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MTCH, Match Group Inc.
We are Match Group, Inc., through its portfolio companies, is a leading provider of digital technologies designed to help people make meaningful connections.
Our global portfolio of brands includes Tinder , Hinge , Match , Meetic , OkCupid , Pairs , Plenty Of Fish , Azar , BLK , and more, each built to increase our users' likelihood of connecting with others.
Through our trusted brands, we provide tailored services to meet the varying preferences of our users.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 8/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~37 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 73% and operating margin about 26% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −1.0% to 32% — on a steadier 73% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 4 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →56% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- International56%$2.0B
- United States44%$1.5B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.1B | $3.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| $2.4B | $2.7B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.6B | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 76% | 80% | 76% | 74% | 73% | 72% | 70% | 72% | 72% | 73% | 74% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 57% | 64% | 35% | 33% | 33% | 33% | 30% | 30% | 30% | 32% | 31% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 7% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 8% | 10% | 11% | 13% | 13% | 13% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($33M) | $188M | $549M | $645M | $746M | $852M | $515M | $917M | $823M | $873M | $936M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −1.0% | 5.7% | 31.8% | 31.5% | 31.2% | 28.5% | 16.2% | 27.3% | 23.7% | 25.0% | 26.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($81M) | $67M | $462M | $532M | $631M | $256M | $377M | $777M | $704M | $746M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($41M) | $305M | $627M | $454M | $162M | $278M | $362M | $652M | $551M | $613M | $663M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 2% | 3% | 7% | -8% | 4% | 16% | 22% | 18% | 18% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $344M | $417M | $988M | $938M | $789M | $912M | $526M | $897M | $933M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $72M | $74M | $35M | $34M | $41M | $41M | $44M | $62M | $87M | $67M | $60M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $209M | ($227M) | $260M | $360M | $483M | $447M | ($84M) | ($49M) | $27M | $142M | $113M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $78M | $76M | $31M | $39M | $42M | $80M | $49M | $67M | $51M | $57M | $62M | CapexCapex |
| 2.5% | 2.3% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 2.7% | 1.5% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 1.6% | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $266M | $341M | $957M | $899M | $746M | $871M | $477M | $829M | $882M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 8.5% | 10.3% | 55.3% | 43.8% | 31.2% | 29.2% | 14.9% | 24.7% | 25.4% | 29.4% | 29.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $266M | $341M | $957M | $899M | $746M | $833M | $477M | $829M | $882M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 8.5% | 10.3% | 55.3% | 43.8% | 31.2% | 27.9% | 14.9% | 24.7% | 25.4% | 29.4% | 29.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $18M | $147M | $0 | $4M | $0 | $860M | $26M | $12M | — | — | $12M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $105M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | $0 | $186M | $183M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $309M | $56M | $133M | $216M | $0 | $0 | $482M | $546M | $753M | $789M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| $13M | $42M | ($173M) | ($330M) | ($3.9B) | ($940M) | ($72M) | ($77M) | ($59M) | ($47M) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($492M) | ($197M) | ($313M) | $400M | $1.8B | $111M | ($689M) | ($534M) | ($758M) | ($985M) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($6M) | $12M | ($2M) | ($2M) | $5M | ($8M) | ($8M) | $4M | ($12M) | $13M | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($141M) | $273M | $500M | $1.0B | ($2.4B) | $76M | ($243M) | $290M | $104M | $62M | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| -1% | — | 11% | 12% | — | — | 17% | 26% | 23% | 27% | 28% | ROICROIC |
| -2% | 13% | 22% | 15% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| −2% | 13% | 18% | 15% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.4B | $278M | $187M | $466M | $739M | $827M | $581M | $869M | $971M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $220M | $304M | $279M | $116M | $137M | $188M | $192M | $299M | $325M | $303M | $293M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $63M | $77M | $75M | $20M | $29M | $38M | $14M | $13M | $18M | $10M | $9M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $157M | $227M | $204M | $96M | $108M | $151M | $178M | $285M | $307M | $294M | $284M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $3.7B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $882M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $713M | $800M | $884M | $1.0B | $500M | $1.2B | $556M | $532M | $549M | $1.0B | $907M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.6× | 2.7× | 3.1× | 3.7× | 2.0× | 1.0× | 1.6× | 2.4× | 2.5× | 1.4× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $306M | $315M | $319M | $101M | $108M | $163M | $176M | $195M | $158M | $131M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $1.9B | $2.6B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $4.6B | $5.9B | $6.9B | $8.4B | $3.0B | $5.1B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $184M | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.3× | 1.8× | 5.8× | 5.8× | 5.7× | 6.5× | 3.5× | 5.7× | 5.1× | 5.9× | 6.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $33M | $43M | $66M | $45M | $640K | $1M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | Redeemable interestsRedeemable |
