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BBT, Beacon Financial Corporation

Banks financial

Beacon Financial Corporation is the holding company for Beacon Bank & Trust and Clarendon Private.

Beacon Financial Corporation offers a wide range of commercial, business and retail banking services, including a full complement of cash management products, foreign exchange services, on-line and mobile banking services, consumer and residential loans and wealth management services.

Through Clarendon Private and the Trust and Investments Division of the Bank, the Company offers a wide range of wealth management services to individuals, families, endowments and foundations to help these clients meet their long-term financial goals.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BBT · Beacon Financial Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$553M

+38.2% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average

Revenue $553M 5-yr avg $443M

Return on equity 4% 5-yr avg 7%

Return on tangible equity 5% 5-yr avg 8%

Efficiency ratio 70% 5-yr avg 68%

Equity / assets 10.7% 5-yr avg 9.9%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~42 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 6%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 70% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25
										Income statement
$298M	$365M	$431M	$449M	$383M	$434M	$414M	$412M	$400M	$553M	RevenueRevenue
$280M	$355M	$466M	$510M	$410M	$329M	$387M	$577M	$629M	$833M	Interest incomeInt. inc.
$48M	$64M	$110M	$144M	$93M	$38M	$43M	—	$299M	$330M	Interest expenseInt. exp.
$232M	$291M	$356M	$365M	$317M	$291M	$345M	$340M	$330M	$503M	Net interest incomeNet int.
$66M	$74M	$74M	$84M	$66M	$143M	$69M	$32M	$26M	$50M	Noninterest incomeFee inc.
$17M	$21M	$25M	$35M	$76M	($500K)	$11M	$38M	$22M	$41M	Credit-loss provisionProvision
$77M	$91M	$138M	$124M	($533M)	$149M	$114M	$94M	$92M	$122M	Pretax incomePretax
$59M	$55M	$106M	$97M	($533M)	$119M	$93M	$75M	$69M	$90M	Net incomeNet inc.
24%	46%	21%	18%	—	20%	19%	20%	25%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
0.6%	0.5%	0.9%	0.7%	-4.2%	1.0%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	Return on assetsROA
5%	4%	7%	6%	-45%	10%	9%	6%	6%	4%	Return on equityROE
3%	1%	4%	3%	−48%	8%	7%	2%	2%	1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
9%	6%	11%	8%	-46%	10%	10%	8%	7%	5%	Return on tangible equityROTCE
68%	69%	62%	65%	—	66%	70%	64%	68%	70%	Efficiency ratioEffic.
$25M	$33M	$41M	$45M	$37M	$25M	$25M	$48M	$48M	$63M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$0	$0	$53M	$473K	$69M	$125M	$24M	$18M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
($208M)	($283M)	($862M)	$1.2B	$641M	$621M	($1.3B)	($665M)	($140M)	$2.3B	Investing cash flowInv. cash
$119M	$341M	$574M	($917M)	$109M	($636M)	$208M	$299M	$445M	($1.0B)	Financing cash flowFin. cash
$10M	$136M	($66M)	$397M	$978M	$70M	($942M)	($250M)	$411M	$1.5B	Change in cashΔ cash
										Balance sheet
$6.5B	$8.3B	$9.0B	$9.5B	$8.1B	$6.8B	$8.3B	$9.0B	$9.8B	$18.0B	Loans held for investmentLoans
$44M	$52M	$61M	$64M	$127M	$106M	$96M	$105M	$115M	$253M	Credit-loss allowanceAllowance
$9.2B	$11.6B	$12.2B	$13.2B	$12.8B	$11.6B	$11.7B	$12.4B	$11.9B	$23.2B	Total assetsAssets
$6.6B	$8.7B	$9.0B	$10.3B	$10.2B	$10.1B	$10.3B	$10.6B	$8.9B	$19.5B	DepositsDeposits
$403M	$519M	$518M	$554M	$0	$0	—	$241M	$241M	$352M	GoodwillGoodwill
$8.1B	$10.1B	$10.7B	$11.5B	$11.7B	$10.4B	$10.7B	$11.4B	$10.7B	$20.7B	Total liabilitiesTotal liab.
$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$992M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
										Per share
62.3M	79.4M	92.5M	98.8M	101M	99.1M	91.8M	88.5M	89.3M	87.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.94	$0.70	$1.14	$0.99	$-5.30	$1.20	$1.01	$0.85	$0.77	$1.03	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.40	$0.42	$0.44	$0.46	$0.36	$0.25	$0.27	$0.54	$0.54	$0.72	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$17.54	$18.85	$16.80	$17.79	$11.81	$11.93	$10.80	$13.55	$13.68	$28.46	Book value / shareBVPS
$10.76	$11.82	$10.83	$11.73	$11.47	$11.63	$10.54	$10.60	$10.79	$22.29	Tangible book / shareTBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.1%/yr	+10.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+6.0%/yr	+2.0%/yr
EPS	+1.0%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+6.8%/yr	+14.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.5%/yr	+14.3%/yr
Book value / share	+5.5%/yr	+19.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Net income+31.4%
“Net Income For the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company reported net income of $90.3 million, or $1.03 per basic and diluted share, an increase of $21.6 million, or 31.4%, from $68.7 million, or $0.77 per basic and diluted share for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase in net income is primarily the result of an increase in net interest income of $173.5 million and an increase in non-interest income of $24.3 million, partially offset by an increase in non-interest expense of $147.9 million driven by merger costs, an incr…”
✓ figure matches the filed record

