NOG, Northern Oil and Gas

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 1.4×
  Thin
  Operating income $246M ÷ interest expense $172M
  What this means

  Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.4B · 9.7× operating profit
  Heavy net debt
  Cash $14M − debt $2.4B
  What this means

  Netting $14M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $2.4B owed, about 9.7× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital 9%
  Solid through the cycle
  6-yr median, range -92%–37%; 3% latest = NOPAT $152M ÷ invested capital $4.5B
  Industry peers: median 6%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 60%
  High through the cycle
  10-yr median margin, range 35%–80%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $2M
  Industry peers: median 24%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 61% of revenue this year, a 60% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.2B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $254M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 38.84×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $1.5B ÷ net income $39M
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 15%
  Reinvests most of it
  Dividends + buybacks $230M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $1.5B Owner Earnings, $230M (15%) went back to shareholders, $173M dividends, $57M buybacks. Net of $15M stock comp, the real buyback was about $42M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 15%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 12%, the capital-allocation section below.

• Investing or harvesting? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.6%
  The count is rising
  Stock compensation $15M (fiscal 2025), 0.6% of revenue · repurchases $57M · diluted shares +14.6% since 2022
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Miss
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $47M WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record Miss
  Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

• Earnings growth —
  Earnings +33% over the record · —
  What this means

  Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.67/share (latest year $0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 6 of 10
  What this means

  Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin −22% → 33% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −22% early to 33% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
  What this means

  Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

• Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
  What this means

  Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.

• Worst year 2016 · −158.2% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

• Share count +5.5%/yr
  What this means

  The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

• Dividend record rising
  What this means

  Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.