| $141M | $517M | $709M | $970M | $1M | $8M | $994K | $475K | $2K | $108K | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $2.9B | ($1.4B) | ($204M) | ($360M) | ($20M) | ($64M) | ($254M) | ($218M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 3.3% | 8.0% | 3.8% | 4.4% | 4.3% | 4.9% | 6.4% | 6.9% | 7.7% | 7.4% | 7.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $275M | — | — | $3M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $215M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 80.0M | 85.3M | 197M | 202M | 256M | 305M | 295M | 293M | 279M | 262M | 251M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $39.23 | $38.77 | $8.78 | $10.17 | $9.34 | $9.79 | $10.80 | $11.47 | $12.47 | $13.29 | $14.00 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.52 | $3.57 | $3.18 | $2.25 | $0.63 | $0.91 | $1.23 | $2.22 | $1.98 | $2.34 | $2.64 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.33 | $4.00 | $4.85 | $4.45 | $2.91 | $2.86 | $1.61 | $2.83 | $3.16 | $3.90 | $4.06 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.33 | $4.00 | $4.85 | $4.45 | $2.91 | $2.73 | $1.61 | $2.83 | $3.16 | $3.90 | $4.06 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.53 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.71 | $0.73 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.97 | $0.89 | $0.16 | $0.19 | $0.17 | $0.26 | $0.17 | $0.23 | $0.18 | $0.22 | $0.25 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $23.35 | $28.48 | $14.42 | $14.51 | $-5.52 | $-0.67 | $-1.22 | $-0.07 | $-0.23 | $-0.97 | $-0.87 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.31 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −11.3%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +1.8%/yr | +6.0%/yr |
| EPS | — | +29.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −15.4%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $613M of profit into $1.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $613M | $551M | $652M | $362M | $278M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$67M | +$87M | +$62M | +$44M | +$41M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$258M | +$267M | +$232M | +$204M | +$147M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$142M | +$27M | −$49M | −$84M | +$447M |
| Cash from operations | $1.1B | $933M | $897M | $526M | $912M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$57M | −$51M | −$67M | −$49M | −$41M |
| Owner earnings | $1.0B | $882M | $829M | $477M | $871M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | — | −$39M |
| Free cash flow | $1.0B | $882M | $829M | $477M | $833M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 29% | 25% | 25% | 15% | 29% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $258M), owner earnings is nearer $765M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $873M ÷ interest expense $148M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 3.4× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $1.0B + ST investments $3M − debt $4.0B
What this means
Netting $1.0B of cash and short-term investments against $4.0B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 3.4× a year's operating profit (4.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 32 + DIO 0 − DPO 4 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle7-yr median, range -1%–27%; 27% latest = NOPAT $718M ÷ invested capital $2.7BIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 27% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–55%; latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $57MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 27% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $258M of SBC) leaves $765M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $613M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $975M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.0B — this fiscal year
What this means
Of $1.0B Owner Earnings, $975M (95%) went back to shareholders, $186M dividends, $789M buybacks. Net of $258M stock comp, the real buyback was about $531M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 95%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 49%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.85×MaintainingCapex $57M ÷ depreciation $67M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Modest selling costSelling and marketing $626M ÷ revenue $3.5B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 7.4%The count is genuinely shrinkingStock compensation $258M (fiscal 2025), 7.4% of revenue · repurchases $789M · diluted shares -11.1% since 2022
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.42×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.0B vs $421M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +104%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.60/share (latest year $2.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 25% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −1.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
- Receivables$293M
- Other current assets$106M
- Debt due within a year$424M
- Accounts payable$9M
- Other current liabilities$473M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $7.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$570M · 7%
- Dividends$291M · 4%
- Buybacks$3.3B · 42%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.7B · 47%
- Returned to owners$3.6B
49% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $291M as dividends and $3.3B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments fell $395M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$38.01
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 68M shares were bought for $2.6B, about $38.01 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $31.94 (2025) to $66.95 (2022); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $31.94 ($789M).
- Net change in share count214.2%
The diluted count rose from 80M to 251M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.71/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$279M written down across 2 years (2016, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 26% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Sharmistha Dubey | $25.4M | $13.6M | $871M |
| 2022 | — | $23.9M | — | $477M |
| 2022 | Sharmistha Dubey | $23.0M | −$17.3M | $477M |
| 2023 | Bernard Kim | $16.1M | $7.8M | $829M |
| 2024 | Bernard Kim | $15.7M | $9.8M | $882M |
| 2025 | Bernard Kim | $10.6M | $1.1M | $1.0B |
| 2025 | Spencer Rascoff | $47.0M | $37.5M | $1.0B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$258M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 7.4% of revenue, equal to 29.6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Interactive Media & Platforms
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SNAPSnap Inc. | $5.9B | 55%3y | -32.4% | -24% | -4% |
| PINSPinterest Inc. | $4.2B | 76% | -4.1% | -5% | 16% |
| MTCHMatch Group Inc. | $3.5B | 73% | 26.1% | 17% | 27% |
| IACIAC Inc. | $2.4B | 66% | -3.9% | -2% | 3% |
| WBWEIBO CORPORATION | $1.8B | 79% | 29.1% | 35% | 34% |
| MOMOHello Group Inc. | $1.5B | 44% | 18.0% | — | 19% |
| BMBLBumble Inc. | $966M | 71% | -14.5% | -6% | — |
| HUYAHUYA Inc. | $961M | 13% | -2.8% | -1% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 68% | -3.3% | -2% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Match Group Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Match Group Inc. earns about $951M on its 27.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $1.0B on 233M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $3.0B. The if-converted diluted count is 251M, 8% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MTB its page in the Manual MTD →
Industry order: ← MOMO the Interactive Media & Platforms chapter NXDR →