Owner Scorecard


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ASPN, Aspen Aerogels Inc.

Building Products capital-intensive UnprofitableCapital build-out

Aspen Aerogels, Inc. is an aerogel technology company that designs, develops and manufactures innovative, high-performance aerogel materials used primarily in the energy industrial, sustainable insulation materials, and electric vehicle markets.

We have provided high-performance aerogel insulation to the energy industrial and sustainable insulation markets for nearly two decades.

We have developed a number of promising aerogel products and technologies for the EV market, including our proprietary line of PyroThin aerogel thermal barriers for use in battery packs in EVs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K/A
ASPN · Aspen Aerogels Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$271M
−40.1% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $202M 5-yr avg $253M
Gross margin 3% 5-yr avg 18%
Operating margin −61.0% 5-yr avg −45.1%
ROIC −80% 5-yr avg −52%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg −20%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg −56%

Next report By 11/8 · the 10-Q for the quarter ended late September · due within 40 days of period end · has filed ~38 days after · the wire records it on arrival

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Thermal Barrier (62%) and Energy Industrial (38%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 14% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 12% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −21%) on a 17% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 11% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −22%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Thermal Barrier is 62% of revenue, with Energy Industrial the other meaningful line at 38%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Thermal Barrier62%$169M
  • Energy Industrial38%$102M
By geographyUnited States63%Latin America18%Asia11%Europe7%Canada1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$118M$112M$104M$139M$100M$122M$180M$239M$453M$271M$202MRevenueRevenue
$23M$19M$13M$26M$15M$10M$5M$57M$183M$46M$5MGross profitGross prof.
21%18%12%19%15%8%3%24%40%17%3%Gross marginGross mgn
25%28%32%23%27%32%37%38%24%31%41%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%6%6%6%9%9%9%7%4%5%6%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($11M)($19M)($34M)($14M)($22M)($41M)($79M)($49M)$55M($378M)($123M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.5%−17.1%−32.5%−10.2%−21.5%−33.4%−43.9%−20.6%12.0%−139.5%−61.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($83M)($46M)$15M($387M)Pretax incomePretax
($12M)($19M)($34M)($15M)($22M)($37M)($83M)($46M)$13M($390M)($126M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($578K)($5M)($9M)($1M)($10M)($19M)($94M)($43M)$46M$33M$49MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$11M$11M$10M$10M$9M$9M$15M$23M$45M$43MDepreciationDeprec.
$2M$4M$15M$3M$2M$9M($21M)($23M)($3M)$369M$124MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$13M$6M$4M$2M$3M$14M$178M$175M$86M$37M$15MCapexCapex
11.2%5.5%3.4%1.5%3.4%11.3%98.7%73.5%19.1%13.8%7.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($10M)($11M)($12M)($3M)($13M)($28M)($104M)($58M)$23M($5M)$34MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−8.8%−9.6%−11.7%−2.3%−13.3%−23.1%−57.5%−24.3%5.1%−1.7%17.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($14M)($11M)($12M)($3M)($13M)($32M)($272M)($218M)($41M)($5M)$34MFree cash flowFCF
−11.7%−9.6%−11.7%−2.3%−13.3%−26.6%−151.0%−91.3%−9.0%−1.7%17.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
($13M)($6M)($4M)($2M)($3M)($14M)($178M)($175M)($86M)($37M)Investing cash flowInv. cash
($924K)$3M$5M$3M$26M$92M$478M$75M$122M($58M)Financing cash flowFin. cash
($15M)($7M)($7M)$306K$13M$60M$206M($143M)$81M($63M)Change in cashΔ cash
-9%-17%-40%-20%-31%-62%-23%-8%10%-177%-80%ROICROIC
-10%-19%-49%-25%-32%-29%-18%-9%2%-165%-66%Return on equityROE
−10%−19%−49%−25%−32%−29%−18%−9%2%−165%−66%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$18M$11M$3M$4M$16M$77M$281M$140M$221M$157M$152MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$18M$27M$26M$32M$16M$20M$57M$70M$109M$35M$40MReceivablesReceiv.
$13M$9M$7M$9M$13M$12M$23M$39M$48M$38M$28MInventoryInvent.
$13M$11M$12M$13M$5M$17M$55M$51M$44M$13M$21MAccounts payablePayables
$17M$25M$20M$28M$23M$15M$25M$58M$112M$60M$47MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$50M$48M$37M$46M$47M$112M$370M$266M$409M$242M$248MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$18M$22M$23M$30M$14M$37M$79M$78M$110M$62M$99MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×2.2×1.6×1.5×3.4×3.1×4.7×3.4×3.7×3.9×2.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$84M$76M$62M$54M$47M$56M$259M$417M$459M$98MNet PP&ENet PP&E
$135M$124M$99M$104M$97M$183M$643M$703M$895M$407M$393MTotal assetsAssets
$4M$104M$115M$115M$91M$80MTotal debtDebt
($13M)($178M)($25M)($106M)($66M)($71M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$19M$23M$29M$45M$30M$55M$196M$215M$280M$171MTotal liabilitiesTotal liab.
$116M$101M$70M$59M$68M$128M$447M$488M$615M$236M$192MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.6%2.8%3.2%3.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
23.1M23.4M23.7M24.1M26.4M30.4M39.4M69.4M80.3M82.3M82.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.09$4.77$4.40$5.78$3.80$4.00$4.58$3.44$5.64$3.29$2.44Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.52$-0.83$-1.45$-0.60$-0.83$-1.22$-2.10$-0.66$0.17$-4.73$-1.52EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.45$-0.46$-0.52$-0.13$-0.51$-0.92$-2.63$-0.83$0.29$-0.06$0.42Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.60$-0.46$-0.52$-0.13$-0.51$-1.06$-6.92$-3.14$-0.51$-0.06$0.42Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.57$0.26$0.15$0.09$0.13$0.45$4.52$2.53$1.07$0.45$0.18Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.99$4.32$2.96$2.45$2.57$4.22$11.37$7.03$7.65$2.86$2.32Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.76 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−4.7%/yr−2.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.5%/yr+28.6%/yr
Book value / share−6.0%/yr+2.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $390M loss into ($5M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($390M)$13M($46M)($83M)($37M)
Depreciationnon-cash charge added back+$45M+$23M+$15M+$9M+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$9M+$13M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$369M−$3M−$23M−$21M+$9M
Cash from operations$33M$46M($43M)($94M)($19M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$37M−$23M−$15M−$9M−$9M
Owner earnings($5M)$23M($58M)($104M)($28M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$64M−$160M−$169M−$4M
Free cash flow($5M)($41M)($218M)($272M)($32M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-2%5%-24%-57%-23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer ($13M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K/A · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $157M − debt $115M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $42M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 47 + DIO 62 − DPO 21 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -177%–10%; -154% latest = NOPAT ($299M) ÷ invested capital $194M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -154% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -57%–5%; latest ($5M) = operating cash $33M − maintenance capex $37M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a -11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves ($13M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($390M) · cash from operations $33M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.83×
    Maintaining
    Capex $37M ÷ property depreciation $45M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

