← All companies ← TRUP Manual TSBK → ← TRUP Insurance — Property & Casualty UFCS →
TRV, Travelers Companies
Travelers is a holding company that, through its subsidiaries, sells commercial and personal property and casualty insurance — coverage against damage, loss, and liability — to businesses, government units, associations, and individuals. It collects premiums up front, pays claims as they come due, and earns money two ways: on the gap between premiums taken in and claims paid out, and on the money held in between. It reaches customers through independent agents and brokers, agency aggregators and carrier-based agencies, and direct.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 10/13–10/19 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~17 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- The lever that governs a property and casualty insurer is underwriting discipline: whether the price charged for a risk holds up against the claims that actually arrive, since the cost of the product is unknown when it is sold and is only settled years later. The filing names the test plainly — profitability substantially depends on actual claims experience being consistent with the assumptions used in pricing — and names the bad case beside it: products can commoditize, pushing the focus onto price and eroding the ability to differentiate. So watch whether this writer prices risk more accurately than rivals across a full cycle, including the years catastrophes and reserve surprises hit, rather than buying volume cheaply; the record below holds the margins, the returns, and the debt.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 89% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 11% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 7% a year across the record. The float runs about 2.0× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $27.6B | $28.9B | $30.3B | $31.6B | $32.0B | $34.8B | $36.9B | $41.4B | $46.4B | $48.8B | $49.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| $25.0B | $26.2B | $27.7B | $29.2B | $29.7B | $32.0B | $35.4B | $40.2B | $43.4B | $44.4B | — | Premiums written (net)Prem. written |
| $24.5B | $25.7B | $27.1B | $28.3B | $29.0B | $30.9B | $33.8B | $37.8B | $41.9B | $43.9B | $43.6B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.2B | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| $4.1B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $4.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $6.2B | $7.8B | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $3.0B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.7B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $5.0B | $6.3B | $8.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 26% | 25% | 15% | 16% | 17% | 18% | 15% | 11% | 19% | 19% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $4.5B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $5.2B | $6.5B | $7.3B | $6.5B | $7.7B | $9.1B | $10.6B | $11.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| 61% | 68% | 68% | 68% | 66% | 66% | 68% | 69% | 65% | 62% | 57% | Loss ratioLoss |
| 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 17% | 17% | 17% | Expense ratioExpense |
| ≈ 96% | ≈ 102% | ≈ 101% | ≈ 101% | ≈ 99% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 99% | ≈ 101% | ≈ 96% | ≈ 93% | ≈ 89% | Combined ratioCombined |
| — | — | ($406M) | $164M | ($267M) | ($484M) | ($537M) | ($38M) | ($548M) | ($939M) | — | Prior-yr reserve developmentReserve dev. |
| 13% | 9% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 18% | 19% | 25% | Return on equityROE |
| 10% | 5% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 15% | 16% | 22% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| $757M | $785M | $814M | $844M | $861M | $869M | $875M | $908M | $951M | $979M | $989M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $2.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $625M | $2.2B | $2.0B | $958M | $1.0B | $3.0B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($1.7B) | ($2.2B) | ($2.3B) | ($2.9B) | ($4.9B) | ($5.2B) | ($3.7B) | ($6.8B) | ($7.3B) | ($7.7B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($2.8B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.2B) | ($1.4B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.7B) | ($1.1B) | ($1.7B) | ($2.7B) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| — | $11M | ($10M) | $5M | $16M | ($1M) | ($30M) | $12M | ($14M) | $23M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($73M) | $37M | $29M | $121M | $227M | $40M | $38M | ($149M) | $49M | $314M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $70.5B | $72.5B | $72.3B | $77.9B | $84.4B | $87.4B | $80.5B | $88.8B | $94.2B | $101.2B | $103.2B | Investments (total)Investments |
