Owner Scorecard


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MRAM, Everspin Technologies Inc.

Semiconductors capital-intensive UnprofitableCapital build-outNet current asset value

We are a pioneer in the successful commercialization of Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory technology.

Our portfolio of MRAM technologies, including Toggle MRAM, Tunnel Magneto Resistance (TMR) Sensors, and Spin-transfer Torque MRAM (STT-MRAM), is delivering superior performance, persistence and reliability in non-volatile memories that transform how mission-critical data is protected against power loss.

With over 20 years of MRAM technology and manufacturing leadership, our memory solutions deliver significant value to our customers in key markets such as industrial, medical, automotive/transportation, aerospace and defense, and data center.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MRAM · Everspin Technologies Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$55M
+9.5% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $62M 5-yr avg $57M
Gross margin 52% 5-yr avg 56%
Operating margin −15.5% 5-yr avg 0.6%
ROIC −25% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg 12%

Next report Est. 10/26–11/9 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~36 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 12% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −14%) on a 52% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −29%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$36M$49M$38M$42M$55M$60M$64M$50M$55M$62MRevenueRevenue
$21M$25M$18M$18M$33M$34M$37M$26M$28M$33MGross profitGross prof.
60%51%49%43%60%57%58%52%51%52%Gross marginGross mgn
45%38%47%35%28%28%31%39%37%43%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
71%48%38%26%23%19%18%27%26%25%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($20M)($17M)($14M)($8M)$5M$6M$6M($7M)($7M)($10M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−56.2%−35.1%−38.4%−18.0%9.1%10.4%9.2%−14.1%−11.8%−15.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
($15M)($8M)$4M$6M$9M$741K($457K)Pretax incomePretax
($21M)($18M)($15M)($9M)$4M$6M$9M$781K($586K)($3M)Net incomeNet inc.
0%0%-0%-5%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($19M)($15M)($8M)($3M)$9M$9M$13M$7M$10M$4MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1M$1M$2M$2M$1M$982K$1M$2M$3M$3MDepreciation & amortizationD&A
($1M)($1M)$1M($361K)$334K($2M)($2M)($2M)$2M($2M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M$2M$861K$320K$1M$3M$1M$3M$7M$10MCapexCapex
8.5%3.9%2.3%0.8%1.9%4.6%2.2%6.0%12.4%15.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($20M)($16M)($9M)($3M)$8M$9M$12M$5M$7M$1MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−55.9%−32.6%−23.9%−7.7%15.1%14.2%18.4%10.7%12.2%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($22M)($17M)($9M)($3M)$8M$7M$12M$4M$3M($5M)Free cash flowFCF
−61.1%−33.6%−23.9%−7.7%15.1%11.2%18.4%8.0%5.7%−8.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
($3M)($2M)($861K)($320K)($1M)($3M)($1M)($3M)($9M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
$5M$27M$85K$3M($2M)($2M)($2M)$1M$1MFinancing cash flowFin. cash
($17M)$10M($9M)$112K$7M$5M$10M$5M$2MChange in cashΔ cash
-158%-98%-96%-55%47%43%35%-29%-20%-25%ROICROIC
-194%-71%-79%-49%16%16%17%1%-1%-4%Return on equityROE
−194%−71%−79%−49%16%16%17%1%−1%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$13M$23M$14M$15M$21M$27M$37M$42M$44M$44MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M$8M$6M$8M$8M$11M$12M$12M$8M$11MReceivablesReceiv.
$10M$9M$8M$6M$6M$7M$8M$9M$11M$13MInventoryInvent.
$3M$3M$3M$2M$2M$3M$3M$2M$5M$2MAccounts payablePayables
$11M$14M$11M$11M$13M$15M$17M$19M$14M$21MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$27M$41M$29M$28M$37M$45M$58M$64M$65M$69MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$12M$14M$8M$10M$10M$11M$9M$10M$13M$15MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×3.0×3.6×2.8×3.6×4.1×6.6×6.5×4.8×4.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4M$4M$3M$2M$973K$4M$4M$3M$14MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$31M$45M$35M$33M$39M$55M$67M$78M$85M$89MTotal assetsAssets
$12M$12M$8M$8M$5M$3M$4M$2M$905KTotal debtDebt
($785K)($11M)($7M)($7M)($17M)($24M)($39M)($43M)($43M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-26.5×-19.5×-19.3×-11.4×9.2×22.7×93.4×-154.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$21M$20M$17M$15M$12M$17M$13M$15M$16MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$11M$25M$18M$17M$27M$39M$54M$63M$69M$73MShareholders’ equityEquity
5.7%5.4%9.5%9.4%5.9%7.3%7.8%13.3%10.5%8.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
12.5M16.4M17.3M18.8M20.0M20.8M21.4M22.2M22.6M23.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.88$3.02$2.17$2.24$2.76$2.89$2.98$2.27$2.45$2.66Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.69$-1.08$-0.85$-0.45$0.22$0.30$0.42$0.04$-0.03$-0.11EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.61$-0.98$-0.52$-0.17$0.42$0.41$0.55$0.24$0.30$0.06Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.76$-1.01$-0.52$-0.17$0.42$0.32$0.55$0.18$0.14$-0.23Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.25$0.12$0.05$0.02$0.05$0.13$0.07$0.14$0.30$0.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.87$1.52$1.07$0.93$1.36$1.86$2.52$2.83$3.05$3.11Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−2.0%/yr+1.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.6%/yr+77.8%/yr
Book value / share+17.0%/yr+26.9%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2021FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $7M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $3M it takes just to hold its position. It put $4M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($586K)$781K$9M$6M$4M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3M+$2M+$1M+$982K+$1M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$6M+$7M+$5M+$4M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2M−$2M−$2M−$2M+$334K
Cash from operations$10M$7M$13M$9M$9M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$3M−$2M−$1M−$982K−$1M
Owner earnings$7M$5M$12M$9M$8M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$4M−$1M−$2M
Free cash flow$3M$4M$12M$7M$8M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue12%11%18%14%15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $3M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $4M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $6M), owner earnings is nearer $972K.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $44M − debt $2M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $43M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 54 + DIO 145 − DPO 70 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -158%–47%; -20% latest = NOPAT ($5M) ÷ invested capital $26M
    Industry peers: median -23%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -56%–18%; latest $7M = operating cash $10M − maintenance capex $3M
    Industry peers: median -12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 9 years. It chose to put $4M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $3M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $6M of SBC) leaves $972K.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($586K) · cash from operations $10M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.13×
    Expanding
    Capex $7M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $3M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $6M ÷ revenue $55M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 10.5%
    The count is rising
    Stock compensation $6M (fiscal 2025), 10.5% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +8.6% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $55M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.84×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2M vs $52M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.13/share (latest year $-0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −43% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −43% early to −6% lately, median −14% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Worst year 2017 · −56.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$69M
  • Cash & short-term investments$44M
  • Receivables$11M
  • Inventory$13M
  • Other current assets$1M
Current liabilities$15M
  • Debt due within a year$889K
  • Accounts payable$2M
  • Other current liabilities$11M
Current ratio4.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$54Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$889K due · $44M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+41.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.7× → 4.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$72Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$53MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$905Kno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$21M · 479%
  • Source of funding−$17M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $17M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Net change in share count88.3%

