Owner Scorecard
An independent research publication · records as of July 18, 2026

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STT, State Street Corporation

Banks financial

State Street Corporation is one of the world's leading providers of financial services to institutional investors, including investment servicing, markets and financing solutions and investment management.

Our clients — asset managers and owners, insurance companies, wealth managers, official institutions and central banks — rely on us to deliver solutions that support their business objectives across the investment life cycle.

Leveraging our strength and scale, innovation and platforms, and industry expertise, we are an essential partner to our clients.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
STT · State Street Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$13.9B
+6.6% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $15.1B 5-yr avg $12.7B
Return on equity 12% 5-yr avg 10%
Return on tangible equity 18% 5-yr avg 15%
Efficiency ratio 71% 5-yr avg 74%
Equity / assets 6.8% 5-yr avg 8.0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Servicing fees (38%) and Net interest income (21%), with 5 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 10%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 71% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Servicing fees at 38%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Servicing fees38%$5.3B
  • Net interest income21%$3.0B
  • Management fees17%$2.4B
  • Foreign exchange trading services12%$1.6B
  • Software and processing fees6%$903M
  • Securities finance4%$505M
  • Other2%$240M
By geographyUnited States57%International43%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 30, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 17.4% year over year; operating income up 4.9%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$10.2B$11.3B$12.1B$11.8B$11.7B$12.0B$12.2B$12.2B$13.1B$13.9B$15.1BRevenueRevenue
$2.5B$2.9B$3.7B$3.9B$2.6B$1.9B$4.1B$9.2B$12.0B$11.6B—Interest incomeInt. inc.
$428M$604M$991M$1.4B$375M$3M$1.5B$6.4B$9.1B$8.7B—Interest expenseInt. exp.
$2.1B$2.3B$2.7B$2.6B$2.2B$1.9B$2.5B$2.8B$2.9B$3.0B$3.2BNet interest incomeNet int.
$8.1B$9.0B$9.5B$9.1B$9.5B$10.0B$9.6B$9.5B$10.2B$11.0B$11.8BNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$10M$2M$15M$10M$88M($33M)$20M$46M$75M$59M$33MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$2.1B$3.0B$3.1B$2.7B$2.9B$3.2B$3.3B$2.3B$3.4B$3.7B—Pretax incomePretax
$2.1B$2.2B$2.6B$2.2B$2.4B$2.7B$2.8B$1.9B$2.7B$2.9B$3.5BNet incomeNet inc.
-1%28%16%17%17%15%17%16%21%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
0.9%0.9%1.1%0.9%0.8%0.9%0.9%0.7%0.8%0.8%0.8%Return on assetsROA
10%10%10%9%9%10%11%8%11%11%12%Return on equityROE
7%6%7%5%6%7%7%4%7%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
16%15%17%15%14%15%17%13%16%16%18%Return on tangible equityROTCE
79%73%74%77%75%75%72%78%73%73%71%Efficiency ratioEffic.
$723M$768M$828M$930M$889M$866M$972M$970M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
$1.4B$1.3B$350M$1.6B$515M$900M$1.5B$3.8B$1.3B$1.2B—BuybacksBuybacks
$4.2B$48M($4.5B)($2.6B)($65.5B)($2.2B)$6.8B$12.7B($39.5B)($13.0B)—Investing cash flowInv. cash
($6.4B)($6.2B)($4.5B)($3.0B)$62.2B$9.0B($18.4B)($13.4B)$51.8B$2.4B—Financing cash flowFin. cash
$107M$800M$1.2B$90M$165M$164M$339M$77M($902M)$1.3B—Change in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$19.7B$23.2B$25.8B$26.3B$27.9B$32.5B$32.1B$36.6B$43.2B$46.8B—Loans held for investmentLoans
————$122M—$97M$135M$174M$193M—Credit-loss allowanceAllowance
$242.7B$238.4B$244.6B$245.6B$314.7B$314.6B$301.4B$297.3B$353.2B$366.0B$418.4BTotal assetsAssets
$187.2B$184.9B$180.4B$181.9B$239.8B$255.0B$235.5B$221.0B$261.9B$274.4B$319.5BDepositsDeposits
$5.8B$6.0B$7.4B$7.6B$7.7B$7.6B$7.5B$7.6B$7.7B$8.2B$8.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$221.5B$216.1B$219.9B$221.2B$288.5B$287.3B$276.3B$273.5B$327.9B$338.2B—Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$21.2B$22.3B$24.7B$24.4B$26.2B$27.4B$25.2B$23.8B$25.3B$27.8B$28.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
396M380M376M374M357M358M370M327M302M289M282MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.41$5.67$6.89$6.00$6.78$7.52$7.50$5.95$8.89$10.19$12.26EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.83$2.02$2.20$2.49$2.49$2.42$2.63$2.97$3.42$3.88$4.10Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$53.57$58.70$65.71$65.38$73.37$76.44$68.06$72.88$83.80$96.33$100.25Book value / shareBVPS
$34.47$38.62$39.64$39.73$46.74$50.08$43.64$45.53$54.75$64.86$68.61Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.2%/yr+8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+26.8%/yr+36.1%/yr
EPS+7.3%/yr+8.5%/yr
Dividends / share+8.7%/yr+9.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.0%/yr+18.4%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr+5.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Foreign exchange trading services+15.2%
    “Foreign exchange trading services revenue, as presented in Table 2: Total Revenue, increased 15% in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily due to higher volumes supported by client franchise growth and higher currency volatility in the first half of 2025.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Software and processing fees+1.7%
    “Software and processing fees revenue, as presented in Table 2: Total Revenue, increased 2% in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily due to higher front office software and data revenue associated with CRD.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Securities finance+15.3%
    “Securities finance revenue, as presented in Table 2: Total Revenue, increased 15% in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily due to higher client lending balances.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Return on equity 11%
    Adequate
    Net income $2.9B ÷ equity $27.8B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Return on tangible equity 16%
    Strong
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $8.2B − intangibles $935M)
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficiency ratio 73%
    Average
    Noninterest expense $10.2B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 64%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 7.6%
    Modest
    Equity $27.8B ÷ assets $366.0B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit funding 75%
    Deposit-funded
    Deposits $274.4B ÷ assets $366.0B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 2%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $59M ÷ net interest income $3.0B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The franchise and the credit cycle

