Owner Scorecard


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POR, Portland General Electric

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
POR · Portland General Electric
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.6B
+4.0% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Operating margin 14.1% 5-yr avg 14.9%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin −5% 5-yr avg −11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 16% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 30% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Modest returns here are the design, not a verdict: a regulated utility's prices are set by commission, so the questions are the return the regulator allows, how fast the invested base it earns that return on is growing, and the health of the relationship with the commissions that decide both — all of which live in the 10-K, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 31, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 0.9% year over year; operating income up 2.5%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$2.9B$3.4B$3.6B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
12%13%14%14%13%14%13%12%12%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$340M$380M$346M$353M$269M$378M$397M$396M$512M$555M$497MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.7%18.9%17.4%16.6%12.5%15.8%15.0%13.5%14.9%15.5%14.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$243M$273M$229M$241M$155M$267M$272M$273M$350M$359MPretax incomePretax
$193M$187M$212M$214M$155M$244M$233M$228M$313M$306M$257MNet incomeNet inc.
21%32%7%11%0%9%14%16%11%15%13%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$562M$597M$630M$546M$567M$532M$674M$420M$778M$1.1B$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$321M$345M$382M$409M$454M$404M$417M$458M$496M$578M$586MDepreciationDeprec.
$42M$58M$31M($86M)($53M)($130M)$9M($283M)($55M)$218M$180MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$584M$514M$595M$606M$784M$636M$766M$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2BCapexCapex
30.4%25.6%29.9%28.5%36.6%26.5%28.9%46.5%36.9%33.2%34.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$241M$252M$248M$137M$113M$128M$257M($38M)$282M$540M$453MOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.5%12.5%12.5%6.5%5.3%5.3%9.7%−1.3%8.2%15.1%12.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($22M)$83M$35M($60M)($217M)($104M)($92M)($938M)($490M)($71M)($189M)Free cash flowFCF
−1.1%4.1%1.8%−2.8%−10.1%−4.3%−3.5%−32.1%−14.2%−2.0%−5.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$110M$118M$125M$134M$140M$150M$158M$179M$200M$225M$236MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$12M$18M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
($585M)($514M)($471M)($604M)($787M)($656M)($758M)($1.4B)($1.3B)($1.2B)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$25M($50M)($79M)($31M)$447M($81M)$197M$778M$526M$142MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
$2M$33M$80M($89M)$227M($205M)$113M($160M)$7M$64MChange in cashΔ cash
6%5%7%6%5%6%5%5%6%5%5%ROICROIC
8%8%8%8%6%9%8%7%8%7%6%Return on equityROE
4%3%3%3%1%3%3%1%3%2%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$6M$39M$119M$30M$257M$52M$165M$5M$12M$76M$35MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$155M$168M$193M$253M$271M$329M$398M$414M$456M$460M$410MReceivablesReceiv.
$129M$132M$168M$165M$153M$244M$457M$347M$365M$330M$451MAccounts payablePayables
$26M$36M$25M$88M$118M$85M($59M)$67M$91M$130M($41M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$463M$526M$643M$500M$721M$688M$1.2B$935M$1.0B$1.1B$1.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$577M$432M$791M$519M$815M$768M$1.5B$1.1B$1.1B$993M$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×1.2×0.8×1.0×0.9×0.9×0.8×0.8×0.9×1.1×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.4B$6.7B$6.9B$7.2B$7.5B$8.0B$8.5B$9.5B$10.3B$11.0BNet PP&ENet PP&E
$534M$500M$462M$500M$592M$557M$527M$713M$837M$787MRegulatory assetsReg. assets
$1.0B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6BRegulatory liabilitiesReg. liab.
$7.5B$7.8B$8.1B$8.4B$9.1B$9.5B$10.5B$11.2B$12.5B$13.2B$13.6BTotal assetsAssets
$2.4B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$3.0B$3.3B$3.6B$4.0B$4.5B$4.7B$4.9BTotal debtDebt
$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8B$3.2B$3.5B$4.0B$4.5B$4.6B$4.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$112M$120M$124M$128M$136M$137M$156M$173M$211M$232M$240MInterest expenseInt. exp.
3.0×3.2×2.8×2.8×2.0×2.8×2.5×2.3×2.4×2.4×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.2B$5.4B$5.6B$5.8B$6.5B$6.8B$7.7B$7.9B$8.8B$9.1BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$2.3B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7B$2.8B$3.3B$3.8B$4.1B$4.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.4%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
89.1M89.2M89.3M89.6M89.6M89.6M89.6M98.0M104M111M116MShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.59$22.53$22.28$23.71$23.93$26.73$29.53$29.84$33.03$32.29$30.39Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.17$2.10$2.37$2.39$1.73$2.72$2.60$2.33$3.01$2.76$2.21EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.71$2.83$2.78$1.53$1.26$1.43$2.87$-0.39$2.71$4.88$3.90Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.25$0.93$0.39$-0.67$-2.42$-1.16$-1.03$-9.58$-4.70$-0.64$-1.63Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.24$1.32$1.40$1.50$1.56$1.67$1.76$1.83$1.92$2.03$2.03Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.56$5.76$6.66$6.77$8.75$7.10$8.55$13.86$12.17$10.74$10.56Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$26.32$27.09$28.05$28.93$29.15$30.20$31.00$33.88$36.43$37.32$35.46Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.6%/yr+6.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.8%/yr+31.1%/yr
EPS+2.7%/yr+9.8%/yr
Dividends / share+5.7%/yr+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.6%/yr+4.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.0%/yr+5.1%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $540M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $578M it takes just to hold its position. It put $611M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($71M).