    The diluted count rose from 12M to 24M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Sanjeev Aggarwal$2.1M$1.9M$12M
2024Sanjeev Aggarwal$3.0M$2.1M$5M
2025Sanjeev Aggarwal$2.6M$2.3M$7M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$6M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 10.5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$21M · 33% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our two largest end customers together accounted for 33% of our total revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 and one of these customers accounted for more than 10% of our revenue during that period.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics, research and the inventory cycle. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the recordR&D / revenuelatest FYCapex / revenuelatest FYInventory dayslatest FY
AXTIAXT Inc$88M32%6.0%4%-16%10.2%6.8%387
AMBQAmbiq Micro Inc.$73M38%2y-54.0%2y-141%1y53.1%153
AIPArteris Inc.$71M90%-56.0%-11163%2y-3%70.7%2.0%
MRAMEverspin Technologies Inc.$55M52%-14.1%-29%11%25.5%12.4%145
NVTSNavitas Semiconductor Corporation$46M33%-196.7%-41%-108%108.5%3.2%153
KOPNKopin Corporation$39M35%-65.8%-70%-40%17.0%3.7%
LPTHLightPath Technologies Inc.$37M35%-4.8%-5%-0%8.2%3.4%173
ICGIntchains Group Limited$33M55%5.6%8%-8%2.1%93
Group median37%-34.0%-35%-8%25.5%3.4%153
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Everspin Technologies Inc. has delivered.

Everspin Technologies Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Everspin Technologies Inc. earns about $6M on its 10.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($5M) on 24M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-30; net cash $43M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($3M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Everspin Technologies Inc. (MRAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MRAM, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← MQ its page in the Manual MRCY →

Industry order: ← MPWR the Semiconductors chapter MRVL →