Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← MHK Manual MHNC → ← MCY Insurance — Property & Casualty MHNC →

MHLA, Maiden Holdings, Ltd.

Insurance — Property & Casualty financial Unprofitable

An insurance business, read on its underwriting result, the combined ratio, and the float it invests, rather than an earnings multiple.

Maiden Holdings, Ltd. is also running off certain business related to its Genesis Legacy Solutions ("GLS") platform.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K
MHLA · Maiden Holdings, Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$75M
−15.9% YoY · −33% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $29M
Cash burn · annual $97M
Runway 4 mo

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
The underwriting result is not cleanly tagged in the filings. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about −33% a year across the record. The float runs about 20.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMMar 2025
Income statement
$2.6B$2.1B$2.1B$2.2B$576M$184M$99M$68M$89M$75M$66MRevenueRevenue
$2.4B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$448M$106M$53M$38M$44M$49M$45MPremiums earnedPremiums
$131M$109M$124M$136M$98M$55M$32M$30M$37M$26M$21MInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$126M$79M($154M)($450M)($110M)$42M$27M($61M)($38M)($200M)Pretax incomePretax
$124M$49M($170M)($545M)($132M)$42M$27M($60M)($39M)($201M)($211M)Net incomeNet inc.
2%1%-0%0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$634M$470M$459M$182M($1.1B)($542M)($394M)($196M)($60M)($67M)($97M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
67%67%78%93%Loss ratioLoss
30%32%32%32%38%37%47%49%44%49%52%Expense ratioExpense
≈ 101%≈ 102%≈ 115%≈ 129%≈ 153%≈ 139%≈ 151%Combined ratioCombined
+16.8%+8.3%+2.5%+2.3%Cost of float (avg)Float cost
$75M$131M$284M$449M$125M($17M)($28M)$33M$38M$154MPrior-yr reserve developmentReserve dev.
9%4%-14%-98%-26%8%7%-21%-15%-445%-562%Return on equityROE
6%0%−18%−106%−26%−562%Retained to equityRetained/eq
$38M$43M$52M$42M$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$654K$470K$26M$873K$18K$1K$2M$1M$3M$4MBuybacksBuybacks
($751M)($578M)($360M)$33M$913M$596M$464M$189M$59M$78MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$100M($77M)($60M)($68M)($18K)($30M)($139M)($11M)($3M)($4M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($2M)$2M$4M($2M)($382K)$4M($470K)($1M)$335K($1M)Exchange-rate effectFX
($18M)($183M)$42M$146M($230M)$29M($70M)($19M)($4M)$5MChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$4.1B$4.7B$3.8B$4.1B$1.9B$1.3B$823M$587M$560M$484M$457MInvestments (total)Investments
$1.5B$1.8B$2.4B$3.1B$1.8B$1.3B$927M$575M$303M$222MFloat (net reserves)Float
$5.7B$6.3B$6.6B$5.3B$3.6B$2.9B$2.3B$1.8B$1.5B$1.3B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$4.4B$4.9B$5.4B$4.7B$3.1B$2.4B$1.9B$1.6B$1.3B$1.3BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1M$355K$452K$641KNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$1.3B$1.4B$1.2B$554M$508M$528M$384M$285M$249M$45M$38MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
85.6M78.7M85.7M83.1M83.1M84.3M86.1M87.1M101M99.9M99.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.45$0.62$-1.98$-6.56$-1.59$0.50$0.31$-0.69$-0.38$-2.01$-2.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.45$0.55$0.60$0.50$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$15.74$17.29$14.38$6.67$6.11$6.26$4.46$3.27$2.46$0.45$0.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−33.6%/yr−35.9%/yr
Book value / share−32.6%/yr−40.6%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 151% · FY2021
    Last reported FY2021
    FY2021, the most recent year reported: total benefits, losses and expenses $80M ÷ premiums earned $53M
    What this means

    The latest fiscal year's premiums or claims are not yet tagged in the structured data, so this reads the most recent year that is — named, never passed off as current. The underwriting question it answers is the same: did the policies pay for themselves, or is the float being rented at a loss?

  • Loss on equity
    Net income ($201M) ÷ equity $45M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • Float $236M
    5.2× equity
    Net reserves + unearned premiums − prepaid reinsurance − receivables − DAC = $236M
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • 10.8% on the float
    Net investment income $26M, 10.8% on the float
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

The cost and the reserves

  • Cost of float 2.8% · FY2021
    Last reported FY2021
    FY2021, the most recent year reported: underwriting loss $27M ÷ that year's float $970M
    What this means

    Buffett's own yardstick — the underwriting result as the price of holding the float — read at the most recent year the filing data carries it, both legs from that same year, and named rather than passed off as current.

  • Past reserves fell short
    Prior-year development, FY2024: unfavorable (past years strengthened) · record: 2 favorable, 8 unfavorable of 10
    What this means

    Each year an insurer restates what its old accident years actually cost. Persistent favorable development means management reserved honestly and released the cushion; persistent unfavorable development means past profits were overstated by under-reserving — the industry's chronic sin, and the single most tell-tale line an owner can read. Signed as the company files it: negative favorable, positive unfavorable.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership9.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2024 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDCombined ratiomedian over the recordLoss ratiomedian over the recordYield on floatmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the record
ACICAmerican Coastal Insurance Corporation$335M62%4.7%2%
AMSFAMERISAFE Inc.$317M84%57%4.5%18%
NODKNI Holdings Inc.$285M69%8.5%3%
AIIAmerican Integrity Insurance Group Inc.$276M75%2y45%2y11.9%2y27%2y
KWYKingsway Corporation$135M86%1y
MBIMBIA Inc.$80M73%1y
MHLAMaiden Holdings, Ltd.$75M129%73%4y5.0%-15%
KGKestrel Group Ltd.$34M71%1y1.3%1y4%2y
Group median84%70%4.8%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Maiden Holdings, Ltd.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered−37%/yr’19→’24

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity−15%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $38M on 100M shares, a −15% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Maiden Holdings, Ltd. (MHLA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MHLA, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← MHK its page in the Manual MHNC →

Industry order: ← MCY the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter MHNC →