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CPRI, Capri Holdings
Capri Holdings Limited is a global fashion luxury group consisting of iconic brands Michael Kors and Jimmy Choo.
Our commitment to glamorous style and craftsmanship is at the heart of each of our luxury brands.
Our strength lies in the unique DNA and heritage of each of our brands, the diversity and passion of our people and our dedication to the clients and communities we serve.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Next report By 8/6 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late June · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~40 days after · the wire records it on arrival
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Michael Kors (83%) and Jimmy Choo (17%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 62% and operating margin about 6.8% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.5% to 16% — on a steadier 62% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Michael Kors is 83% of revenue, with Jimmy Choo the other meaningful segment at 17%.
- Michael Kors83%$2.9B
- Jimmy Choo17%$600M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $4.5B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $4.1B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $4.1B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.6B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $1.6B | Gross profitGross prof. |
| 59% | 61% | 61% | 59% | 64% | 66% | 66% | 63% | 62% | 62% | 45% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 34% | 37% | 40% | 44% | 50% | 45% | 48% | 51% | 55% | 57% | 57% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $690M | $749M | $735M | ($192M) | $19M | $903M | $679M | $59M | ($26M) | $23M | $23M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 15.4% | 15.9% | 14.0% | −3.5% | 0.5% | 16.0% | 12.1% | 1.4% | −0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $689M | $742M | $621M | ($215M) | $3M | $915M | $648M | $21M | ($2M) | $107M | — | Pretax incomePretax |
| $553M | $592M | $543M | ($223M) | ($62M) | $822M | $616M | ($229M) | ($1.2B) | $137M | $137M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | 20% | 13% | — | — | 10% | 4% | 38% | — | 25% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $1.1B | $694M | $859M | $624M | $704M | $771M | $309M | $281M | $77M | $77M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $198M | $182M | $188M | $200M | $165M | $193M | $179M | $132M | $132M | $121M | $121M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $250M | $238M | ($97M) | $812M | $450M | ($396M) | ($102M) | $351M | $1.3B | ($215M) | ($215M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $165M | $120M | $181M | $223M | $111M | $131M | $226M | $135M | $74M | $63M | $63M | CapexCapex |
| 3.7% | 2.5% | 3.5% | 4.0% | 2.7% | 2.3% | 4.0% | 3.3% | 2.0% | 1.8% | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $870M | $942M | $513M | $636M | $513M | $573M | $545M | $174M | $207M | $14M | $14M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.4% | 20.0% | 9.8% | 11.5% | 12.6% | 10.1% | 9.7% | 4.2% | 5.7% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $870M | $942M | $513M | $636M | $513M | $573M | $545M | $174M | $207M | $14M | $14M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.4% | 20.0% | 9.8% | 11.5% | 12.6% | 10.1% | 9.7% | 4.2% | 5.7% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $481M | $1.4B | $1.9B | $13M | $13M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $9M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $1.0B | $361M | $207M | $102M | $1M | $661M | $1.4B | $107M | $4M | $81M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| ($651M) | ($1.5B) | ($2.1B) | $62M | ($124M) | $58M | $183M | ($135M) | ($53M) | $1.2B | — | Investing cash flowInv. cash |
| ($850M) | $389M | $1.5B | ($497M) | ($870M) | ($800M) | ($776M) | ($208M) | ($242M) | ($1.3B) | — | Financing cash flowFin. cash |
| ($6M) | $15M | ($11M) | ($4M) | $12M | ($24M) | ($94M) | ($17M) | ($16M) | ($25M) | — | Exchange-rate effectFX |
| ($472M) | ($67M) | $9M | $420M | ($358M) | ($62M) | $84M | ($51M) | ($30M) | ($30M) | — | Change in cashΔ cash |
| 37% | 22% | 13% | -4% | 0% | 23% | 19% | 1% | -1% | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 35% | 29% | 22% | -10% | -3% | 32% | 33% | -14% | -321% | 171% | 171% | Return on equityROE |
| 35% | 29% | 22% | −10% | −3% | 32% | 33% | −14% | −321% | 171% | 171% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $228M | $163M | $172M | $592M | $232M | $169M | $249M | $199M | $107M | $135M | $135M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $266M | $294M | $383M | $308M | $373M | $434M | $369M | $332M | $215M | $211M | $211M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $549M | $661M | $953M | $827M | $736M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $862M | $701M | $581M | $581M | InventoryInvent. |
| $176M | $294M | $371M | $428M | $512M | $555M | $475M | $352M | $379M | $311M | $311M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $639M | $661M | $965M | $707M | $597M | $975M | $951M | $842M | $537M | $481M | $481M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $566M | $960M | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $954M | $954M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 1.3× | 1.1× | 1.4× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $592M | $583M | $615M | $561M | $485M | $476M | $552M | $579M | $393M | $371M | — | Net PP&ENet PP&E |
| $120M | $848M | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $253M | $199M | $202M | $202M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.4B | $4.1B | $6.7B | $7.9B | $7.5B | $7.5B | $7.3B | $6.7B | $5.2B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $133M | $875M | $2.6B | $2.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $357M | $357M | Total debtDebt |
| ($95M) | $712M | $2.4B | $1.6B | $1.1B | $991M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $222M | $222M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $815M | $2.0B | $4.2B | $5.8B | $5.3B | $4.9B | $5.4B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $3.1B | — | Total liabilitiesTotal liab. |
| $2M | $4M | $3M | $1M | ($1M) | ($1M) | $1M | $1M | $4M | $4M | — | Noncontrolling interestsNCI |
