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CRWV, CoreWeave Inc.
CoreWeave Cloud combines proprietary software and orchestration, advanced infrastructure, and managed cloud services within a highly secure environment to deliver best-in-class high-performance computing, enabling our customers to develop, deploy, and operate advanced AI models and applications at scale.
Our CoreWeave Cloud platform enables the full lifecycle of AI, including large-scale model training, inference, data movement, continuous iteration, and agentic workflows.
We address them by integrating purpose-built infrastructure with AI-native software and managed services into a single, vertically integrated platform optimized for performance, reliability, and scalability.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 11/13 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 45 days of period end · has filed ~44 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 17% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.9%) on a 72% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 454% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Revenue up 112.5% year over year; operating income down 357.9%
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $229M | $1.9B | $5.1B | $7.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| $160M | $1.4B | $3.7B | $5.1B | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 70% | 74% | 72% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 7% | 15% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 3% | 7% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($14M) | $324M | ($46M) | ($231M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −6.1% | 16.9% | −0.9% | −3.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($558M) | ($744M) | ($1.2B) | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| ($594M) | ($863M) | ($1.2B) | ($1.9B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $1.8B | $2.7B | $3.1B | $6.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $103M | $863M | $2.5B | $4.0B | Depreciation & amortizationD&A |
| $2.3B | $2.7B | $1.1B | $4.2B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2.9B | $8.7B | $10.3B | $20.6B | CapexCapex |
| n/m | 454.4% | 200.9% | 271.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.7B | $1.9B | $604M | $2.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 755.5% | 98.5% | 11.8% | 38.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($1.1B) | ($6.0B) | ($7.3B) | ($13.7B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −484.7% | −310.9% | −141.3% | −179.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $108M | $62M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| ($3.1B) | ($8.7B) | ($10.3B) | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| $1.8B | $7.5B | $9.3B | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| $473M | $1.6B | $2.1B | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| — | 4% | -0% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -35% | -38% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −35% | −38% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $217M | $1.4B | $3.2B | $5.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $417M | $3.2B | $2.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $868M | $1.6B | $3.6B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($451M) | $1.5B | ($1.1B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.9B | $7.5B | $9.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $5.0B | $16.4B | $20.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.4× | 0.5× | 0.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $11.9B | $30.6B | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $0 | $20M | $1.1B | $1.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $17.8B | $49.3B | $77.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $7.9B | $21.4B | $21.4B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $6.6B | $18.2B | $15.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | $16.5B | $46.0B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| ($597M) | ($414M) | $3.3B | $5.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 6.6% | 1.6% | 12.3% | 8.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 192M | 218M | 436M | 539M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.19 | $8.78 | $11.77 | $14.08 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-3.09 | $-3.96 | $-2.68 | $-3.58 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $9.01 | $8.65 | $1.39 | $5.42 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-5.78 | $-27.31 | $-16.63 | $-25.33 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $15.33 | $39.92 | $23.64 | $38.16 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-3.11 | $-1.90 | $7.65 | $9.32 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $604M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put $7.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($7.3B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($1.2B) | ($863M) | ($594M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.5B | +$863M | +$103M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$630M | +$31M | +$15M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.1B | +$2.7B | +$2.3B |
| Cash from operations | $3.1B | $2.7B | $1.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2.5B | −$863M | −$103M |
| Owner earnings | $604M | $1.9B | $1.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$7.9B | −$7.8B | −$2.8B |
| Free cash flow | ($7.3B) | ($6.0B) | ($1.1B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 12% | 98% | 755% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $630M), owner earnings is nearer ($26M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“Risks Related to Financial and Accounting Matters We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $3.1B + ST investments $34M − debt $21.4B
What this means
Netting $3.2B of cash and short-term investments against $21.4B of debt leaves $18.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 225 + DIO 0 − DPO 408 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($36M) ÷ invested capital $21.6B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle3-yr median margin, range 12%–755%; latest $604M = operating cash $3.1B − maintenance capex $2.5BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 98% median across 3 years. It chose to put $7.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($7.3B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $630M of SBC) leaves ($26M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($1.2B) · cash from operations $3.1B
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 4.20×ExpandingCapex $10.3B ÷ depreciation & amortization as filed $2.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Sells itselfSelling and marketing $144M ÷ revenue $5.1B
What this means
Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 12.3%Stock pay, share count unreadStock compensation $630M (fiscal 2025), 12.3% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.46×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $21.4B vs ($9.0B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.62/share (latest year $-2.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$5.5B
- Receivables$2.5B
- Other current assets$1.4B
- Debt due within a year$6.7B
- Accounts payable$3.6B
- Other current liabilities$10.6B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.1B against the $6.7B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 92% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $29.8B, of which the leases are 28%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership5.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$630M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 12.3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics and what the growth costs. Each column names the period it is read over, and a median resting on fewer than three years carries that count beside it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record | Sales & marketinglatest FY | Stock paylatest FY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TOSTToast Inc. | $6.2B | 19% | -13.4% | -38% | -1% | 9.3% | 3.9% |
| EPAMEPAM Systems | $5.5B | 34% | 11.9% | 31% | 11% | — | 3.2% |
| CRWVCoreWeave Inc. | $5.1B | 72% | -0.9% | 2%2y | 98% | 2.8% | 12.3% |
| DOXAmdocs | $5.0B | 35% | 13.7% | 15% | 13% | — | — |
| BILIBilibili Inc. | $4.5B | 22% | -22.3% | -19% | 2% | — | — |
| VRSKVerisk Analytics Inc. | $3.1B | 65% | 40.3% | 14% | 32% | — | 1.8% |
| KCKingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited | $1.4B | 5% | -24.9% | -22% | — | — | — |
| DAVAEndava plc | $1.0B | 33% | 12.9% | 25% | — | — | — |
| Group median | — | 34% | 5.5% | 8% | 12% | — | 3.6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CoreWeave Inc. has delivered.
CoreWeave Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($13.7B) on 539M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $15.8B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($20.6B) runs well above depreciation ($4.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CRWD its page in the Manual CSCO →
Industry order: ← CLVT the IT Services & Consulting chapter CTSH →