← All companies ← SKY Manual SKYT → ← SAFE REITs — Specialty & Diversified SMA →
SKYH, Sky Harbour Group Corporation
We are an aviation infrastructure development company building the first nationwide network of Home Base Operator campuses designed exclusively for business aircraft.
We develop, lease and manage general aviation hangars across the United States, targeting airfields in markets with significant based aircraft populations and high hangar demand.
Our HBO campuses feature private and semi-private hangars and a full suite of dedicated services specifically optimized for home based, versus transient, aircraft.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~43 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating cash per share does not form a clean trend in the record. Debt is 23% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $2M | $2M | $8M | $15M | $28M | $34M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($14M) | ($3M) | ($16M) | ($45M) | $19M | $925K | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $1M | $695K | $2M | $3M | $6M | $8M | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| ($7M) | ($27M) | ($8M) | ($9M) | ($2M) | $225K | Cash from operationsOp. cash |
| ($16M) | ($188M) | ($16M) | ($44M) | ($62M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $226M | $53M | $55M | $75M | $7M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $204M | ($163M) | $31M | $22M | ($57M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $304M | $331M | $402M | $557M | $593M | $823M | Total assetsAssets |
| 53% | 49% | 40% | 29% | 32% | 23% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $161M | $162M | $162M | $163M | $187M | $187M | Total debtDebt |
| ($43M) | $121M | $90M | $68M | $150M | $23M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1M | $0 | $541K | $715K | $1M | $4M | Interest expenseInt. exp. |
| 2.5× | — | -31.4× | -28.6× | -20.6× | -7.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $233M | $233M | $270M | $397M | $421M | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| ($18M) | $98M | $132M | $160M | $172M | $164M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 0K | 14.0M | 16.5M | 25.7M | 77.8M | 34.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $7.04 | $8.04 | $6.21 | $2.21 | $4.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.56 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3.02 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.27 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +38.9%/yr (3-yr) | +38.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +17.6%/yr (3-yr) | +17.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −32.0%/yr (3-yr) | −32.0%/yr (3-yr) |
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- What an owner could take out ($12M) to ($2M)A range, because the filings do not split maintenance from expansionBetween cash from operations less all capital spending ($2M) − $10M = ($12M), and cash from operations ($2M)
What this means
Owner earnings is what a business produces in cash after the spending needed to keep it competitive. For a property trust that spending cannot be read: the filings mix the money that replaces a roof with the money that buys a building, and management decides which is which. Rather than model the split and publish a single figure, the two ends are shown. The upper end is operating cash, which no owner could exceed. The lower end deducts every dollar of capital spending, which is too harsh, since a trust that is growing is charged for buildings it is adding. A trust whose distribution sits near the lower end is paying it out of the properties; one whose distribution exceeds the upper end is paying it from somewhere else.
- Not enough data
What this means
Operating cash flow or the property cost wasn't found in the filing data.
- Not enough data
What this means
Dividends or operating cash flow missing.
- Withheld — not in the filings' structured data
What this means
Funds from operations is defined by the industry's trade association rather than by accounting rules, and no REIT tags it in the structured data behind this site. Rebuilding it from the standard tags misses the figure these companies report by as much as half, because the gains on property sales it must exclude sit behind each filer's own custom tags. Rather than publish an invented number under the industry's name, the record shows the cash the properties actually produced.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 32%ConservativeTotal debt $187M ÷ assets $593MIndustry peers: median 24%
What this means
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Not enough data
What this means
Operating income or interest is missing, or operating income sits far below net income (a triple-net REIT's lease income bypasses the operating line), so an EBITDA coverage would mislead — read it on net income against the interest bill, and on debt / assets, instead.
- Consolidated accounts only
What this means
These figures are the trust's consolidated accounts. Where a REIT owns buildings through joint ventures it does not control, its share of those properties — and of the debt against them — sits outside every line here, and the filings do not tag it in a form this pipeline can read. Read the equity-method and off-balance-sheet notes in the 10-K before concluding anything about total leverage.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership2.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$6M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 20.9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Specialty REITs
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Cash marginmedian over the record | Cash / assetsmedian over the record | Dividend / cashmedian over the record | Debt / assetsmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MRPMillrose Properties Inc. | $600M | 612%1y | 39.7%1y | 8%1y | 23%1y |
| FPHFive Point Holdings LLC Class A | $110M | -46% | -2.7% | — | 21% |
| LANDGladstone Land Corporation | $88M | 43% | 2.4% | 55% | 54% |
| FPIFarmland Partners Inc. | $52M | 28% | 1.6% | 88% | 45% |
| TRCTejon Ranch Co | $50M | 31% | 2.1% | — | 12% |
| FRPHFRP Holdings Inc. | $43M | 70% | 4.0% | — | 25% |
| SKYHSky Harbour Group Corporation | $28M | -102% | -1.9% | — | 40% |
| MLPMaui Land & Pineapple Company Inc. | $19M | 14% | 4.4% | — | 18%1y |
| Group median | — | 29% | 2.2% | — | 24% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← SKY its page in the Manual SKYT →
Industry order: ← SAFE the REITs — Specialty & Diversified chapter SMA →