Owner Scorecard


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LEA, Lear Corporation

Auto Components capital-intensive

Lear Corporation is a global automotive technology leader in Seating and E-Systems, enabling superior in-vehicle experiences for consumers around the world.

We supply complete seat systems, key seat components, complete electrical distribution and connection systems, high-voltage power distribution products, including battery disconnect units ("BDUs"), and low-voltage power distribution products and electronic controllers t o all of the world's major automotive manufacturers.

At Lear, we are Making every drive better TM by providing technology for safer, smarter and more comfortable journeys, while adhering to our values — Be Inclusive.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LEA · Lear Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$23.3B
−0.2% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $23.7B 5-yr avg $22.0B
Gross margin 7% 5-yr avg 7%
Operating margin 3.7% 5-yr avg 3.6%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Seating (74%) and E-Systems (26%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 7.3% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.7% to 7.9% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Seating is 74% of revenue, with E-Systems the other meaningful segment at 26%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Seating74%$17.3B
  • E-Systems26%$6.0B
By geographyOther countries38%United States23%Mexico15%China13%Morocco6%Germany5%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 31, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 3.0% year over year; operating income up 8.0%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJul 2026
Income statement
$18.6B$20.5B$21.1B$19.8B$17.0B$19.3B$20.9B$23.5B$23.3B$23.3B$23.7BRevenueRevenue
$2.1B$2.3B$2.3B$1.7B$1.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5B$1.6BGross profitGross prof.
11%11%11%9%7%7%7%7%7%6%7%Gross marginGross mgn
3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.1B$454M$675M$654M$933M$888M$777M$871MOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.9%7.9%7.8%5.4%2.7%3.5%3.1%4.0%3.8%3.3%3.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$954M$299M$584M$509M$777M$733M$625MPretax incomePretax
$975M$1.3B$1.1B$754M$159M$374M$328M$573M$507M$437M$556MNet incomeNet inc.
28%13%20%15%31%24%26%23%26%24%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.6B$1.8B$1.8B$1.3B$663M$670M$1.0B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$378M$428M$484M$510M$540M$574M$577M$604M$621M$604M$609MDepreciationDeprec.
$198M($28M)$104M($3M)($75M)($338M)$65M$5M($72M)($18M)$248MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$528M$595M$677M$604M$452M$585M$638M$627M$559M$562M$630MCapexCapex
2.8%2.9%3.2%3.0%2.7%3.0%3.1%2.7%2.4%2.4%2.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$680M$211M$85M$383M$623M$561M$527M$849MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.7%6.6%6.1%3.4%1.2%0.4%1.8%2.7%2.4%2.3%3.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$680M$211M$85M$383M$623M$561M$527M$849MFree cash flowFCF
5.9%5.8%5.2%3.4%1.2%0.4%1.8%2.7%2.4%2.3%3.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$156M$292M$0$322M$0$0$188M$175M$800K$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$89M$138M$186M$186M$67M$107M$186M$182M$174M$165M$162MDividends paidDiv. paid
$659M$451M$705M$385M$70M$100M$100M$297M$417M$325MBuybacksBuybacks
($637M)($869M)($694M)($922M)($469M)($647M)($830M)($762M)($543M)($517M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($873M)($742M)($1.0B)($362M)($412M)($14M)($387M)($420M)($694M)($619M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($34M)$56M($36M)($9M)$22M($3M)($8M)$13M($26M)$26MExchange-rate effectFX
$75M$229M$19M($9M)($196M)$7M($204M)$81M($143M)($20M)Change in cashΔ cash
28%30%28%17%5%8%8%11%11%9%10%ROICROIC
32%32%27%17%4%8%7%12%11%9%11%Return on equityROE
29%28%23%13%2%6%3%8%7%5%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.7B$3.2B$2.9B$3.0B$3.3B$3.0B$3.5B$3.7B$3.6B$3.9B$4.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B$1.8B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BInventoryInvent.
$2.6B$3.2B$2.9B$2.8B$3.1B$3.0B$3.2B$3.4B$3.3B$3.4B$3.9BAccounts payablePayables
$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$2.0B$1.9B$2.2B$2.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$5.6B$6.6B$6.3B$6.4B$6.8B$6.8B$7.0B$7.6B$7.2B$7.7B$8.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.2B$4.9B$4.5B$4.7B$5.1B$4.8B$5.2B$5.7B$5.4B$5.7B$6.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.4×1.4×1.3×1.4×1.3×1.3×1.3×1.4×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.0B$2.5B$2.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7B$2.9B$3.0B$2.8B$2.9BNet PP&ENet PP&E
$1.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$9.9B$11.9B$11.6B$12.7B$13.2B$13.4B$13.8B$14.7B$14.0B$14.8B$15.7BTotal assetsAssets
$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7BTotal debtDebt
$672M$429M$427M$761M$949M$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
17.7×18.8×19.7×11.6×4.6×7.4×6.6×9.2×8.4×7.7×8.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$136M$142M$160M$151M$148M$165M$152M$142M$149M$166MNoncontrolling interestsNCI
$3.1B$4.2B$4.2B$4.3B$4.5B$4.6B$4.7B$4.9B$4.5B$5.0B$5.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
73.1M69.3M66.2M61.9M60.4M60.4M59.9M59.1M56.5M53.6M51.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$253.78$295.43$319.65$319.92$282.07$318.82$348.65$396.96$412.67$434.01$462.99Revenue / shareRev/sh
$13.33$18.96$17.38$12.17$2.62$6.19$5.47$9.68$8.97$8.15$10.86EPS (diluted)EPS
$16.97$19.56$19.58$10.99$3.49$1.41$6.40$10.54$9.94$9.84$16.59Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$14.92$17.16$16.67$10.99$3.49$1.41$6.40$10.54$9.94$9.84$16.59Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.21$1.99$2.82$3.01$1.11$1.77$3.10$3.08$3.08$3.08$3.15Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$7.22$8.58$10.23$9.75$7.48$9.68$10.65$10.60$9.89$10.48$12.30Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$41.81$59.91$63.49$70.24$73.93$76.85$78.08$83.21$78.82$93.95$101.20Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.1%/yr+9.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−5.9%/yr+23.0%/yr
EPS−5.3%/yr+25.5%/yr
Dividends / share+10.9%/yr+22.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.2%/yr+7.0%/yr
Book value / share+9.4%/yr+4.9%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $437M of profit into $527M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$437M
Owner earnings$527M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$437M$507M$573M$328M$374M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$604M+$621M+$604M+$577M+$574M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$66M+$64M+$68M+$52M+$60M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$18M−$72M+$5M+$65M−$338M
Cash from operations$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.0B$670M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$562M−$559M−$627M−$638M−$585M
Owner earnings$527M$561M$623M$383M$85M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%2%3%2%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $66M), owner earnings is nearer $461M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $777M ÷ interest expense $101M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B · 2.2× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $1.0B − debt $2.7B
    What this means

