CRGY, Crescent Energy

Will it survive?

• Can it pay its interest? 0.8×
  Does not cover its interest
  Operating income $229M ÷ interest expense $298M
  What this means

  A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

• How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.5B · 24.0× operating profit
  Heavy net debt
  Cash $10M − debt $5.5B
  What this means

  Netting $10M of cash and short-term investments against $5.5B of debt leaves $5.5B owed, about 24.0× a year's operating profit (24.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

• How long is cash tied up? —
  Not enough data
  What this means

  The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

• Return on invested capital 2%
  Below average
  NOPAT $182M ÷ invested capital $10.7B (debt + equity − cash)
  Industry peers: median 7%
  What this means

  The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

• Owner-earnings margin 23%
  High through the cycle
  7-yr median margin, range 8%–54%; latest $861M = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $819M
  Industry peers: median 26%
  What this means

  What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $245M of SBC) leaves $616M.

• Are earnings backed by cash? 12.64×
  Cash-backed
  Cash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $133M
  What this means

  How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

• Where do the earnings go? 17%
  Reinvests most of it
  Dividends + buybacks $149M ÷ Owner Earnings $861M — this fiscal year
  What this means

  Of $861M Owner Earnings, $149M (17%) went back to shareholders, $115M dividends, $33M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($245M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does. This year's proportion is 17%; across the record (2019–2025) it is 9%, the capital-allocation section below.

• Investing or harvesting? 0.70×
  Harvesting
  Capex $819M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
  What this means

  Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

• Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 6.9%
  Stock pay, share count unread
  Stock compensation $245M (fiscal 2025), 6.9% of revenue · repurchases $33M
  What this means

  Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

• Adequate size Pass
  Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
  What this means

  Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

• Strong liquidity Miss
  Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.48×
  What this means

  Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

• Conservative debt Miss
  Debt ≤ working capital · $5.5B vs $602M WC
  What this means

  Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

• Earnings stability Miss
  A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
  What this means

  Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

• Dividend record Miss
  Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 7 yrs
  What this means

  An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

• Earnings growth —
  Earnings +33% over the record · —
  What this means

  Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

• Moderate price —
  P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
  What this means

  Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.09/share (latest year $0.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

• Profitable years 3 of 7
  What this means

  Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

• Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs
  What this means

  A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

• Operating margin 1% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

  In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

  What this means

  Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 9% lately, median 14% — pricing power intact or improving.

• Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
  What this means

  Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

• Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
  What this means

  Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

• Worst year 2020 · −49.5% op. margin
  What this means

  Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

• Dividend record rising
  What this means

  Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.