Owner Scorecard


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HAS, Hasbro Inc.

Leisure Products consumer brand Cyclical

Hasbro Inc. is a leading game, intellectual property, and toy company whose mission is to create joy and community through the magic of play.

With over 100 years of expertise, we deliver play experiences to kids, families, and fans around the world, through physical and digital games, video games, toys, licensed consumer products, location-based entertainment, film, TV and more.

Through our franchise-first approach, we unlock value from both new and legacy IP, including MAGIC: THE GATHERING, MONOPOLY, HASBRO GAMES, PLAY-DOH, TRANSFORMERS, DUNGEONS & DRAGONS, NERF, and PEPPA PIG, as well as premier partner brands.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HAS · Hasbro Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.7B
+13.7% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $5.2B
Gross margin 72% 5-yr avg 69%
Operating margin 23.4% 5-yr avg 1.0%
ROIC 27% 5-yr avg −0%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Grow Brands (74%), Optimize Brands (15%) and Reinvent Brands (11%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 67% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −31% to 17% — on a steadier 67% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Grow Brands is 74% of revenue, with Optimize Brands the other meaningful line at 15%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Grow Brands74%$3.5B
  • Optimize Brands15%$698M
  • Reinvent Brands11%$524M
  • Non-Hasbro Branded Film and TV0%$0
By geographyUnited States60%International40%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 30, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 16.2% year over year

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$5.0B$5.2B$4.6B$4.7B$5.5B$6.4B$5.9B$5.0B$4.1B$4.7B$5.0BRevenueRevenue
$3.1B$3.2B$2.7B$2.9B$3.7B$4.5B$3.9B$3.3B$3.0B$3.4B$3.6BGross profitGross prof.
62%61%60%62%69%70%67%66%71%72%72%Gross marginGross mgn
22%22%28%22%23%22%28%30%29%25%25%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%5%5%6%5%5%5%6%7%8%8%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$788M$810M$331M$652M$502M$763M$408M($1.5B)$690M$11M$1.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.7%15.6%7.2%13.8%9.2%11.9%7.0%−30.8%16.7%0.2%23.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$692M$786M$270M$594M$322M$582M$262M($1.7B)$497M($102M)Pretax incomePretax
$551M$397M$220M$521M$223M$429M$204M($1.5B)$386M($322M)$794MNet incomeNet inc.
23%50%18%12%30%25%22%21%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$817M$724M$646M$653M$976M$818M$373M$726M$847M$893M$1.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$154M$172M$168M$181M$265M$280M$233M$211M$163M$136M$127MDepreciationDeprec.
$50M$100M$230M($76M)$439M$11M($147M)$1.9B$248M$1000M$272MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$155M$135M$140M$134M$126M$133M$128M$136M$87M$63M$75MCapexCapex
3.1%2.6%3.1%2.8%2.3%2.1%2.2%2.7%2.1%1.3%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$662M$590M$506M$520M$851M$685M$245M$590M$760M$830M$1.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.2%11.3%11.0%11.0%15.6%10.7%4.2%11.8%18.4%17.7%24.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$662M$590M$506M$520M$851M$685M$245M$590M$760M$830M$1.2BFree cash flowFCF
13.2%11.3%11.0%11.0%15.6%10.7%4.2%11.8%18.4%17.7%24.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M$0$155M$9M$4.4B$0$146M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$249M$277M$309M$337M$373M$375M$385M$388M$390M$393M$394MDividends paidDiv. paid
$150M$151M$250M$61M$0$0$125M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
($138M)($131M)($286M)($61M)($4.5B)$242M($313M)$118M($204M)($284M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($375M)($312M)($737M)$2.8B$406M($1.5B)($553M)($818M)($498M)($531M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
$2M$18M($21M)($5M)($13M)($31M)($13M)$7M$3M$4MExchange-rate effectFX
$306M$299M($399M)$3.4B($3.1B)($431M)($506M)$32M$150M$82MChange in cashΔ cash
29%21%12%23%5%9%5%-30%14%27%ROICROIC
30%22%13%17%8%14%7%-137%33%-57%109%Return on equityROE
16%7%−5%6%−5%2%−6%−173%−0%−126%55%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.3B$1.6B$1.2B$4.6B$1.4B$1.0B$513M$545M$695M$777M$881MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.4B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.1B$1.0B$920M$1.1B$752MReceivablesReceiv.
$388M$433M$443M$446M$396M$552M$677M$332M$274M$260M$353MInventoryInvent.
$320M$348M$334M$344M$426M$580M$427M$341M$342M$335M$375MAccounts payablePayables
$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.0B$853M$984M$730MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.2B$3.6B$3.1B$6.7B$3.8B$3.7B$3.0B$2.3B$2.2B$2.6B$2.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.6B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$2.4B$2.5B$2.2B$2.1B$1.4B$1.9B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×2.9×2.4×5.4×1.6×1.5×1.4×1.1×1.6×1.4×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$267M$260M$256M$256M$297M$262M$305M$334M$303M$248MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$571M$573M$486M$495M$3.7B$3.4B$3.5B$2.3B$2.3B$1.3B$1.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$5.1B$5.3B$5.3B$8.9B$10.8B$10.0B$9.3B$6.5B$6.3B$5.6B$6.0BTotal assetsAssets
$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$4.0B$5.1B$4.0B$3.8B$3.5B$3.4B$3.3B$3.5BTotal debtDebt
$266M$112M$513M($534M)$3.6B$3.0B$3.3B$2.9B$2.7B$2.5B$2.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
8.1×8.2×3.6×6.4×2.5×4.2×2.4×-8.3×4.0×0.1×6.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.5B$3.5B$5.9B$7.9B$7.0B$6.4B$5.5B$5.2B$5.0BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$0$24M$24M$0$0Redeemable interestsRedeemable
$1.9B$1.8B$1.8B$3.0B$2.9B$3.1B$2.9B$1.1B$1.2B$566M$730MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%1.1%0.6%0.6%0.9%1.5%1.4%1.4%1.2%1.7%1.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$33M$86M$1.2B$1.0BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
127M127M127M129M138M138M139M139M140M140M143MShares out (diluted)Shares
$39.54$41.01$36.09$36.73$39.72$46.39$42.16$36.05$29.48$33.53$34.73Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.34$3.12$1.74$4.05$1.62$3.10$1.47$-10.73$2.75$-2.30$5.55EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.22$4.64$3.98$4.04$6.18$4.95$1.76$4.25$5.42$5.92$8.47Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.22$4.64$3.98$4.04$6.18$4.95$1.76$4.25$5.42$5.92$8.47Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.96$2.18$2.44$2.62$2.71$2.71$2.77$2.80$2.78$2.80$2.75Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.22$1.06$1.11$1.04$0.91$0.96$0.92$0.98$0.62$0.45$0.52Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.67$14.41$13.83$23.31$21.34$22.13$20.60$7.83$8.45$4.03$5.10Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−1.8%/yr−3.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+1.4%/yr−0.9%/yr
Dividends / share+4.0%/yr+0.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−10.5%/yr−13.2%/yr
Book value / share−13.4%/yr−28.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Optimize Brands-4.6%
    “During 2025, Optimize Brands net revenue decreases were driven by lower net revenues from the Company's products for STAR WARS, impacted by a reduced slate of entertainment releases, along with declines from PEPPA PIG and BABY ALIVE.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $322M loss into $830M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($322M)$386M($1.5B)$204M$429M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$136M+$163M+$211M+$233M+$280M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$80M+$51M+$72M+$83M+$98M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1000M+$248M+$1.9B−$147M+$11M
Cash from operations$893M$847M$726M$373M$818M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$63M−$87M−$136M−$128M−$133M
Owner earnings$830M$760M$590M$245M$685M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue18%18%12%4%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $80M), owner earnings is nearer $750M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $11M ÷ interest expense $163M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.5B · 224.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $777M − debt $3.3B
    What this means

