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SHEN, Shenandoah Telecom
Shenandoah Telecommunications Company, provide broadband services through its high speed, state-of-the-art fiber-optic and cable networks to customers in eight contiguous states in the eastern United States.
The Company's services include: broadband internet, video and voice; high-speed Ethernet, dark fiber leasing; and managed network services.
Shentel provides broadband data, video and voice services to residential and commercial customers in portions of Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Delaware, Ohio and Indiana, via fiber optic and hybrid fiber coaxial ("HFC") cable networks.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report Est. 8/3 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~31 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Residential and SMB - Incumbent Broadband (47%) and Residential and SMB - Glo Fiber Expansion Markets (23%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 100% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −1.1% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 55% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Residential And SMB - Incumbent Broadband at 47%.
- Residential And SMB - Incumbent Broadband47%$170M
- Residential And SMB - Glo Fiber Expansion Markets23%$83M
- Commercial Fiber22%$79M
- RLEC & Other7%$26M
- Income From Leasing Arrangements2%$7M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $535M | $612M | $193M | $207M | $221M | $245M | $249M | $269M | $328M | $358M | $362M | RevenueRevenue |
| $342M | $400M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $149M | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 64% | 65% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 41% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 25% | 27% | 37% | 38% | 39% | 34% | 37% | 37% | 35% | 33% | 33% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $23M | $47M | ($3M) | ($1M) | ($3M) | ($2M) | ($17M) | $142K | ($29M) | ($23M) | ($28M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.2% | 7.6% | −1.5% | −0.6% | −1.2% | −1.0% | −7.0% | 0.1% | −8.7% | −6.5% | −7.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $2M | $13M | $734K | $2M | $586K | $6M | ($19M) | $2M | ($38M) | ($42M) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($895K) | $66M | $47M | $56M | $126M | $999M | ($8M) | $8M | $194M | ($33M) | ($40M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $162M | $223M | $266M | $259M | $303M | ($251M) | $75M | $114M | $63M | $101M | $105M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $144M | $177M | $44M | $47M | $49M | $55M | $66M | $63M | $97M | $130M | $135M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $16M | ($24M) | $170M | $153M | $123M | ($1.3B) | $9M | $33M | ($238M) | ($5M) | ($2M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $173M | $146M | $57M | $67M | $120M | $160M | $189M | $255M | $319M | $359M | $352M | CapexCapex |
| 32.4% | 23.9% | 29.4% | 32.4% | 54.6% | 65.3% | 75.9% | 94.8% | 97.3% | 100.3% | 97.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($12M) | $76M | $221M | $212M | $254M | ($306M) | $9M | $51M | ($34M) | ($29M) | ($30M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.2% | 12.5% | 114.8% | 102.7% | 115.1% | −124.8% | 3.7% | 18.9% | −10.5% | −8.0% | −8.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($12M) | $76M | $209M | $192M | $182M | ($411M) | ($114M) | ($141M) | ($257M) | ($258M) | ($247M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −2.2% | 12.5% | 108.5% | 92.9% | 82.6% | −167.6% | −45.8% | −52.5% | −78.2% | −72.1% | −68.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $657M | $6M | $0 | $10M | $2M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $347M | $5M | $5M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $12M | $12M | $13M | $14M | $16M | $940M | $4M | $5M | $6M | $6M | $6M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $5M | $0 | $0 | $7M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($820M) | ($151M) | ($188M) | ($165M) | ($156M) | $1.8B | ($184M) | ($237M) | ($339M) | ($295M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $618M | ($29M) | ($71M) | ($77M) | ($54M) | ($1.6B) | $69M | $218M | $184M | $196M | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($41M) | $42M | $7M | $17M | $94M | ($111M) | ($40M) | $95M | ($93M) | $2M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 1% | 4% | -0% | -0% | -0% | -0% | -2% | 0% | -2% | -1% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| -0% | 19% | 11% | 12% | 22% | 156% | -1% | 1% | 21% | -4% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| −4% | 15% | 8% | 9% | 19% | 9% | −2% | 1% | 20% | −4% | −5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $36M | $79M | $85M | $102M | $195M | $84M | $44M | $139M | $46M | $27M | $44M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $70M | $54M | $54M | $64M | $70M | $22M | $21M | $20M | $30M | $31M | $25M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $39M | $6M | $5M | $6M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $3M | InventoryInvent. |
| $73M | $29M | $36M | $40M | $20M | $29M | $49M | $54M | $58M | $61M | $54M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $36M | $31M | $24M | $29M | $51M | ($7M) | ($29M) | ($34M) | ($28M) | ($30M) | ($26M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $161M | $173M | $210M | $242M | $1.4B | $166M | $129M | $176M | $95M | $97M | $114M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $164M | $138M | $89M | $154M | $1.2B | $67M | $96M | $98M | $115M | $108M | $102M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.3× | 2.4× | 1.6× | 1.2× | 2.5× | 1.3× | 1.8× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $698M | $686M | $703M | $363M | $440M | $554M | $688M | $850M | $1.4B | $1.6B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $145M | $146M | $146M | $149M | — | — | — | — | $67M | $68M | $68M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $891M | $978M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $829M | $822M | $770M | $720M | $688M | $0 | $75M | $300M | $417M | $628M | $694M | Total debtDebt |
