Owner Scorecard


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SITM, SiTime

Semiconductors capital-intensive UnprofitableCapital build-outNet current asset value

We are a leading provider of Precision Timing solutions to the global electronics industry.

The ability to accurately measure and reference time has been essential to humankind's greatest inventions and technological advances.

Timing technology has continued to evolve over centuries, underpinning broader technological evolution and is the heartbeat of digital electronic systems.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SITM · SiTime
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$327M
+61.2% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $380M 5-yr avg $235M
Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 58%
Operating margin −13.5% 5-yr avg −26.2%
ROIC −6% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 4%

Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 16% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 15% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.3%) on a 53% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$85M$84M$116M$219M$284M$144M$203M$327M$380MRevenueRevenue
$36M$40M$58M$139M$183M$82M$104M$175M$212MGross profitGross prof.
42%47%50%64%65%57%52%54%56%Gross marginGross mgn
25%25%30%25%27%58%50%36%34%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
27%28%27%24%32%68%53%36%32%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($8M)($5M)($9M)$33M$16M($107M)($115M)($67M)($51M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.1%−5.8%−7.4%15.0%5.7%−74.4%−56.9%−20.5%−13.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
($9M)($7M)($9M)$32M$23M($80M)($93M)($42M)Pretax incomePretax
($9M)($7M)($9M)$32M$23M($81M)($94M)($43M)($24M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($1M)$7M$17M$59M$40M$8M$23M$87M$103MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$7M$8M$6M$8M$12M$16M$30M$40M$44MDepreciationDeprec.
$52K$4M$4M($11M)($53M)($4M)($6M)($14M)($25M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$1M$6M$31M$32M$9M$36M$52M$49MCapexCapex
2.7%1.7%5.2%14.1%11.2%6.2%17.9%15.9%12.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($3M)$6M$11M$51M$28M($889K)($13M)$47M$54MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.9%7.1%9.0%23.4%9.8%−0.6%−6.4%14.4%14.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)$6M$11M$28M$8M($889K)($13M)$35M$54MFree cash flowFCF
−3.9%7.1%9.0%12.9%2.8%−0.6%−6.4%10.8%14.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$39M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
($5M)($3M)($8M)($34M)($560M)($37M)$65M($428M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$5M$51M$1M$461M($5M)$3M($91M)$351MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($1M)$56M$10M$486M($525M)($25M)($3M)$11MChange in cashΔ cash
-11%-4%-19%45%2%-12%-13%-5%-6%ROICROIC
-85%-11%-9%5%3%-11%-13%-4%-2%Return on equityROE
−85%−11%−9%5%3%−11%−13%−4%−2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$74M$559M$35M$9M$6M$17M$498MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M$18M$24M$38M$41M$22M$38M$45M$55MReceivablesReceiv.
$21M$12M$12M$24M$58M$66M$77M$82M$91MInventoryInvent.
$5M$4M$6M$13M$15M$9M$23M$21M$23MAccounts payablePayables
$35M$26M$30M$49M$84M$79M$92M$105M$123MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$53M$100M$113M$626M$669M$623M$544M$949M$949MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$59M$53M$19M$37M$34M$121M$108M$84M$76MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.9×5.9×16.7×19.8×5.1×5.0×11.3×12.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11M$9M$12M$38M$59M$55M$82M$105MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$0$87M$87M$87M$87MGoodwillGoodwill
$73M$123M$136M$678M$751M$952M$885M$1.3B$1.3BTotal assetsAssets
$46M$41M$35MTotal debtDebt
$46M$41M($463M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.2×-2.8×-11.9×-70.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$62M$61M$26M$46M$42M$244M$185M$139MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$11M$62M$110M$632M$708M$708M$700M$1.2B$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.6%13.8%13.7%20.2%53.3%45.7%31.7%28.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
10.0M10.6M16.1M21.1M22.7M22.2M23.1M25.0M26.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.52$7.96$7.23$10.35$12.51$6.49$8.77$13.08$14.42Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.93$-0.63$-0.58$1.53$1.03$-3.63$-4.05$-1.72$-0.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.34$0.56$0.65$2.42$1.23$-0.04$-0.56$1.88$2.06Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.34$0.56$0.65$1.33$0.35$-0.04$-0.56$1.41$2.06Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23$0.14$0.38$1.46$1.40$0.40$1.57$2.08$1.86Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.10$5.89$6.84$29.91$31.26$31.91$30.27$46.31$44.00Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.52 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.3%/yr+12.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+23.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+36.9%/yr+40.6%/yr
Book value / share+70.6%/yr+46.6%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $47M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $40M it takes just to hold its position. It put $12M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $35M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($43M)($94M)($81M)$23M$32M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$40M+$30M+$16M+$12M+$8M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$104M+$93M+$77M+$57M+$30M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$14M−$6M−$4M−$53M−$11M
Cash from operations$87M$23M$8M$40M$59M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$40M−$36M−$9M−$12M−$8M
Owner earnings$47M($13M)($889K)$28M$51M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$12M−$20M−$23M
Free cash flow$35M($13M)($889K)$8M$28M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%-6%-1%10%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $40M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $12M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $104M), owner earnings is nearer ($57M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $17M − debt $41M
    What this means