  • Deposit franchise 13%
    Rate-sensitive funding
    Noninterest-bearing deposits $35.3B ÷ deposits $274.4B · pays 2.73% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
    What this means

    The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.

  • Net charge-offs —
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. O’Hanley$14.1M$22.7M($7.3B)
2022Mr. O’Hanley$18.0M$10.1M$11.4B
2023Mr. O’Hanley$13.4M$10.6M$132M
2024Mr. O’Hanley$16.7M$28.2M($13.8B)
2025Mr. O’Hanley$19.5M$43.1M$11.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

    Peers, Banks

    The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

    CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the recordEfficiencymedian over the recordNII / assetsmedian over the recordNoninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
    BBDBanco Bradesco Sa$20.6B13%15%22%2y4.3%—
    BKTHE Bank of NEW York Mellon Corporation$20.1B10%20%69%0.9%18%
    BNSBank Nova Scotia Halifax Pfd 3$14.5B12%15%—1.4%—
    STTState Street Corporation$13.9B10%15%74%0.9%13%
    MTBM&T Bank Corporation$9.7B9%13%57%3.2%28%
    FCNCAFirst Citizens BancShares Inc.$9.5B12%13%64%3.0%25%
    FITBFifth Third Bancorp$9.0B12%16%58%2.7%25%
    NTRSNorthern Trust Corporation$8.1B12%13%70%1.2%19%
    Group median—12%15%64%2.0%22%
    IV

    The price

    What a price has to assume.

    What the price implies

    price / tangible book

    A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what State Street Corporation’s record justifies.

    $
    The assumptions

    Tangible book / share, delivered6%/yr’20→’25

    The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

    Enter a price above to run it.

    Price / tangible book—
    Justified by the return—
    Normalized return on tangible equity15%
    Price / book—
    Earnings yield—
    P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
    Graham’s price gate—

    Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

    Tangible book $19.3B on 275M shares, a 15% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

    Weigh STT against another business →

    The owners of STT: the meeting and the votes →

    Cite: Owner Scorecard, "State Street Corporation (STT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/STT, data as of 2026-07-18.

    Manual order: ← STRZ its page in the Manual STTK →

    Industry order: ← STEL the Banks chapter SUPV →