Owner Scorecard


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FHB, First Hawaiian

Banks financial

We provide a diversified range of banking services to consumer and commercial customers, including deposit products, lending services and wealth management and trust services.

Through our distribution channels, we offer a variety of deposit products to our customers, including checking and savings accounts and other types of deposit accounts.

We offer comprehensive commercial banking services to middle market and large Hawaii-based businesses with strong balance sheets and high-quality collateral.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FHB · First Hawaiian
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$881M
+8.9% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $890M 5-yr avg $807M
Return on equity 10% 5-yr avg 10%
Return on tangible equity 16% 5-yr avg 16%
Efficiency ratio 57% 5-yr avg 58%
Equity / assets 11.4% 5-yr avg 10.5%

Next report Est. 8/3–8/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~35 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Retail Banking (71%) and Commercial Banking (29%).
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 10%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 57% efficiency ratio, lean. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Retail Banking is 71% of revenue, with Commercial Banking the other meaningful segment at 29%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Retail Banking71%$629M
  • Commercial Banking29%$255M
  • Corporate/Other0%($3M)

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$718M$734M$745M$766M$733M$715M$793M$837M$809M$881M$890MRevenueRevenue
$519M$571M$646M$679M$583M$549M$663M$924M$980M$951MInterest incomeInt. inc.
$27M$42M$80M$105M$47M$19M$50M$287M$357M$288MInterest expenseInt. exp.
$492M$529M$566M$573M$536M$531M$614M$636M$623M$664M$671MNet interest incomeNet int.
$226M$206M$179M$193M$197M$185M$180M$201M$186M$217M$219MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$9M$19M$22M$14M$122M($39M)$1M$1MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$372M$368M$358M$382M$244M$349M$351M$309M$293M$354MPretax incomePretax
$230M$184M$264M$284M$186M$266M$266M$235M$230M$276M$285MNet incomeNet inc.
38%50%26%25%24%24%24%24%21%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.2%0.9%1.3%1.4%0.8%1.1%1.1%0.9%1.0%1.2%1.2%Return on assetsROA
9%7%10%11%7%10%12%9%9%10%10%Return on equityROE
6%2%5%6%2%5%6%4%4%5%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
16%12%17%17%11%16%21%16%14%16%16%Return on tangible equityROTCE
47%47%49%48%50%57%56%60%62%57%57%Efficiency ratioEffic.
$86M$123M$131M$138M$135M$134M$133M$133M$133M$131M$131MDividends paidDiv. paid
$132M$136M$5M$75M$9M$40M$100MBuybacksBuybacks
($1.9B)($971M)($258M)$375M($2.1B)($2.4B)($965M)$1.0B$549M$264MInvesting cash flowInv. cash
$78M$684M($125M)($981M)$2.2B$2.2B($197M)($67M)($1.4B)($292M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($1.6B)($17M)($31M)($310M)$347M$218M($732M)$1.2B($570M)$308MChange in cashΔ cash
Balance sheet
$11.5B$12.3B$13.1B$13.2B$13.3B$13.0BLoans held for investmentLoans
$135M$137M$142M$131M$208M$157MCredit-loss allowanceAllowance
$19.7B$20.5B$20.7B$20.2B$22.7B$25.0B$24.6B$24.9B$23.8B$24.0B$24.3BTotal assetsAssets
$16.8B$17.6B$17.2B$16.4B$19.2B$21.8B$21.7B$21.3B$20.3B$20.5B$20.8BDepositsDeposits
$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995M$995MGoodwillGoodwill
$17.2B$18.0B$18.2B$17.5B$19.9B$22.3B$22.3B$22.4B$21.2B$21.2BTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6B$2.8B$2.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
139M140M137M133M130M130M128M128M128M126M123MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.65$1.32$1.93$2.13$1.43$2.05$2.08$1.84$1.79$2.20$2.31EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.62$0.88$0.96$1.04$1.04$1.04$1.04$1.04$1.03$1.04$1.06Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$17.75$18.13$18.41$19.79$21.07$20.51$17.73$19.44$20.40$22.07$22.44Book value / shareBVPS
$10.62$10.91$11.04$12.24$13.35$12.83$9.95$11.65$12.64$14.13$14.32Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.5%/yr+4.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.3%/yr+11.3%/yr
EPS+3.3%/yr+9.1%/yr
Dividends / share+6.0%/yr+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.6%/yr−0.3%/yr
Book value / share+2.4%/yr+0.9%/yr
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $276M ÷ equity $2.8B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Strong
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $995M − intangibles $0)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Low cost ratio (<58%)
    Noninterest expense $499M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 59%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 11.6%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $2.8B ÷ assets $24.0B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $20.5B ÷ assets $24.0B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

The franchise and the credit cycle

  • A true franchise
    Noninterest-bearing deposits $6.5B ÷ deposits $20.5B · pays 2.04% on the interest-bearing rest (avg of year-ends)
    What this means

    The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    Not derivable from the filings' structured data — some filers carry recoveries only on segment axes, and a gross figure dressed as net would be a wrong number.

  • A real dent if realized
    HTM at cost $3.5B − fair value $3.2B = $344M, against tangible equity $1.8B
    What this means

    Bonds held to maturity are carried at cost, so rate rises open a gap between the books and reality that only shows in this disclosure. The gap never hits earnings if the bank can hold on — which is precisely why the reader checks whether it could be forced to sell: the 2023 bank failures were this number meeting deposit flight.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Robert S. Harrison$4.4M$4.8M$401M
2022Robert S. Harrison$4.6M$5.8M$417M
2023Robert S. Harrison$5.4M$3.5M$239M
2024Robert S. Harrison$5.4M$7.4M$304M
2025Robert S. Harrison$6.3M$6.1M$319M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio84:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 1.8% of revenue, equal to 2.5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDROEmedian over the recordROTCEmedian over the recordEfficiencymedian over the recordNII / assetsmedian over the recordNoninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
GBCIGlacier Bancorp$1.0B10%13%59%3.1%
RNSTRenasant Corporation$986M7%12%65%3.0%23%
FHBFirst Hawaiian$881M10%16%53%2.6%32%
INDBIndependent Bank Group$858M9%12%59%3.0%
IBOCInternational Bancshares Corporation$842M11%13%48%3.3%36%
CUBBCustomers Bancorp, Inc.$818M10%10%55%2.8%30%
CATYCathay General Bancorp$818M11%13%45%3.1%17%
MCHBMechanics Bancorp$809M9%10%77%2.7%35%
Group median10%13%57%3.0%31%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what First Hawaiian’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered1%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity16%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $1.8B on 122M shares, a 16% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "First Hawaiian (FHB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FHB, data as of 2026-07-18.

Manual order: ← FGN its page in the Manual FHI →

Industry order: ← FGBIP the Banks chapter FHN →