Reported net income$306M
Owner earnings$540M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$306M$313M$228M$233M$244M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$578M+$496M+$458M+$417M+$404M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$24M+$17M+$15M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$218M−$55M−$283M+$9M−$130M
Cash from operations$1.1B$778M$420M$674M$532M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$578M−$496M−$458M−$417M−$404M
Owner earnings$540M$282M($38M)$257M$128M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$611M−$772M−$900M−$349M−$232M
Free cash flow($71M)($490M)($938M)($92M)($104M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%8%-1%10%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $578M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $611M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $524M.

A regulated utility reads differently here. What it spends above depreciation goes into rate base, where the commission lets it earn the allowed return and recover the capital, with interest, over decades — growth that is financed, not taken out of owners' pockets this year. So the truth sits between the bridge's two ends: owner earnings excuses the build-out entirely, free cash flow charges it entirely, and the scorecard's utility-plant figure shows how fast the base earning that return is compounding.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

The allowed return, earned and credited

  • Below the typical allowed band
    Median over 10 readable years · latest FY2025: 7.4% (net income $306M ÷ equity $4.1B)
    What this means

    A commission caps what a regulated utility may earn on shareholders' capital, so the question is not whether the return is high but whether the company actually earns what it is allowed — persistent under-earning means costs the regulator will not put in rates, and a return above the band usually means unregulated businesses in the mix. Read through the record, because a single year carries rate-case timing noise.

  • AFUDC in earnings 5.9%
    Construction credit in earnings
    Equity allowance for funds used during construction $18M ÷ net income $306M
    What this means

    While a plant is under construction the commission lets the utility credit itself the allowed return on the capital tied up — a real, allowed profit that arrives as a bookkeeping entry now and as cash only after the plant enters rates. A large share means heavy reinvestment at the allowed return, the thing Berkshire's utility letters prize; it also means that much of this year's earnings has not yet been collected from anyone.

The invested base and the regulatory ledger

  • Net utility plant $11.0B
    Growing ≈ 6.1%/yr
    Utility plant net of depreciation, as filed · FY2016→FY2025: $6.4B → $11.0B, ≈ 6.1%/yr
    What this means

    The closest filed figure to the rate base — the invested capital the commission sets the allowed return on. Its growth rate is the utility's reinvestment runway: under regulation, earnings power compounds roughly as fast as the base the return is earned on, funded by capital the regulator lets the company recover with interest. Rate base itself is not tagged in any structured filing, so this is the proxy, labeled as what it is.

  • Regulatory assets & liabilities $787M / $1.6B
    Owes ratepayers
    Regulatory assets $787M · regulatory liabilities $1.6B · net $776M liability position, as filed
    What this means

    The ledger of the regulatory relationship: assets are costs the commission has agreed the utility may collect from ratepayers in future rates, liabilities are amounts it must give back. Both are promises whose worth depends entirely on the commissions that made them — which is why they are shown as filed and never netted into earnings adjustments here.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× (waived for utilities) · exempt
    What this means

    Graham exempted public utilities from this test: their working capital “takes care of itself” through the continuous bond-and-share financing of growth, so a thin current ratio is the industry's structure, not a warning. His substitute test — debt no more than twice book equity — is the next line.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ 2× equity (Graham's utility test) · $4.7B vs $4.1B equity
    What this means

    Graham's own substitution for public utilities: debt not exceeding twice the stock equity at book value, in place of the working-capital tests an industrial faces. A utility finances its plant with bonds by design; the question is whether the borrowing stays inside the equity behind it.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +43%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.40/share (latest year $2.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 15% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 12.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$35M
  • Receivables$410M
  • Other current assets$599M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Accounts payable$451M
  • Other current liabilities$618M
Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($25M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($8.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$303M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$160M
'28$100M
'29$200M
'30$325M
later$3.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$160Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$325Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$4.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$8.3B · 129%
  • Dividends$1.5B · 24%
  • Buybacks$30M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$1.6B

    73% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.5B as dividends and $30M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$3.4B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.4B to $4.9B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $30M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count30.6%

    The diluted count rose from 89M to 116M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.03/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained2%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($716M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $14M, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ms. Pope$5.4M$7.8M$128M
2022Ms. Pope$6.3M$7.0M$257M
2023Ms. Pope$7.0M$6.4M($38M)
2024Ms. Pope$7.4M$6.8M$282M
2025Ms. Pope$7.6M$7.7M$540M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio45:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.4% of revenue, equal to 2.9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordPlant growthannualized over the recordDividend / cashmedian over the record
PPLPPL Corporation$9.0B9%1.5%42%
PNWPinnacle West$5.3B9%5.6%29%
PORPortland General Electric$3.6B8%6.1%24%
OGEOGE Energy$3.3B10%5.4%35%
HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc.$3.1B9%26%
BKHBlack Hills$2.3B8%25%
PNMPNM Resources$2.2B6%7.4%20%
OTTROtter Tail$1.3B13%9.0%28%
Group median9%5.9%27%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Portland General Electric has delivered.

Portland General Electric’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Portland General Electric earns about $320M on its 9.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($189M) on 118M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-24; net debt $4.9B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.2B) runs well above depreciation ($586M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $461M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Portland General Electric (POR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/POR, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← POOL its page in the Manual POST →

Industry order: ← PNW the Electric Utilities chapter PPL →