KMX, CarMax

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 4.5×
  Adequate
  Operating income $494M ÷ interest expense $110M
  What this means

  Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $17.9B · 36.3× operating profit
  Heavy net debt
  Cash $123M − debt $18.1B
  What this means

  Netting $123M of cash and short-term investments against $18.1B of debt leaves $17.9B owed, about 36.3× a year's operating profit (36.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? 51d
  Tight
  DSO 3 + DIO 65 − DPO 18 days
  What this means

  Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital 4%
  Below average through the cycle
  10-yr median, range 1%–5%; 1% latest = NOPAT $318M ÷ invested capital $23.8B
  Industry peers: median 13%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 6%
  Solid, recently turned positive
  latest $1.4B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $346M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)
  Industry peers: median 1%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $99M of SBC) leaves $1.3B.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 7.21×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $247M
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 45%
  Returns about half
  Dividends + buybacks $643M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.4B — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $1.4B Owner Earnings, $643M (45%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $643M buybacks. Net of $99M stock comp, the real buyback was about $544M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

• Investing or harvesting? 1.56×
  Expanding
  Capex $541M ÷ depreciation $346M
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.4%
  The count is genuinely shrinking
  Stock compensation $99M (fiscal 2026), 0.4% of revenue · repurchases $643M · diluted shares -7.6% since 2023
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $25.9B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Pass
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.20×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ working capital · $18.1B vs $2.9B WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Pass
  A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record —
  Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

• Earnings growth Miss
  Earnings +33% over the record · −42%
  What this means

  At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.88/share (latest year $1.74), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $41.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 10 of 10
  What this means

  Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin 7% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

  In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 3% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
  What this means

  Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

• Worst year 2026 · 1.9% op. margin
  What this means

  Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

• Share count −2.9%/yr
  What this means

  The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.