Owner Scorecard


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TAP, Molson Coors

Brewers, Distillers & Wineries consumer brand Cyclical

From our core power brands, Coors Light, Miller Lite, Coors Banquet, Molson Canadian, Carling and O ujsko, to our above premium brands, including Madr Excepcional, Staropramen, Blue Moon Belgian White and Leinenkugel's Summer Shandy , to our value brands, like Miller High Life and Keystone Light , we produce many beloved and iconic beers.

Our brands are designed to appeal to a wide range of consumer tastes, styles and price preferences.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TAP · Molson Coors
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$11.1B
−4.2% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $13.0B 5-yr avg $11.1B
Gross margin 47% 5-yr avg 38%
Operating margin −17.9% 5-yr avg 4.4%
ROIC −12% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%

Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −21% to 68% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −37 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$4.9B$11.0B$10.8B$10.6B$9.7B$10.3B$10.7B$11.7B$11.6B$11.1B$13.0BRevenueRevenue
$4.8B$4.2B$4.2B$3.8B$4.1B$3.7B$4.4B$4.5B$4.3B$6.2BGross profitGross prof.
43%39%40%39%39%34%37%39%38%47%Gross marginGross mgn
33%28%26%26%25%25%24%24%23%24%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$3.3B$1.7B$1.6B$764M($409M)$1.5B$158M$1.4B$1.8B($2.3B)($2.3B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
68.0%15.2%15.2%7.2%−4.2%14.1%1.5%12.3%15.1%−21.0%−17.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.1B$1.4B$1.4B$480M($644M)$1.2B($63M)$1.3B$1.5B($2.5B)Pretax incomePretax
$1.6B$1.6B$1.1B$242M($949M)$1.0B($175M)$949M$1.1B($2.1B)($2.1B)Net incomeNet inc.
48%17%49%19%24%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.1B$1.9B$2.3B$1.9B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5B$2.1B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$388M$813M$858M$859M$922M$786M$685M$683M$759M$711M$711MDepreciationDeprec.
($885M)($570M)$315M$788M$1.7B($250M)$959M$402M($15M)$3.2B$3.2BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$342M$600M$652M$594M$575M$523M$661M$672M$674M$717M$717MCapexCapex
7.0%5.4%6.1%5.6%6.0%5.1%6.2%5.7%5.8%6.4%5.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$785M$1.3B$1.7B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1B$841M$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
16.1%11.5%15.6%12.3%11.6%10.2%7.9%12.0%10.6%9.6%8.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$785M$1.3B$1.7B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1B$841M$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1BFree cash flowFCF
16.1%11.5%15.6%12.3%11.6%10.2%7.9%12.0%10.6%9.6%8.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12.0B$0$0$0$0$64M$9M$22M$22MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$353M$353M$354M$424M$125M$148M$329M$355M$369M$376M$376MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$52M$206M$643M$648MBuybacksBuybacks
($12.3B)($538M)($669M)($433M)($414M)($510M)($625M)($842M)($648M)($822M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$11.3B($1.5B)($1.0B)($2.0B)($1.1B)($1.2B)($890M)($981M)($1.1B)($1.1B)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($28M)$26M($14M)$9M$35M($24M)($25M)$13M($24M)$22MExchange-rate effectFX
$130M($142M)$639M($535M)$247M($133M)($37M)$269M$100M($73M)Change in cashΔ cash
8%7%6%2%-2%6%1%6%7%-12%-12%ROICROIC
14%12%8%2%-8%7%-1%7%9%-21%-21%Return on equityROE
11%9%6%−1%−9%6%−4%5%6%−25%−25%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$561M$419M$1.1B$523M$770M$637M$600M$869M$969M$897M$897MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$654M$728M$736M$706M$550M$679M$740M$758M$693M$703M$703MReceivablesReceiv.
$593M$592M$592M$616M$664M$805M$793M$802M$728M$716M$716MInventoryInvent.
$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$2.1B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8BAccounts payablePayables
($51M)($249M)($289M)($365M)($519M)($615M)($536M)($421M)($454M)($404M)($404M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.2B$2.2B$2.8B$2.2B$2.4B$2.8B$2.6B$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$2.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.2B$3.4B$4.3B$3.7B$3.9B$3.6B$3.4B$4.1B$3.0B$5.3B$5.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.6×0.6×0.6×0.6×0.8×0.8×0.7×0.9×0.6×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.5B$4.7B$4.6B$4.5B$4.3B$4.2B$4.2B$4.4B$4.5B$4.8BNet PP&ENet PP&E
$8.3B$8.4B$8.3B$7.6B$6.2B$6.2B$5.3B$5.3B$5.6B$1.9B$1.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$29.3B$30.2B$30.1B$28.9B$27.3B$27.6B$25.9B$26.4B$26.1B$22.7B$22.7BTotal assetsAssets
$12.1B$11.4B$10.5B$9.0B$8.2B$7.2B$6.5B$6.2B$6.1B$6.3B$6.3BTotal debtDebt
$11.6B$11.0B$9.5B$8.5B$7.4B$6.5B$5.9B$5.3B$5.2B$5.4B$5.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
12.2×4.8×5.3×2.7×-1.5×5.6×0.6×6.1×6.2×-9.4×-9.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$17.7B$17.1B$16.4B$15.2B$14.7B$14.0B$13.0B$12.9B$12.6B$12.2BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$0$28M$169M$116MRedeemable interestsRedeemable
$203M$209M$228M$254M$256M$247M$226M$211M$192M$197MNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$11.4B$13.0B$13.5B$13.4B$12.4B$13.4B$12.7B$13.2B$13.1B$10.2B$10.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.5%0.4%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$16M$674M$1.5B$845M$3.6B$3.6BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
213M217M217M217M217M218M217M217M210M199M199MShares out (diluted)Shares
$22.89$50.82$49.72$48.78$44.53$47.24$49.34$53.85$55.39$55.96$65.50Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.47$7.23$5.15$1.11$-4.38$4.62$-0.81$4.37$5.35$-10.75$-10.75EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.68$5.85$7.75$6.01$5.17$4.83$3.88$6.48$5.89$5.36$5.36Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.68$5.85$7.75$6.01$5.17$4.83$3.88$6.48$5.89$5.36$5.36Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.65$1.63$1.64$1.96$0.58$0.68$1.52$1.63$1.76$1.89$1.89Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.60$2.77$3.01$2.74$2.65$2.40$3.05$3.09$3.21$3.60$3.60Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$53.51$59.95$62.36$61.87$57.03$61.66$58.50$60.73$62.37$51.38$51.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.4%/yr+4.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.3%/yr+0.7%/yr
Dividends / share+1.5%/yr+26.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.4%/yr+6.3%/yr
Book value / share−0.4%/yr−2.1%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $2.1B loss into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($2.1B)$1.1B$949M($175M)$1.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$711M+$759M+$683M+$685M+$786M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$35M+$43M+$45M+$34M+$32M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$3.2B−$15M+$402M+$959M−$250M
Cash from operations$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$1.5B$1.6B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$717M−$674M−$672M−$661M−$523M
Owner earnings$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$841M$1.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%11%12%8%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $35M), owner earnings is nearer $1.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($2.3B) ÷ interest expense $248M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $897M − debt $6.3B
    What this means