    Netting $777M of cash and short-term investments against $3.3B of debt leaves $2.5B owed, about 224.2× a year's operating profit (294.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 82 + DIO 73 − DPO 94 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -30%–29%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–18%; latest $830M = operating cash $893M − maintenance capex $63M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $80M of SBC) leaves $750M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($322M) · cash from operations $893M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $393M ÷ Owner Earnings $830M — this fiscal year
    What this means

    Of $830M Owner Earnings, $393M (47%) went back to shareholders, $393M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 47%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 68%, the capital-allocation section below.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.47×
    Harvesting
    Capex $63M ÷ depreciation $136M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.7%
    The count is flat
    Stock compensation $80M (fiscal 2025), 1.7% of revenue · no repurchases · diluted shares +0.9% since 2022
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.38×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.3B vs $713M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −222%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.37/share (latest year $-2.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to −5% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −42%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −30.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$881M
  • Receivables$752M
  • Inventory$353M
  • Other current assets$864M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Debt due within a year$497M
  • Accounts payable$375M
  • Other current liabilities$843M
Current ratio1.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.46×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$497M due · $881M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($952M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$340M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$168Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 17%
  • Dividends$3.5B · 46%
  • Buybacks$738M · 10%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.0B · 27%
  • Returned to owners$4.2B

    68% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.5B as dividends and $738M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.0B and cash and short-term investments fell $402M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $738M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count12.8%

    The diluted count rose from 127M to 143M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.80/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.7B31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$4.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$2.3B written down across 4 years (2016, 2018, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 49% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Goldner$23.7M$29.1M$685M
2021Stoddart$3.1M$3.2M$685M
2022Cocks$9.4M$3.5M$245M
2022Stoddart$270k−$574k$245M
2023Cocks$15.1M$14.1M$590M
2024Cocks$16.8M$16.2M$760M
2025Cocks$18.7M$35.3M$830M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$80M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.7% of revenue, equal to 724.3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$1.7B · 35% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “In 2025, net revenues from our top five customers accounted for approximately 35% of our consolidated global net revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Leisure Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
BCBrunswick$5.4B27%11.1%13%7%
MATMattel$5.3B47%9.9%11%7%
HASHasbro Inc.$4.7B67%10.5%12%12%
GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp.$2.6B51%11.4%12%7%
PTONPeloton Interactive Inc.$2.5B43%-15.3%-10%-5%
CALYCallaway Golf Company$2.1B44%6.9%7%8%
YETIYETI Holdings$1.9B54%12.3%28%12%
FNKOFunko Inc.$908M36%4.7%6%5%
Group median45%10.2%11%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hasbro Inc. has delivered.

Hasbro Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Hasbro Inc. earns about $543M on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.2B on 141M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-20; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($75M) runs well above depreciation ($127M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hasbro Inc. (HAS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HAS, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← HALO its page in the Manual HASI →

Industry order: ← GOLF the Leisure Products chapter JOUT →