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GE, GE Aerospace

GE Aerospace designs and builds the jet engines that power commercial airliners and military aircraft, selling them to airframe makers, airlines, and governments. The engine itself is mostly the entry ticket: the larger share of the money comes from servicing those engines over service lives that run for decades — spare parts, overhauls, and long-term maintenance on the fleet already in the air.

Demand for our equipment and services is demonstrated by our backlog of engine orders and services and growth in our installed base, and tends to follow commercial air travel and freight demand and government funding for defense budgets.

Refer to the Segment Operations sections for Commercial Engines & Services and Defense & Propulsion Technologies below for additional detail about these dynamics for our commercial and defense businesses, respectively.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GE · GE Aerospace

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$45.9B

+18.5% YoY · −10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $50.6B 5-yr avg $41.1B

Operating margin 45.2% 5-yr avg 6.1%

ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 9%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 11%

Next report Est. 10/13–10/22 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~21 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Commercial Engines & Services (73%) and Defense & Propulsion Technologies (19%).
What moves the needle: The question that decides the outcome is whether the installed base is a franchise or merely a backlog. An engine chosen for an aircraft program is wedded to that airframe for its service life, so the test to watch is whether the aftermarket throws off a captive stream of parts and service — and whether that annuity, rather than the engine sale itself, carries the profit; that is where pricing power and switching costs, if they are real, would show. Admission is costly, since an engine takes years and heavy capital to develop before a program returns a dollar, and the bad case is plain: air travel is cyclical, one troubled program can swallow a fortune, and the balance sheet here carries debt rather than cash. The record below shows whether the service annuity is wide enough, and the returns high enough, to make the long wait pay.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Commercial Engines & Services is 73% of revenue, with Defense & Propulsion Technologies the other meaningful segment at 19%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Commercial Engines & Services73%$33.3B
Defense & Propulsion Technologies19%$8.9B

