MDB, MongoDB Inc.

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? -43.8×
  Does not cover its interest
  Operating income ($137M) ÷ interest expense $3M
  What this means

  A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$867M
  Net cash
  Cash $1.1B − debt $217M
  What this means

  Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $867M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? 63d
  Long (60+ days)
  DSO 74 + DIO 0 − DPO 11 days
  What this means

  Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital -19%
  Below average through the cycle
  9-yr median, range -41%–-6%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($108M) ÷ invested capital $2.1B
  Industry peers: median 10%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 20%
  High, recently turned positive
  latest $500M = operating cash $505M − maintenance capex $5M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -5%)
  Industry peers: median 21%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a -5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $550M of SBC) leaves ($50M).

• Are earnings backed by cash? $505M
  Loss, but cash-generative
  Net income ($71M) · cash from operations $505M
  What this means

  The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 80%
  Returns about half
  Dividends + buybacks $400M ÷ Owner Earnings $500M — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $500M Owner Earnings, $400M (80%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $400M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($550M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 80%; across the record (2017–2026) it is 79%, the capital-allocation section below.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.22×
  Harvesting
  Capex $5M ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $22M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• How much of next year is already sold? 31%
  Most of next year still has to be sold
  Contracted and not yet earned $1.5B, of which the filing expects 52% within twelve months = $766M against revenue of $2.5B
  Retention and the customer ladder, in the filing’s words

  net ARR expansion rateapproximately 121%

  “As of January 31, 2026, our net ARR expansion rate was approximately 121%.”

  ✓ the figure is the sentence’s own characters

  Customer countover 65,200

  “As of January 31, 2026, we had over 65,200 customers across a wide range of industries and in over 100 countries, compared to over 54,500 customers and over 47,800 customers as of January 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”

  Customers from $100,0002,799

  “The number of customers with $100,000 or greater in ARR was 2,799, 2,396 and 2,052 as of January 31, 2026, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”

  What this means

  Remaining performance obligations are revenue the customer has committed to and the company has not yet earned — the nearest thing a software business has to an insurer's float. The headline total is a duration figure and can mislead badly on its own, because a contract signed for seven years counts the same as one signed for one. What matters is the part the filing itself expects to recognise within twelve months, shown here against a year of revenue. Where a company does not tag that band, both figures are withheld rather than shown half-told.

• What does winning a customer cost? 38%
  Heavy selling cost
  Selling and marketing $944M ÷ revenue $2.5B
  What this means

  Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 22.3%
  The count is rising
  Stock compensation $550M (fiscal 2026), 22.3% of revenue · repurchases $400M · diluted shares +18.4% since 2023
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Pass
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.65×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Pass
  Debt ≤ working capital · $217M vs $2.4B WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record —
  Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

• Earnings growth —
  Earnings +33% over the record · —
  What this means

  Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.56/share (latest year $-0.88), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 0 of 10
  What this means

  Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin −49% → −10% (3-yr avg ends)
  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −49% early to −10% lately, median −35% — pricing power intact or improving.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%
  What this means

  Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

• Worst year 2017 · −60.4% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.