| $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $368M | $80M | $80M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 1.7% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 1.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | $171M | $94M | — | $82M | $192M | $66M | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 168M | 155M | 152M | 151M | 150M | 152M | 134M | 118M | 118M | 120M | 120M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $26.73 | $30.42 | $34.55 | $36.83 | $26.99 | $37.08 | $41.93 | $35.07 | $30.62 | $28.99 | $28.99 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.29 | $3.82 | $3.58 | $-1.48 | $-0.41 | $5.39 | $4.60 | $-1.94 | $-10.00 | $1.14 | $1.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $5.17 | $6.07 | $3.38 | $4.22 | $3.41 | $3.76 | $4.07 | $1.47 | $1.75 | $0.12 | $0.12 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $5.17 | $6.07 | $3.38 | $4.22 | $3.41 | $3.76 | $4.07 | $1.47 | $1.75 | $0.12 | $0.12 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.98 | $0.77 | $1.19 | $1.48 | $0.74 | $0.86 | $1.69 | $1.14 | $0.63 | $0.53 | $0.53 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.47 | $13.01 | $16.02 | $14.38 | $14.34 | $16.78 | $13.79 | $13.54 | $3.11 | $0.67 | $0.67 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.9%/yr | +1.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −34.4%/yr | −49.1%/yr |
| EPS | −11.1%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −6.7%/yr | −6.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | −25.5%/yr | −45.9%/yr |
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported $137M of profit but $14M of owner earnings: $123M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $137M | ($1.2B) | ($229M) | $616M | $822M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$121M | +$132M | +$132M | +$179M | +$193M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$34M | +$50M | +$55M | +$78M | +$85M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$215M | +$1.3B | +$351M | −$102M | −$396M |
| Cash from operations | $77M | $281M | $309M | $771M | $704M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$63M | −$74M | −$135M | −$226M | −$131M |
| Owner earnings | $14M | $207M | $174M | $545M | $573M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 6% | 4% | 10% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $34M), owner earnings is nearer ($20M).
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $222M · 9.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $135M − debt $357M
What this means
Netting $135M of cash and short-term investments against $357M of debt leaves $222M owed, about 9.7× a year's operating profit (15.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -4%–37%; 6% latest = NOPAT $19M ÷ invested capital $302MIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–20%; latest $14M = operating cash $77M − maintenance capex $63MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $34M of SBC) leaves ($20M).
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $77M ÷ net income $137M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $81M ÷ Owner Earnings $14M — this fiscal year
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $14M of Owner Earnings, $81M (579%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $81M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $34M stock comp, the real buyback was about $47M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands. This year's proportion is 579%; across the record (2017–2026) it is 78%, the capital-allocation section below.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.52×HarvestingCapex $63M ÷ depreciation $121M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
The promise and the pay packet
- Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 1.0%The count is genuinely shrinkingStock compensation $34M (fiscal 2026), 1.0% of revenue · repurchases $81M · diluted shares -10.6% since 2023
What this means
Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.21×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $357M vs $199M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record —Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −175%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.69/share (latest year $1.19), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 15% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 0% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −3.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −3.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$135M
- Receivables$211M
- Inventory$581M
- Other current assets$226M
- Debt due within a year$14M
- Accounts payable$311M
- Other current liabilities$629M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.4B, of which the leases are 75%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 28, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.4B · 22%
- Buybacks$3.9B · 61%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 17%
- Returned to owners$3.9B
78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.9B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−28.7%
The diluted count fell from 168M to 120M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$605M written down across 5 years (2020, 2021, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 16% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Idol | $14.7M | $15.5M | $573M |
| 2023 | Mr. Idol | $14.3M | $11.0M | $545M |
| 2024 | Mr. Idol | $10.5M | $9.8M | $174M |
| 2025 | Mr. Idol | $9.1M | −$3.1M | $207M |
| 2026 | Mr. Idol | $11.9M | $10.4M | $14M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$34M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2026, 1.0% of revenue, equal to 147.8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Footwear & Accessories
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.
| Company | Revenuelatest FY, USD | Gross marginmedian over the record | Op. marginmedian over the record | ROICmedian over the record | Owner earn. marginmedian over the record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SKXSkechers U.S.A. | $9.0B | 48% | 9.5% | 20% | 5% |
| TPRTapestry Inc. | $7.0B | 69% | 15.7% | 20% | 12% |
| DECKDeckers Outdoor Corporation | $5.5B | 52% | 18.0% | 65% | 16% |
| CROXCrocs Inc. | $4.0B | 53% | 13.0% | 34% | 16% |
| CPRICapri Holdings | $3.5B | 62% | 6.8% | 10% | 10% |
| CALCaleres | $2.8B | 42% | 4.2% | 10% | 5% |
| SHOOSteven Madden Ltd. | $2.5B | 40% | 10.5% | 23% | 9% |
| WWWWolverine World Wide | $1.9B | 41% | 6.0% | 9% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 50% | 10.0% | 20% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Capri Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, Capri Holdings earns about $346M on its 10.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.68% 10-year Treasury (Jul 30, 2026) + 4.32 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.68%, as of Jul 30, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $14M on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-22; net debt $222M. The if-converted diluted count is 120M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CPNG its page in the Manual CPRT →
Industry order: ← CAL the Footwear & Accessories chapter CROX →