The promise and the pay packet

  • Sells itself
    Selling and marketing $28M ÷ revenue $271M
    What this means

    Sales and marketing as a share of revenue, kept apart from administrative overhead because it answers a different question: how much a business must spend to win the next customer. A company whose product pulls customers in spends little here and keeps the difference; one that must buy its growth is running to stand still, and the spending has to keep rising for revenue to keep rising. Read it beside the growth rate, not alone.

  • Is the buyback buying ownership, or mopping up? 3.2%
    Stock pay, share count unread
    Stock compensation $9M (fiscal 2025), 3.2% of revenue · no repurchases · the share count is not comparable across these years (a split or a first listing sits in the record), so the drift is withheld
    What this means

    Stock handed to employees is a real cost paid in the owner's own currency: it is charged against profit, but the shares it creates are permanent. Many companies repurchase stock at the same time, which looks like a return of capital and often is not — if the count barely moves, the cash merely cancelled the pay packet and bought the owner nothing. The three states worth telling apart are a count genuinely shrinking, a count standing still despite large repurchases, and a count rising because the issuance was never offset at all.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $271M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.90×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $115M vs $180M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record
    Uninterrupted dividends · no dividend line tagged in the data
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. This record carries no dividends-paid line in any year — common for partnerships, whose distributions file under tags the chain doesn't read — so the criterion is withheld rather than judged on silence.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.69/share (latest year $-4.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −20% → −49% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −20% early to −49% lately, median −22% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Worst year 2025 · −139.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$248M
  • Cash & short-term investments$152M
  • Receivables$40M
  • Inventory$28M
  • Other current assets$29M
Current liabilities$99M
  • Debt due within a year$23M
  • Accounts payable$21M
  • Other current liabilities$54M
Current ratio2.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.24×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.54×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$150Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$23M due · $152M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−36.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.9× → 2.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$192Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$48MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$103M$22M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$35Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Young$8.4M$30.3M($28M)
2022Mr. Young$2.4M−$20.8M($104M)
2023Mr. Young$3.6M$7.8M($58M)
2024Mr. Young$3.1M$1.2M$23M
2025Mr. Young$2.7M−$1.4M($5M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio110:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares in fiscal 2025, 3.2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each column names the period it is read over; the group median at the foot is the line to read each figure against.

CompanyRevenuelatest FY, USDGross marginmedian over the recordOp. marginmedian over the recordROICmedian over the recordOwner earn. marginmedian over the record
TREXTrex Company, Inc.$1.2B41%25.1%37%18%
ROCKGibraltar Industries Inc.$1.1B25%9.6%12%11%
CSWCSW Industrials Inc.$1.1B45%16.3%12%14%
TGLSTecnoglass Inc.$984M39%20.5%20%12%
JBIJanus International Group Inc.$884M38%16.2%13%13%
PRLBProto Labs Inc.$533M48%11.0%7%15%
CSTECaesarstone Ltd.$397M27%4.4%4%5%
ASPNAspen Aerogels Inc.$271M17%-21.1%-22%-11%
Group median38%13.6%12%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Aspen Aerogels Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.65% 10-year Treasury (Aug 19, 2026) + 4.35 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.65%, as of Aug 19, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $34M on 83M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-08-04; net cash $71M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Aspen Aerogels Inc. (ASPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASPN, data as of 2026-08-17.

Manual order: ← ASPI its page in the Manual ASPS →

Industry order: ← APOG the Building Products chapter CARR →