| $793M | $743M | $685M | $618M | $493M | ($84M) | $31M | $161M | $371M | $601M | $650M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.9× | 1.2× | -0.1× | -0.0× | — | -0.9× | -11.1× | 0.0× | -1.8× | -0.9× | -0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $0 | $82M | $89M | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| $296M | $352M | $440M | $468M | $577M | $642M | $638M | $653M | $919M | $881M | $867M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.6% | 0.6% | 2.5% | 1.6% | 2.7% | 1.4% | 3.4% | 3.7% | 3.0% | 2.7% | 2.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 48.8M | 50.0M | 50.1M | 50.1M | 50.0M | 50.1M | 50.2M | 50.7M | 53.7M | 55.1M | 55.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.97 | $12.23 | $3.85 | $4.13 | $4.41 | $4.89 | $4.96 | $5.31 | $6.11 | $6.49 | $6.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.02 | $1.33 | $0.93 | $1.11 | $2.51 | $19.92 | $-0.17 | $0.16 | $3.61 | $-0.60 | $-0.71 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.24 | $1.53 | $4.42 | $4.24 | $5.08 | $-6.10 | $0.18 | $1.00 | $-0.64 | $-0.52 | $-0.55 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.24 | $1.53 | $4.18 | $3.83 | $3.65 | $-8.20 | $-2.27 | $-2.79 | $-4.77 | $-4.68 | $-4.44 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.25 | $0.26 | $0.28 | $0.33 | $18.75 | $0.08 | $0.09 | $0.11 | $0.12 | $0.12 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $3.55 | $2.93 | $1.13 | $1.34 | $2.41 | $3.19 | $3.77 | $5.03 | $5.94 | $6.51 | $6.33 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.06 | $7.04 | $8.80 | $9.34 | $11.54 | $12.81 | $12.72 | $12.87 | $17.10 | $15.99 | $15.61 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −5.7%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −7.7%/yr | −18.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +7.0%/yr | +22.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +11.4%/yr | +6.7%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($29M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $130M it takes just to hold its position. It put $229M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($258M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($33M) | $194M | $8M | ($8M) | $999M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$130M | +$97M | +$63M | +$66M | +$55M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$10M | +$10M | +$10M | +$9M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$5M | −$238M | +$33M | +$9M | −$1.3B |
| Cash from operations | $101M | $63M | $114M | $75M | ($251M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$130M | −$97M | −$63M | −$66M | −$55M |
| Owner earnings | ($29M) | ($34M) | $51M | $9M | ($306M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$229M | −$222M | −$192M | −$123M | −$105M |
| Free cash flow | ($258M) | ($257M) | ($141M) | ($114M) | ($411M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -8% | -10% | 19% | 4% | -125% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $130M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $229M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($38M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($23M) ÷ interest expense $25M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $27M − debt $628M
What this means
Netting $27M of cash and short-term investments against $628M of debt leaves $601M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–4%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($18M) ÷ invested capital $1.5BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -125%–115%; latest ($29M) = operating cash $101M − maintenance capex $130MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $229M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($258M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($38M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($33M) · cash from operations $101M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.77×ExpandingCapex $359M ÷ depreciation $130M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 2.7%The count is risingStock compensation $10M (fiscal 2025), 2.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +9.9% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $358M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.90×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $628M vs ($11M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +51%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.02/share (latest year $-0.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −5% lately, median −1% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · −8.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.4%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$44M
- Receivables$25M
- Inventory$3M
- Other current assets$42M
- Accounts payable$54M
- Other current liabilities$47M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.8B · 141%
- Dividends$1.0B · 78%
- Buybacks$12M · 1%
- Returned to owners$1.0B
235% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.0B as dividends and $12M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.6B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count13.8%
The diluted count rose from 49M to 56M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.12/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($412M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $99M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. French | $2.4M | $1.6M | ($306M) |
| 2022 | Mr. French | $2.8M | $2.2M | $9M |
| 2023 | Mr. French | $3.4M | $4.0M | $51M |
| 2024 | Mr. French | $3.3M | $941k | ($34M) |
| 2025 | Mr. French | $3.0M | $2.6M | ($29M) |
| 2025 | Mr. McKay | $2.3M | $1.9M | ($29M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio36:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 2.7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Telecom Operators
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITUniti Group Inc. | $2.2B | — | 32.9% | 11%2y | 1% |
| IDTIDT Corporation | $1.2B | 24% | 2.8% | 75% | 2% |
| TDSTelephone and Data Systems | $1.2B | 76%2y | 2.2% | 1% | 3% |
| VIVTelefonica Brasil S.A. | $1.2B | — | 159.8%1y | — | 183%1y |
| KYIVKyivstar Group Ltd. | $1.2B | — | 37.9% | 45% | 35% |
| ATNIATN International Inc. | $728M | — | 2.5% | 1% | 3% |
| SHENShenandoah Telecom | $358M | 65%2y | -1.1% | -0% | 8% |
| ADArray Digital Infrastructure Inc. | $163M | 51% | 1.4% | 1% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 58% | 2.7% | 1% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shenandoah Telecom has delivered.
Shenandoah Telecom’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Shenandoah Telecom earns about $3M on its 0.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −8.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($247M) on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $650M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($352M) runs well above depreciation ($135M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($25M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SHC its page in the Manual SHLS →
Industry order: ← SATS the Telecom Operators chapter SIFY →