By geographyUnited States40%Asia24%Europe19%Middle East and Africa10%Americas8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMJun 2026
											Income statement
$110.2B	$111.0B	$113.5B	$90.2B	$75.8B	$56.5B	$29.1B	$35.3B	$38.7B	$45.9B	$50.6B	RevenueRevenue
$47.7B	$46.6B	$40.7B	$23.3B	$15.4B	—	—	—	—	—	—	Gross profitGross prof.
43%	42%	36%	26%	20%	—	—	—	—	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	13%	13%	15%	17%	14%	13%	11%	11%	9%	9%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%	5%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($6.4B)	($1.7B)	($6.8B)	($2.5B)	($5.4B)	($8.4B)	$711M	$3.7B	$5.4B	$8.5B	$22.9B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.8%	−1.6%	−6.0%	−2.8%	−7.2%	−14.9%	2.4%	10.5%	13.8%	18.6%	45.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$7.0B	($11.3B)	($21.0B)	($54M)	$6.0B	($5.7B)	$1.5B	$10.4B	$7.6B	$10.0B	—	Pretax incomePretax
$7.5B	($8.5B)	($22.4B)	($5.0B)	$5.7B	($6.3B)	$336M	$9.5B	$6.6B	$8.7B	$9.0B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	-8%	—	11%	10%	13%	14%	13%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.2B	$6.6B	$5.0B	$8.7B	$3.6B	$3.5B	$5.9B	$5.2B	$4.7B	$8.5B	$9.8B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$7.1B	$7.4B	$8.2B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$1.6B	$846M	$797M	$834M	$863M	$887M	DepreciationDeprec.
($13.4B)	$7.6B	$19.1B	$11.7B	($4.3B)	$8.2B	$4.7B	($5.1B)	($2.7B)	($1.0B)	($58M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$7.2B	$6.6B	$6.6B	$2.2B	$1.6B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$862M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.4B	CapexCapex
6.5%	6.0%	5.8%	2.5%	2.1%	2.2%	4.7%	2.4%	2.7%	2.8%	2.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($6.0B)	($88M)	($1.6B)	$6.5B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$5.1B	$4.3B	$3.7B	$7.7B	$8.9B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−5.5%	−0.1%	−1.5%	7.2%	2.6%	4.0%	17.4%	12.2%	9.5%	16.7%	17.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($6.0B)	($88M)	($1.6B)	$6.5B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$4.5B	$4.3B	$3.7B	$7.3B	$8.4B	Free cash flowFCF
−5.5%	−0.1%	−1.5%	7.2%	2.6%	4.0%	15.6%	12.2%	9.5%	15.8%	16.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.3B	$2.7B	$1M	$68M	$85M	$69M	$30M	$41M	$135M	$360M	$7M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$8.8B	$8.7B	$4.5B	$649M	$648M	$575M	$639M	$589M	$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.6B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$22.6B	—	—	—	—	$107M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$5.8B	$7.6B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
$49.1B	$5.4B	$18.3B	$9.0B	$16.7B	$21.4B	$2.3B	$4.0B	($1.7B)	($1.2B)	—	Investing cash flowInv. cash
($90.5B)	($18.5B)	($31.8B)	($16.1B)	($19.9B)	($45.4B)	($5.6B)	($8.6B)	($6.7B)	($8.7B)	—	Financing cash flowFin. cash
($1.1B)	$891M	($628M)	($50M)	$145M	($213M)	($369M)	$120M	($193M)	$201M	—	Exchange-rate effectFX
($41.3B)	($5.7B)	($9.2B)	$1.5B	$531M	($20.8B)	$2.2B	$664M	($3.9B)	($1.1B)	—	Change in cashΔ cash
-4%	-1%	-5%	-2%	-7%	-11%	1%	10%	17%	26%	14%	ROICROIC
11%	-15%	-72%	-18%	16%	-16%	1%	35%	34%	47%	51%	Return on equityROE
−2%	−31%	−87%	−20%	14%	−17%	−1%	32%	29%	39%	42%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$48.1B	$43.3B	$31.1B	$35.8B	$36.5B	$15.8B	$15.8B	$15.2B	$13.6B	$12.4B	$9.3B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$24.1B	$24.2B	$14.6B	$16.6B	$16.7B	$15.6B	$14.8B	$8.7B	$9.3B	$11.8B	$12.4B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$22.4B	$19.4B	$13.8B	$17.2B	$15.9B	$15.8B	$14.9B	$8.3B	$9.8B	$11.9B	$12.4B	InventoryInvent.
$14.4B	$15.2B	$13.8B	$15.9B	—	$11.0B	$10.0B	$7.5B	$7.9B	$10.1B	$10.8B	Accounts payablePayables
$32.0B	$28.5B	$14.6B	$17.9B	$32.6B	$20.5B	$19.7B	$9.5B	$11.2B	$13.6B	$14.0B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	—	—	$103.1B	$84.9B	$66.3B	$58.4B	$42.6B	$37.6B	$40.6B	$39.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	—	—	$78.9B	$54.6B	$52.0B	$49.4B	$32.1B	$34.4B	$39.0B	$40.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	—	—	1.3×	1.6×	1.3×	1.2×	1.3×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$50.5B	$53.9B	$43.6B	$45.9B	$44.7B	—	—	—	—	—	—	Net PP&ENet PP&E
$70.4B	$58.8B	$34.0B	$25.9B	$25.5B	$13.3B	$8.8B	$8.9B	$8.5B	$9.1B	$9.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
$365.2B	$369.2B	$309.6B	$265.2B	$256.2B	$198.9B	$188.9B	$173.3B	$123.1B	$130.2B	$127.7B	Total assetsAssets
$136.2B	$134.6B	$103.6B	$90.9B	$74.9B	$35.2B	$24.1B	$22.0B	$21.3B	$22.2B	$136.2B	Total debtDebt
$88.1B	$91.3B	$72.5B	$55.1B	$38.4B	$19.4B	$8.2B	$6.8B	$7.7B	$9.8B	$126.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$284.7B	$292.4B	$257.7B	—	—	$157.3B	$153.9B	$144.7B	$103.6B	$111.3B	—	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$3.0B	$3.4B	$382M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Redeemable interestsRedeemable
$1.7B	$17.5B	$20.5B	—	—	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$223M	$221M	—	Noncontrolling interestsNCI
$70.2B	$56.0B	$31.0B	$28.3B	$35.6B	$40.3B	$33.7B	$27.4B	$19.3B	$18.7B	$17.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	$2.5B	$22.1B	$1.5B	$877M	—	—	—	$251M	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
1.14B	1.09B	1.09B	1.09B	1.09B	1.10B	1.10B	1.10B	1.09B	1.07B	1.05B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$96.54	$102.19	$104.52	$82.70	$69.25	$51.43	$26.47	$32.16	$35.38	$42.94	$48.23	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.57	$-7.81	$-20.58	$-4.56	$5.21	$-5.77	$0.31	$8.63	$5.99	$8.15	$8.54	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-5.29	$-0.08	$-1.52	$5.97	$1.82	$2.03	$4.61	$3.94	$3.36	$7.19	$8.49	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.29	$-0.08	$-1.52	$5.97	$1.82	$2.03	$4.13	$3.94	$3.36	$6.80	$8.00	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$7.72	$7.97	$4.12	$0.59	$0.59	$0.52	$0.58	$0.54	$0.92	$1.36	$1.56	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.31	$6.12	$6.10	$2.03	$1.44	$1.14	$1.25	$0.78	$0.94	$1.19	$1.34	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$61.48	$51.60	$28.52	$25.95	$32.47	$36.71	$30.60	$24.93	$17.68	$17.49	$16.80	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−8.6%/yr	−9.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+31.7%/yr
EPS	+2.4%/yr	+9.4%/yr
Dividends / share	−17.5%/yr	+18.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−16.9%/yr	−3.7%/yr
Book value / share	−13.0%/yr	−11.6%/yr

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $7.7B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $863M it takes just to hold its position. It put $410M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $7.3B.