    Netting $1.0B of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, about 2.2× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 61 + DIO 28 − DPO 57 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–30%; 9% latest = NOPAT $579M ÷ invested capital $6.7B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–7%; latest $527M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $562M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $66M of SBC) leaves $461M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $437M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $490M ÷ Owner Earnings $527M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    Of $527M Owner Earnings, $490M (93%) went back to shareholders, $165M dividends, $325M buybacks. Net of $66M stock comp, the real buyback was about $259M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 93%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 72%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.93×
    Maintaining
    Capex $562M ÷ depreciation $604M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.3%
    The count is genuinely shrinking
    Stock compensation $66M (fiscal 2025), 0.3% of revenue · repurchases $325M · diluted shares -10.6% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $23.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.35×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.7B vs $2.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −56%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.24/share (latest year $8.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $102.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 4% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −29%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 2.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jul 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
  • Receivables$4.2B
  • Inventory$1.7B
  • Other current assets$1.4B
Current liabilities$6.4B
  • Debt due within a year$19M
  • Accounts payable$3.9B
  • Other current liabilities$2.4B
Current ratio1.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.04×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$19M due · $1.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jul 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$770M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.5B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$194M
'27$167M
'28$135M
'29$98M
'30$79M
later$183M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$194Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$856Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$764Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$764M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.5B, of which the leases are 22%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $12.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$5.8B · 47%
  • Dividends$1.5B · 12%
  • Buybacks$3.5B · 29%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.5B · 12%
  • Returned to owners$5.0B

    72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.5B as dividends and $3.5B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$130.18

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 27M shares were bought for $3.5B, about $130.18 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $103.72 (2025) to $170.08 (2021); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $163.61 ($705M).

  • Net change in share count−30.0%

    The diluted count fell from 73M to 51M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.08/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−46%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $727M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.46 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Raymond E. Scott$13.3M$23.4M$85M
2022Raymond E. Scott$15.4M$4.8M$383M
2023Raymond E. Scott$18.9M$25.3M$623M
2024Raymond E. Scott$17.4M$3.8M$561M
2025Raymond E. Scott$18.9M$25.2M$527M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$66M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 0.3% of revenue, equal to 8.5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
MGAMagna International Inc.$42.0B14%5.0%11%6%
LEALear Corporation$23.3B7%3.9%11%3%
APTVAptiv PLC$20.4B19%9.1%14%6%
ADNTAdient plc Ordinary Shares$14.5B6%0.1%0%1%
BWABorgWarner Inc.$14.3B19%8.1%9%7%
ALVAutoliv Inc.$10.8B19%8.3%15%6%
DANDana Incorporated Common Stock$7.5B9%2.6%5%2%
DCHDauch Corporation$5.8B13%3.2%5%3%
Group median14%4.5%10%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lear Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Lear Corporation earns about $589M on its 2.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $849M on 49M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-28; net debt $1.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 51M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($630M) runs well above depreciation ($609M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $917M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lear Corporation (LEA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LEA, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← LE its page in the Manual LECO →

Industry order: ← LCII the Auto Components chapter MGA →