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

Return on equity 4%

Below the cost of equity

Net income $90M ÷ equity $2.5B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
Return on tangible equity 5%

Modest

Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $352M − intangibles $190M)

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
Efficiency ratio 70%

Average

Noninterest expense $390M ÷ (net interest income + fees)

Industry peers: median 64%

What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

Capital (equity / assets) 10.7%

Well capitalized

Equity $2.5B ÷ assets $23.2B

What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
Deposit funding 84%

Deposit-funded

Deposits $19.5B ÷ assets $23.2B

What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
Credit cost (provision / NII) 8%

Low

Provision for credit losses $41M ÷ net interest income $503M

What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

The franchise and the credit cycle

Deposit franchise (demand) 21%

Solid core deposits

Demand deposits $4.0B ÷ deposits $19.5B

What this means
The share of deposits the bank pays nothing for — checking accounts that stay through rate cycles. This is the deposit moat in one number: a high share means cheap, sticky raw material for lending; a low share means the funding reprices with every rate move. Buffett's Wells letter is built on exactly this economics.
Net charge-offs 0.27%

Disciplined book

Charge-offs net of recoveries $38M ÷ loans $13.9B (avg of year-ends) · worst year on record 0.47% · allowance held at 1.40% of loans

What this means
Loans actually written off, net of what was later recovered — the realized truth the provisions were guessing at. Graham's rule applies doubly here: the worst year in the record, not the average, is the read, because a loan book's sins are committed in the good years and confessed in the bad ones.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$541M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity14%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring($1.9B)over 11 years since fiscal 2011 buying other businesses, against $80M of capital spent building over the 10-year record

$554M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 35% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Beside that spending sits $93M of cumulative amortization of acquired intangibles charged against earnings since fiscal 2009 — the purchase price of past deals, expensed over time. The cash figure above counts only cash consideration: goodwill of $352M against it says much of the buying was paid for in stock, which never passes through the cash-flow statement.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and amortization summed across the company's full tagged history, write-downs across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Mhatre	$2.3M	$2.9M	$83M
2022	Mr. Mhatre	$2.6M	$3.0M	$109M
2023	Mr. Mhatre	$2.6M	$1.7M	$108M
2024	Mr. Mhatre	$2.7M	$2.7M	$100M
2025	Mr. Mhatre	$8.5M	$8.4M	$212M
2025	Mr. Perrault	$1.3M	$1.3M	$212M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

Company	Revenuelatest FY, USD	ROEmedian over the record	ROTCEmedian over the record	Efficiencymedian over the record	NII / assetsmedian over the record	Noninterest-bearing sharelatest FY
PFSProvident Financial Services Inc	$870M	8%	11%	56%	2.8%	19%
EBCEastern Bankshares Inc.	$723M	6%	8%	70%	2.6%	—
BBTBeacon Financial Corporation	$553M	6%	8%	68%	2.6%	—
TFSLTFS Financial Corporation	$321M	5%	5%	66%	1.7%	—
HFWAHeritage Financial Corporation	$246M	8%	11%	64%	3.2%	27%
NBBKNB Bancorp Inc.	$214M	6%	6%	63%	2.9%	—
TCBXThird Coast Bancshares Inc.	$209M	8%	8%	68%	3.4%	11%
SMBCSouthern Missouri Bancorp Inc.	$183M	11%	12%	57%	3.2%	12%
Group median	—	7%	8%	65%	2.9%	—

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Beacon Financial Corporation’s record justifies.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Cost of equity 10% Long-term growth 3%

Tangible book / share, delivered−9%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book—

Justified by the return—

Normalized return on tangible equity8%

Price / book—

Earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $2.0B on 84M shares, a 8% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Weigh BBT against another business →

The owners of BBT: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Beacon Financial Corporation (BBT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BBT, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← BBSI its page in the Manual BBW →

Industry order: ← BBDO the Banks chapter BBVA →