.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$131M$9M$28M$12M$103M$161M$3.3B$7M$0$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$155M$362M$0$0$200M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
($129M)($272M)($224M)$4M($807M)$139M($2.9B)($28M)($152M)($649M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($50M)($281M)($464M)($77M)($57M)($257M)$1.9B($91M)$651M$95MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($8M)$25M($11M)($11M)$19M($5M)($16M)$3M$3M$9MExchange-rate effectFX
$221M($35M)$146M$601M$67M$135M($961M)($133M)$457M$79MChange in cashΔ cash
26%20%17%32%29%20%-8%-35%-80%-2%-2%ROICROIC
7%12%16%16%18%11%-12%-66%-210%-8%-8%Return on equityROE
7%12%16%16%18%11%−12%−66%−210%−8%−8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$2.0B$2.7B$2.6B$1.0B$776M$1.5B$2.0B$2.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$220M$302M$396M$593M$553M$579M$763M$680M$771M$737M$737MReceivablesReceiv.
$16M$15M$28M$19M$18M$13M$13MInventoryInvent.
$32M$35M$73M$66M$71M$126M$140M$196M$195M$211M$211MAccounts payablePayables
$204M$282M$351M$546M$500M$467M$623M$484M$576M$526M$539MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.2B$2.4B$2.8B$3.5B$4.2B$3.9B$2.5B$2.3B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0B$2.2B$2.1B$3.9B$2.4B$3.6B$2.6B$2.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.4×1.4×1.7×1.9×1.8×0.7×0.9×0.8×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$67M$102M$128M$132M$149M$242M$403M$411M$444M$445MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$359M$400M$382M$386M$535M$675M$6.8B$4.4B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$3.1B$3.7B$4.2B$4.9B$6.0B$6.5B$15.9B$12.2B$9.2B$9.4B$9.4BTotal assetsAssets
$252M$8M$0$0$3.1B$3.1B$3.7B$2.5B$2.6BTotal debtDebt
($1.1B)($1.4B)($1.6B)($2.6B)$2.1B$2.3B$2.2B$541M$626MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-9.0×-25.5×-26.2×-0.7×-0.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.2B$2.4B$2.7B$2.7B$6.8B$6.5B$7.0B$5.9BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1.0B$1.5B$2.0B$2.5B$3.3B$3.8B$9.0B$5.7B$2.1B$3.5B$3.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
4.6%6.5%9.3%8.3%3.3%5.2%5.9%6.3%5.8%4.6%4.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
94.1M113M115M114M116M117M160M170M175M184M184MShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.92$15.89$23.16$27.06$29.15$30.01$33.46$31.45$32.17$36.20$36.20Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.72$1.54$2.90$3.54$5.09$3.58$-7.03$-22.01$-25.58$-1.62$-1.62EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.11$3.98$6.97$5.54$7.29$1.69$-0.76$-0.93$-1.23$2.51$2.51Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.11$3.83$6.74$5.54$7.29$0.85$-1.27$-0.93$-1.23$2.51$2.51Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23$0.55$0.58$0.47$0.60$1.36$1.28$0.83$0.97$0.89$0.89Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.67$13.19$17.71$22.25$28.80$32.62$56.55$33.32$12.21$19.09$19.09Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.5%/yr+4.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−5.3%/yr−19.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.4%/yr+8.3%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr−7.9%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $298M loss into $462M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($298M)($4.5B)($3.7B)($1.1B)$418M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$199M+$229M+$171M+$122M+$61M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$305M+$324M+$336M+$318M+$183M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$419M+$3.9B+$3.2B+$686M−$404M
Cash from operations$624M($45M)($16M)$1M$258M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$163M−$169M−$142M−$122M−$61M
Owner earnings$462M($215M)($158M)($121M)$197M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$82M−$98M
Free cash flow$462M($215M)($158M)($203M)$99M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%-4%-3%-2%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $305M), owner earnings is nearer $156M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($104M) ÷ interest expense $151M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.5B + ST investments $444M − debt $2.5B
    What this means

    Netting $2.0B of cash and short-term investments against $2.5B of debt leaves $541M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 40 + DIO 0 − DPO 27 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -80%–32%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($82M) ÷ invested capital $4.5B
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–30%; latest $462M = operating cash $624M − maintenance capex $163M
    Industry peers: median 24%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $305M of SBC) leaves $156M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($298M) · cash from operations $624M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.82×
    Maintaining
    Capex $163M ÷ depreciation $199M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Modest selling cost
    Selling and marketing $1.8B ÷ revenue $6.7B
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 4.6%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $305M (fiscal 2026), 4.6% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +15.0% since 2023
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.24×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.5B vs $611M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −1583%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-15.30/share (latest year $-1.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.91/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → −49% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to −49% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −46%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −77.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.0B
  • Receivables$737M
  • Inventory$13M
  • Other current assets$460M
Current liabilities$2.6B
  • Debt due within a year$128M
  • Accounts payable$211M
  • Other current liabilities$2.3B
Current ratio1.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.77×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$611Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$128M due · $2.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$796Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$440M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.0B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$1.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'27$93M
'28$86M
'29$84M
'30$75M
'31$64M
later$147M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$93Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$549Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$440Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$440M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.0B, of which the leases are 15%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.1B · 27%
  • Buybacks$717M · 17%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.3B · 56%
  • Returned to owners$717M

    22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $717M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $597M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $717M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count95.5%

    The diluted count rose from 94M to 184M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.7B29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity30%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$5.9B written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Strauss Zelnick$138k$138k$843M
2022Strauss Zelnick$143k$143k$197M
2023Strauss Zelnick$115k$115k($121M)
2024Strauss Zelnick$274k$274k($158M)
2025Strauss Zelnick$106k$106k($215M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$305M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2026, 4.6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$5.4B · 81% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Sales to our five largest customers during the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, accounted for 80.6% of our net revenue, with Apple, Sony, Google, and Microsoft each accounting for more than 10.0% of our net revenue.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Video Games

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
NTESNetEase Inc.$16.6B56%25.0%22%29%
7974Nintendo$14.6B52%4y25.6%15%
EAElectronic Arts$7.5B75%20.1%19%29%
TTWOTake-Two Interactive$6.7B50%6.3%18%14%
RBLXRoblox Corporation$4.9B76%-28.8%-247%3y18%
9766Konami Group$3.1B44%4y19.1%29%
3659Nexon$3.0B70%4y30.6%15%37%
GCLGCL Global Holdings Ltd$190M32%2.3%-0%2y-6%
Group median54%19.6%18%18%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Take-Two Interactive has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Take-Two Interactive earns about $912M on its 13.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+34%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $462M on 186M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-11; net debt $626M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Take-Two Interactive (TTWO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TTWO, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← TTMI its page in the Manual TVTX →

Industry order: ← RBLX the Video Games chapter