    Netting $17M of cash and short-term investments against $41M of debt leaves $24M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 50 + DIO 196 − DPO 51 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -19%–45%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($53M) ÷ invested capital $1.2B
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -6%–23%; latest $47M = operating cash $87M − maintenance capex $40M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 8 years. It chose to put $12M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $35M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $104M of SBC) leaves ($57M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($43M) · cash from operations $87M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.29×
    Expanding
    Capex $52M ÷ depreciation $40M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 31.7%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $104M (fiscal 2025), 31.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +10.2% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $327M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 11.30×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $41M vs $865M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.74/share (latest year $-1.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.80/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −7% → −51% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −7% early to −51% lately, median −9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +44%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 44% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −74.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$949M
  • Cash & short-term investments$498M
  • Receivables$55M
  • Inventory$91M
  • Other current assets$305M
Current liabilities$76M
  • Debt due within a year$35M
  • Accounts payable$23M
  • Other current liabilities$18M
Current ratio12.48×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio11.28×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio6.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$873Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$35M due · $498M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+88.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.9× → 12.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$930Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$815MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$38M$3M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $240M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$170M · 71%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$70M · 29%
  • Net change in share count163.4%

    The diluted count rose from 10M to 26M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Vashist$10.9M$113.4M$51M
2022Mr. Vashist$9.9M−$88.7M$28M
2023Mr. Vashist$10.6M$13.5M($889K)
2024Mr. Vashist$12.8M$47.7M($13M)
2025Mr. Vashist$14.3M$57.0M$47M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio84:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$104M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 31.7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics, research and the inventory cycle. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the recordR&D / revenuelatest FYCapex / revenuelatest FYInventory dayslatest FY
SHLSShoals Technologies Group Inc.$475M36%17.0%10%17%7.0%106
POWIPower Integrations$444M51%13.4%11%17%22.8%5.5%302
SKYTSkyWater Technology Inc.$442M18%-5.7%-8%2y-6%3.3%5.5%25
TOYOTOYO Co. Ltd$427M23%13.8%19%13%21.5%88
AMBAAmbarella$391M61%-21.4%-15%11%61.0%4.0%120
SITMSiTime$327M53%-8.3%-8%8%36.4%15.9%196
LASRnLIGHT Inc.$261M28%-9.8%-16%-2%18.4%3.5%90
INDIindie Semiconductor Inc.$217M41%-81.8%-26%-64%70.9%6.6%136
Group median38%-7.0%-8%10%29.6%6.0%113
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SiTime has delivered.

SiTime’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, SiTime earns about $26M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $54M on 26M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $463M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($49M) runs well above depreciation ($44M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $63M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SiTime (SITM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SITM, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← SITE its page in the Manual SJM →

Industry order: ← SIMO the Semiconductors chapter SKYT →