| $47.9B | $49.6B | $50.7B | $51.8B | $54.5B | $56.9B | $58.6B | $61.6B | $64.1B | $65.7B | $67.2B | Float (reserves)Float |
| $100.2B | $103.5B | $104.2B | $110.1B | $116.8B | $120.5B | $115.7B | $126.0B | $133.2B | $143.7B | $143.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $77.0B | $79.8B | $81.3B | $84.2B | $87.6B | $91.6B | $94.2B | $101.1B | $105.3B | $110.8B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $23.2B | $23.7B | $22.9B | $25.9B | $29.2B | $28.9B | $21.6B | $24.9B | $27.9B | $32.9B | $33.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 291M | 279M | 270M | 262M | 255M | 251M | 240M | 232M | 231M | 228M | 216M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.36 | $7.38 | $9.35 | $10.00 | $10.59 | $14.60 | $11.86 | $12.88 | $21.63 | $27.63 | $38.44 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.60 | $2.82 | $3.02 | $3.22 | $3.38 | $3.46 | $3.65 | $3.91 | $4.12 | $4.30 | $4.58 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $79.80 | $85.18 | $84.86 | $98.91 | $114.69 | $115.18 | $89.95 | $107.33 | $120.57 | $144.53 | $153.34 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.5%/yr | +11.3%/yr |
| EPS | +11.5%/yr | +21.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +5.7%/yr | +4.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.8%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 93%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $41.0B ÷ premiums earned $43.9BIndustry peers: median 100%
What this means
The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 19%StrongNet income $6.3B ÷ equity $32.9BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float $64.9B2.0× equityNet reserves + unearned premiums − prepaid reinsurance − receivables − DAC = $64.9B
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $4.0B6.1% on the floatNet investment income $4.0B, 6.1% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
The cost and the reserves
- Cost of float −4.4%Paid to hold the moneyUnderwriting profit $2.9B ÷ float $64.9B
What this means
Buffett's own yardstick: the underwriting result as the price of holding the float. At or below zero, policyholders are paying the company to invest their money — the gold standard. A modest positive cost can still beat borrowing; a chronic high cost means the float is expensive leverage.
- Reserve development −$939MPast promises heldPrior-year development, FY2025: favorable (reserves released) · record: 7 favorable, 1 unfavorable of 8In the filing’s words
“In 2025 , estimated claims and claim adjustment expenses incurred included $ 939 million of net favorable development for claims arising in prior years, including $ 1.04 billion of net favorable prior year reserve development and $ 43 million of accretion of discount that impacted the Company's results of operations.”
✓ the narrated $ 939 million ties the filed figure · the words are the company’sWhat this means
Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Schnitzer | $19.9M | $37.3M | $3.7B |
| 2022 | Mr. Schnitzer | $21.1M | $50.4M | $2.8B |
| 2023 | Mr. Schnitzer | $22.7M | $27.6M | $3.0B |
| 2024 | Mr. Schnitzer | $23.1M | $61.2M | $5.0B |
| 2025 | Mr. Schnitzer | $27.0M | $55.6M | $6.3B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Combined ratiomedian over the record | Loss ratiomedian over the record | Yield on floatmedian over the record | ROTCEmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGRProgressive Corp. | $87.7B | 95% | 72% | 4.8% | 23% |
| ALLAllstate Corp. | $67.7B | 100% | 65% | 11.8% | 14% |
| CBChubb Ltd. | $59.5B | 91% | 57% | 5.9% | 17% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 99% | 67% | 5.4% | 15% |
| HIGThe Hartford Insurance Group Inc. | $28.4B | 107% | 68% | 5.3%1y | 16% |
| AIGAmerican International Group | $28.0B | 124% | 76% | 6.2% | 3% |
| ACGLArch Capital | $19.9B | 88% | 55% | 5.1% | 14% |
| LLoews Corp. | $18.5B | 149% | 76% | 9.7% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 100% | 67% | 5.6% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Travelers Companies’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered4%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $28.7B on 209M shares, a 15% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← TRUP its page in the Manual TSBK →
Industry order: ← TRUP the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter UFCS →