    Netting $897M of cash and short-term investments against $6.3B of debt leaves $5.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 23 + DIO 38 − DPO 97 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -12%–8%; -12% latest = NOPAT ($1.8B) ÷ invested capital $15.6B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–16%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $717M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $35M of SBC) leaves $1.0B.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($2.1B) · cash from operations $1.8B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $1.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B — this fiscal year
    What this means

    Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $1.0B (96%) went back to shareholders, $376M dividends, $648M buybacks. Net of $35M stock comp, the real buyback was about $613M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 96%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 40%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.01×
    Maintaining
    Capex $717M ÷ depreciation $711M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $1.3B ÷ revenue $11.1B
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.3%
    The count is genuinely shrinking
    Stock compensation $35M (fiscal 2025), 0.3% of revenue · repurchases $648M · diluted shares -8.2% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $11.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $6.3B vs ($2.4B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −102%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.11/share (latest year $-10.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.38/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 33% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 33% early to 2% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −21.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$897M
  • Receivables$703M
  • Inventory$716M
  • Other current assets$620M
Current liabilities$5.3B
  • Debt due within a year$2.4B
  • Accounts payable$1.8B
  • Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio0.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.42×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.4B due · $897M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($3.7B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($9.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.5B$213M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$2.4B
'27$500K
'28$500K
'29$2M
'30$500K
later$3.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$2.4Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.4Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.4Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$6.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Dec 31, 2025$897M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$1.1B
Together, against $2.4B due next year0.81×

Cash on hand as of Dec 31, 2025 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $2.0B against the $2.4B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 81% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $17.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$6.0B · 34%
  • Dividends$3.2B · 18%
  • Buybacks$1.5B · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$7.0B · 40%
  • Returned to owners$4.7B

    40% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.2B as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $5.9B and cash and short-term investments rose $336M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$54.79

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 28M shares were bought for $1.5B, about $54.79 each.

  • Net change in share count−6.7%

    The diluted count fell from 213M to 199M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.89/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$13.9B61% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity19%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$12.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $6.0B of capital spent building

$6.7B written down across 5 years (2016, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 55% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.2M$7.5M$1.1B
2022$9.1M$9.0M$841M
2023$12.2M$22.6M$1.4B
2024$11.3M$9.1M$1.2B
2025$11.1M−$1.0M$1.1B
2025$4.1M$3.0M$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio97:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$35M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Brewers, Distillers & Wineries

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
BUDAnheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV$59.3B58%25.9%17%
HEIAHeineken N.V.$33.1B11.8%8%10%
RIPernod Ricard SA$12.6B60%25.9%14%2y
TAPMolson Coors$11.1B39%13.2%6%12%
BF-BBrown-Forman$3.9B61%32.4%22%20%
CPRDavide Campari-Milano N.V.$3.5B59%18.5%16%14%
CCUCompania Cervecerias Unidas S.A.$3.1B49%12.6%7%
SAMBoston Beer$2.0B48%9.5%16%10%
Group median58%15.8%16%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Molson Coors has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Molson Coors earns about $1.3B on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.1B on 199M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $5.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Molson Coors (TAP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TAP, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← TALO its page in the Manual TARS →

Industry order: ← SAM the Brewers, Distillers & Wineries chapter