Reported net income$8.7B

Owner earnings$7.7B · 17% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$8.7B	$6.6B	$9.5B	$336M	($6.3B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$863M	+$834M	+$797M	+$846M	+$1.6B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$1.0B	−$2.7B	−$5.1B	+$4.7B	+$8.2B
Cash from operations	$8.5B	$4.7B	$5.2B	$5.9B	$3.5B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$863M	−$1.0B	−$862M	−$846M	−$1.3B
Owner earnings	$7.7B	$3.7B	$4.3B	$5.1B	$2.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$410M	—	—	−$525M	—
Free cash flow	$7.3B	$3.7B	$4.3B	$4.5B	$2.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	17%	10%	12%	17%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $863M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $410M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $123.8B · 5.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $12.4B − debt $136.2B

What this means
Netting $12.4B of cash and short-term investments against $136.2B of debt leaves $123.8B owed, about 5.4× a year's operating profit (6.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -11%–26%; 14% latest = NOPAT $19.7B ÷ invested capital $142.5B

Industry peers: median 20%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -5%–17%; latest $7.7B = operating cash $8.5B − maintenance capex $863M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.98×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $8.5B ÷ net income $8.7B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 117%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $9.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $7.7B — this fiscal year

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $7.7B of Owner Earnings, $9.0B (117%) went back to shareholders, $1.5B dividends, $7.6B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 117%; across the record (2016–2025) it is 278%, the capital-allocation section below.
Investing or harvesting? 1.48×

Expanding

Capex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $863M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 0.7%

The count is edging down

Stock compensation $325M (fiscal 2025), 0.7% of revenue · repurchases $7.6B · diluted shares -3.0% since 2022

What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $45.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.04×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $136.2B vs $1.6B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.95/share (latest year $8.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −4% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 14% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2021 · −14.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$39.7B

Cash & short-term investments$9.3B
Receivables$12.4B
Inventory$12.4B
Other current assets$5.6B

Current liabilities$40.4B

Debt due within a year$2.0B
Accounts payable$10.8B
Other current liabilities$27.6B

Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.67×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($733M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$2.0B due · $9.3B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$4.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($70.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$23.5B$1.1B of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$11.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.7B

'27$1.7B

'28$480M

'29$1.6B

'30$1.7B

later$13.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.7Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$3.4Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.7Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$20.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Jun 30, 2026$9.3B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$7.7B

Together, against $1.7B due next year10.2×

Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $17.0B against the $1.7B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 10 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $52.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$30.1B · 57%
Dividends$27.5B · 52%
Buybacks$38.3B · 73%

Returned to owners$65.8B
278% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $27.5B as dividends and $38.3B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$43.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $43.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $38.8B.
Average price paid for buybacks$215.64
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 178M shares were bought for $38.3B, about $215.64 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $77.06 (2022) to $251.70 (2025); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $248.90 ($22.6B).
Net change in share count−8.0%
The diluted count fell from 1141M to 1050M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.36/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$13.3B10% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity49%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$5.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $30.1B of capital spent building

$27.3B written down across 5 years (2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	H. Lawrence Culp, Jr.	$22.7M	$21.3M	$2.2B
2022	H. Lawrence Culp, Jr.	$8.2M	−$23.8M	$5.1B
2023	H. Lawrence Culp, Jr.	$14.7M	$182.5M	$4.3B
2024	H. Lawrence Culp, Jr.	$89.0M	$284.7M	$3.7B
2025	H. Lawrence Culp, Jr.	$45.6M	$213.5M	$7.7B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	Gross marginmedian over the record	Op. marginmedian over the record	ROICmedian over the record	Owner earn. marginmedian over the record
LMTLockheed Martin Corporation	$75.0B	13%	12.9%	34%	9%
GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation	$52.5B	19%4y	10.9%	14%	8%
GEGE Aerospace	$45.9B	36%	-2.2%	-2%	6%
NOCNorthrop Grumman Corporation	$42.0B	54%2y	11.4%	16%	8%
BABAE Systems plc	$38.1B	—	10.7%	17%	12%
HONHoneywell International Inc.	$37.4B	35%	21.5%	23%	14%
SAFSafran SA	$36.4B	—	11.8%	38%	—
RRRolls-Royce Holdings plc	$28.5B	21%	9.0%	—	11%
Group median	—	28%	11.1%	17%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GE Aerospace has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($5.1B) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($8.9B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $8.4B on 1038M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $126.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.4B) runs well above depreciation ($887M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GE against another business →

The owners of GE: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GE Aerospace (GE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GE, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← GDYN its page in the Manual GEF →

Industry order: ← GD the Aerospace & Defense chapter GRMN →